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**German Strategic Culture and Institutional Choice:
Transatlanticism and/or Europeanism?**

Björn Conrad/Mario Stumm

With a preface by Sebastian Harnisch

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Universität Trier

University of Trier
Dept. Of Political Science
Universitätsring 15
54286 Trier
Telefon: 0651/201-2129
Telefax: 0651/201-3821
<http://www.politik.uni-trier.de>
eM@il: harnisch@uni-trier.de

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ABBREVEATIONS

AWACS	-	Airborne Warning and Control System
CJTF	-	Combined Joint Task Force
CFSP	-	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DCI	-	Defense Capability Initiative
EAPC	-	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Counsel
ERRF	-	European Rapid Response Force
ESDI	-	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	-	European Security and Defense Policy
ESVP	-	Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik => CFSP
EUPM	-	European Union Police Mission
EURATOM	-	European Atomic Energy Community
FYROM	-	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
MAP	-	Membership Action Plan
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NACC	-	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NSDAP	-	National-Socialist German Workers Party
PfP	-	Partnership for Peace Program
QMV	-	Qualified Majority Voting
SACEUR	-	Supreme Allied Command Europe
WEU	-	Western European Union

PREFACE

This working paper on German Strategic Culture and institutional choices brings together three distinct strands in recent literature on German security policy and International Relations theory analysis: first, the question of the persistence of change in recent German security policy, most notably the Iraq case; second, the question of whether this change can be understood as a “Europeanization” of German security policy, thus ending a long period of evenhandedness between Washington and Brussels/Paris; third, the question of how to conceptualize change of those core cultural concepts which have informed the emerging constructivist scholarship in both IR theory building and security studies.

The studies by Mario Stumm of Germany’s Strategic Culture and institutional choices (1949-1999) and Björn Conrad (1999-2004) address these questions by reflecting upon Germany’s choice for transatlantic and European security cooperation. More specifically they ask which functions NATO and European security cooperation performed during and after the Cold War. Their studies suggest that Germany’s Strategic Culture – understood through the institutional choices it triggered – has undergone substantial change over the past 60 years. While some of the results touch familiar themes – such as the fundamental change from the expansionistic and militaristic culture of the Nazi regime to the rejection of military force as an instrument of foreign policy after 1945, other findings are new and thought provoking.

In his comparison of institutional choices before and after 1989 Mario Stumm shows not only how existing security functions lost their priority for both Germany and its partners, e.g. collective defense for Germany and collective security against a potentially threatening Germany. He also provides ample evidence as to how old security functions such as the reintegration of Germany into the international community has been transformed into the transfer of stability and democracy to Eastern Europe. Stumm’s account also has two other important findings. First, he delineates the pathway through which Germany reprioritized the traditional foundational elements – rejection of the use of force, reliable partnership and reflexive multilateralism. Secondly, he introduces external expectations concerning Germany’s participation in foreign deployments after the Gulf War (1990/1991) as the main driving force behind this shift between foundational elements. In nuce, Germany’s political elite prioritized multilateralism because this enabled them to blend partnership with Germany’s traditional skepticism about the use of force. In sum, this study holds that changes in the structural make-up of the foundational elements of a strategic culture can bring about substantial changes in the policy

standpoints and therefore the security policy of a nation. Thus, while the core elements remain (more or less) intact, structural repositioning vis-à-vis each other (may) divert policy outcomes.

Björn Conrad's analysis of Germany's institutional choice since 1999 provides a second, to some degree, deeper cut of recent changes in Germany's Strategic Culture. Conrad starts with an elegant argument on how to combine the analytical framework of strategic culture with other constructivist approaches, most notably Boekle et al. (2001) study on societal and transnational socialization. His theoretical findings are especially valuable since they address crucial questions on the likely course of change within a given strategic culture. Conrad holds that the specific make-up of Germany's strategic culture made transnational socialization more likely than societal, because several traditional foundational elements contained an explicit reference to either external partners or institutions and when these foundational elements were conflicted with each other, multilateralism gained priority. As a consequence, the reprioritization towards multilateralism ensured that transnational expectations still play a major role in shaping German security policy behavior. Now, when it comes to Germany's institutional choice, Conrad argues, that Germany traditionally tried to balance transatlantic and European security cooperation. However, this changed (temporarily) when the Red-Green coalition faced US expectations during the Iraq crisis that diverged strongly from its traditional strategic culture. Conrad however is cautious when projecting this "turn towards Europe" for the future. While he argues that a "Europeanization of Germany's Strategic Culture is clearly detectable, because the evolving European strategic culture seems much more compatible with the existing German one, it is plausible to infer that Germany's institutional choice will continue to contain a strong transatlantic component, because it is already evident that Europe will have to rely on NATO, i.e. US capabilities, in the foreseeable future. In sum, Conrad provides a thoughtful theoretical argument when supplementing the existing Strategic Culture literature with mechanisms and pathways for change. In addition, he outlines a plausible projection for the future course of German security policy.

This working paper consists of two studies that were originally prepared for a trilateral workshop held at the European research Institute at the University of Birmingham in December 2003. The workshop brought together 40 graduate students from Kardinal Wysinski University and Warsaw University, the University of Birmingham and Trier University to compare the security Policies of Poland, the United Kingdom and Germany in NATO. The workshop was made possible by the generous support of the Polish Embassy in London, the Jean Monnet Program and the Institute for German Studies (University of Birmingham) and the Public

Diplomacy Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels. I would like to thank again our supporting institutions and my colleagues, Kerry Longhurst and Tomasz Zyro as well as the participants of the workshop.

Sebastian Harnisch

PART A: INTER(B)LOCKING INSTITUTIONS: NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE EARLY YEARS

BY MARIO STUMM

1. INTRODUCTION¹

When Germany reunited in 1990 there were question marks on the future trajectory of its foreign policy. Some scholars predicted a ‘normalisation’ because a fully sovereign Germany would pursue a foreign policy corresponding to its enhanced size and power. As a consequence, the federal republic would leave multilateral frameworks if it did not gain from them relative to other powers. Another group of scholars contradicted that scenario. They foresaw continuity in German foreign policy despite dramatic changes in national capabilities and the international environment. In the end, the latter group came closer to the truth. Germany continued its traditional embedment in NATO, the European security cooperation and other multilateral frameworks. Furthermore, over the 1990s the German defence budget was cut by one half, thus decreasing not increasing Germany’s military capabilities. Scholars explained this behaviour through Germany’s traditional political culture that had been established after the Second World War. The cultural impact upon behaviour in foreign policy and security policy was described by the concept of ‘Strategic Culture’. The concepts strength lay with the description of the continuity of German security policy after the Cold War. However, whether it could also account for policy changes in the post-Cold War era was an open question. Changes in the security policy trajectory mainly occurred in out-of-area missions of the

¹ I am very grateful for remarks from Sebastian Harnisch, Hanns W. Maull, Marco Overhaus, Siegfried Schieder und Martin Wagener which have really helped to improve this paper.

Bundeswehr that reached a first climax during the Kosovo War when German forces participated in NATO air strikes on former Yugoslavia without a proper mandate by the United Nations.

As a consequence this analysis will consider changes of Germany's security policy, employing the analytical framework of Strategic Culture. It compares German security policy behaviour in the 1990s to the time during the Cold War. Specifically, this study will try to enhance the concept of Strategic Culture by linking changes in the policy trajectory to the web of security functions that NATO and the European security cooperation fulfilled for Germany. Hence, we ask: *Which functions did Germany's traditional Strategic Culture assign to NATO and the European security cooperation during the Cold War? Is there a discernible change in Germany's institutional choice after 1990 (until 1999) and how does this relate to Germany's Strategic Culture?*

We argue that by looking at the security function assigned to NATO and the European security cooperation two different sets of (compatible) functions can be identified for these two institutional contexts during and after the Cold War. While changing their sets of functions the two security institutions reflect an adaptation of Germany's Strategic Culture to a new environment. Thus, while Germany kept its scepticism on the use of force in the 1990s, it clearly started to integrate military instruments in its foreign and security policy strategy.

Moreover, we also maintain that changes of Germany's Strategic Culture are predominantly caused by changes in the international environment as it places new external demands on the Federal Republic. Hence, the paper identifies the transformation of the international community after the end of the Cold War as a cause for a change in Germany's Strategic Culture.

The analysis proceeds as follows: First, this study tries to conceptualise Strategic Culture in chapter two. Then, in chapter three, the methodology for the empirical part will be outlined. In chapter four we will deal with Germany's Strategic Culture during the Cold War and link this to functions of NATO and the European security cooperation. This analysis will then serve as a yardstick for comparison with the sets of functions after the Cold War in chapter five. If the set of functions after the Cold War contains new functions, misses functions from the time during the Cold War or simply has got a new order of priority, then we can identify a change in institutional choice between NATO and the European security cooperation. Finally, in the second part of chapter five, we will discuss, whether and how the identified change in institutional choice is related to a change of Germany's Strategic Culture after the Cold War.

2. THE NOTION OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

2.1 STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A PART OF CULTURE THEORY

Chapter 2 elucidates the notion of Strategic Culture more precisely. Strategic Culture is elaborated as an instrument for our later analysis of institutional choice between NATO and the European security cooperation. Furthermore, the concept of Strategic Culture will be put into the context of International Relations theory.

Before defining Strategic Culture the concept is contextualized within the broader concept of political culture. A starting point will be Almond and Verba's notion of political culture as a subset of culture that shapes not only the attitudes of individuals towards life, but towards their political system (Almond/Verba 1963: 11-14). Almond and Verba identified different political codes, rules, recipes, standard operating procedures, and routines in several countries that shape and regulate an individual's or collective's orientation towards its political environment. Elkins and Simeon assumed that political culture is a 'mind-set' that limits the attention of an individual on the full scale of available decision-options that are logically possible. Individuals of a collective will take a certain course of action for granted and never consider that there can be other options (Elkins/Simeon 1979: 127-128).

In sum, culture or political culture consists of shared assumptions and decision rules held by a collective. These cultural patterns are distributed in a society through a socialization process of the individual that goes back to anthropological origins (e.g. language, religion, customs) or shared experiences from history (Lantis 2002: 91). This process places a 'mind-set' upon each individual. It will act as a guide within society as it will help the individual to behave as its environment expects it to. Subsequently, the individuals 'mind-set' will not be identical but at least similar to the 'mind-sets' held by others. Behaviour is affected but not determined by the 'mind-sets' or cultural patterns of a society (Johnston 1995b: 45). However, the decision-options for behaviour are limited by the cultural patterns to a quantity less than all available decision-options. This fact allows prediction for future action to a certain degree.

This notion of political culture will help to define Strategic Culture: Whereas political culture affects political behaviour as such, Strategic Culture works in the realm of security policy. It helps to identify a frame of decision-options held by a country's decision-makers that is limited to a quantity less than all logically available decision-options. Once Strategic Culture is identified it allows inferences from the identified frame of decision-options and predictions of

future state behaviour. Thus, Strategic Culture helps to understand why states act in similar situations differently.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

Based on the short introduction of political culture as it relates to Strategic Culture, this section further elaborates the concept of Strategic Culture. In 1995, after two decades of reflection on the notion of Strategic Culture, Alastair Ian Johnston developed a strongly positivistic concept of Strategic Culture when analysing Chinese foreign policy behaviour. Thus, his intention was to explain rather than to understand China's security policy (Johnston 1995a). Johnston identified objects and methods of analysis and designed a clear methodology to relate Strategic Culture to behaviour. This was a great step forward as Johnston's concept developed a clear formulated concept of Strategic Culture that is easy to operationalize. In 2000 Kerry Anne Longhurst formulated another useful concept to trace Strategic Culture. However, she stressed the intention to understand rather than to explain German security policy. Her composition of Strategic Culture also allows to assign empirical data to a model containing several levels. Moreover, she includes the possibility to trace change in Strategic Culture, a new aspect in Strategic Culture research (Longhurst 2000: 58-63).

Hence, the conceptualisation of Strategic Culture in this work will follow closely the research design of Longhurst. First, policy change is related to the composition of the Strategic Culture. Secondly, the role of the international system as a context that shapes Strategic Culture will be elucidated. Finally, I will describe the causal pathway by which we can trace change in Strategic Culture.

Strategic Culture is composed of two levels, which connect the 'mind-set' of shared assumptions or *norms* held by collectives with possible and appropriate decision-options for *behaviour*. The mind-set's structure can be characterized as follows: On the first level there are the *foundational elements*. They consist of norms that are basic beliefs about security policy, which have their roots in the formative phase of the Strategic Culture (Longhurst 2000: 58). These foundational norms inform the process through which abstract goals in security matters are defined.

The foundational elements are connected to *security policy standpoints* on the second level. They represent the widely accepted readings and interpretations of the norms on level one by the political elite of a collective. The security policy standpoints in turn inform the process of defining the strategies and instruments by which security policy goals should be achieved. Standpoints thus select "culturally appropriate options" out the quantity of all available deci-

sion-options. Moreover, the security policy standpoints provide information on how the political elite value certain foundational elements and how they put them into an order of priority.

The context, defined as the external expectations of other actors on behaviour, is also a factor that can shape of Strategic Culture. In a settled period, when the behaviour of a nation state is equivalent to the external expectations on behaviour, the influence of Strategic Culture on behaviour may not be visible because the decisions taken will seem to be related to the expectations of the context. Strategic Culture gets more obvious in an unsettled period when the decisions demanded by external actors differ from those emanating from the security policy standpoints of the given Strategic Culture. Then, the environment puts pressure on the decision-makers to adjust Strategic Culture to external expectations. Before adjustment and change occur, the given Strategic Culture will guide behaviour almost as an ideology (Longhurst 2000: 65) because political elites are not able to consider alternative decision-options beyond their current 'mind-set'. Accordingly, Strategic Culture is perceived as resistant to change and only after prolonged debates and close examination alternative decision-options will be pursued that in turn inform new experiences that change the make-up of a given Strategic Culture.

Now, how does change occur? We posit that it comes in two different modes: Fine tuning or fundamental change. The former emerges, when there is contradiction between external expectations on security policies and Strategic Culture, which can be reconciled through adaptation in the realm of security policy standpoints. These changes will have to match the persistent foundational elements. Subsequently, the core norms of Strategic Culture need to be re-interpreted by the elites. During the period of change there is great ambiguity about which standpoints will be adopted. Several diverging propositions of how external and internal realities can be reconciled with the foundational elements are competing in public debates (Longhurst 2000: 61). While fine-tuning leaves the core values of the Strategic Culture intact, it may change their order of priority depending on the value of the security policy standpoints assigned by the elites.

In turn, a fundamental change causes a collapse or redefinition of an existing Strategic Culture. An abrupt change of external realities strongly contradicts foundational elements of the Strategic Culture in the way that a re-interpretation of the core values would not be sufficient to reconcile contradictions. Hence, a new Strategic Culture will be formed that corresponds to the new external demands (Longhurst 2000: 62). Subsequently, the policy standpoints below

the foundational elements will be changed too. However, fundamental change occurs far less than fine-tuning.

2.3 STRATEGIC CULTURE AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

In the last part of this chapter I will contextualize the concept of Strategic Culture within the broader field of theories of International Relations. Intersubjectively shared assumptions about appropriate behaviour for a given identity are regarded as norms (Harnisch 2002: 24). The concept of Strategic Culture strongly emphasises the influence of norms upon behaviour. These norms are not exogenously given and equally valid for each state. Rather every state holds an individual set of norms that constitute its individual Strategic Culture. Thus the strategic cultural approach rejects rationalist theories such as neorealism and liberalism that assume interests to be fixed (Wendt 1992: 392). Moreover, in these theories other variables such as the structure of the international system explain behaviour.

As a consequence, Strategic Culture more closely relates to approaches that focus on analysing norms as important indicators for behaviour. The concept also allows for change in norms and the subsequent behaviour. Alexander Wendt's conceptualisation of constructivism seems to fit on that demand. According to Wendt, a key characteristic of constructivism is that actors act towards other actors depending on what meaning these other actors have for them (Wendt 1992: 396). Thus, an actor's behaviour depends upon the perception of another actor with regard to a common set of norms that regulate behaviour. However, norms do not only regulate behaviour by actors. They also "constitute" actors in the way that they tell them which behaviour is appropriate for a given identity (Harnisch 2002: 25). This aspect leads to a second key characteristic of constructivism: What an actor means to another actor is constituted by interaction (Wendt 1992: 403), i.e. actors are not automatically enemies or friends. Which role or identity actors take for each other depends upon interaction. If the interaction consists of friendly gestures the two actors may enter a cooperative relationship. If not, they most possibly will mistrust each other, which may lead to conflict. Reciprocal interaction between two actors will shape a stable concept of each other (Wendt 1992: 406). This process can be understood as co-constituting. Interaction shapes a set of norms of an actor, which guide interaction and so on. This conceptualization also allows for change of behaviour, because interaction is a dynamic process that communicates external demands to a nation. These demands press a nation to change behaviour in order to suit external expectations.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this study I will focus on two security webs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European security cooperation, which includes the European Communities but also several other institutions and initiatives. Not all of them will be discussed in the following section as some were regarded meaningless shortly after they were initiated like the European Defense Community (Howorth/Keeler 2003: 6).

The study identifies the functions which NATO and European security cooperation fulfilled for Germany. Not all functions will be considered in depth (e.g. disarmament), because of space constraints, but a representative set of functions will be considered to characterize the functional setting or division of labour between these two security webs. Once, some functions are identified in the period *during* the Cold War they will be taken as reference points for a comparison with the functions of the two security webs identified *after* the Cold War. This study holds that changes in Germany's Strategic Culture can be inferred from the (changing) functions the security institutions fulfilled for Germany, because Germany Strategic Culture and the security institutions co-constituted themselves through interaction. Hence through a comparison of the two sets of functions this essay tries to operationalize change of Strategic Culture. It claims that: *If one country has got two different sets of functions for security webs in two different periods of time and they both portray a different Strategic Culture then change of Strategic Culture can be identified.*

Before this study begins to trace particular functions it needs to define the notion of security functions with regard to security institutions, which will be the objects of analysis later on. Usually, a security institution comes into existence when a group of states shares the same norms as how to tackle a security problem. Thus, states of this group discover that they all want to reach the same goal and now need to address a cooperation problem (Haftendorn 1997: 16). As a consequence, a *general function* of an institution is to solve the cooperation problem by selecting and coordinating the measures taken to reach the common goal. The collective response will have greater effect than the sum of measures taken by a single nation state. A *specific function* of an institution is to actually reach a certain goal, the institution has been implicitly or explicitly set up for. As the objects of analysis are security institutions, this study focuses on specific functions that provide for territorial integrity, political self-determination and economical welfare of the member states of these institutions.

4. GERMAN STRATEGIC CULTURE DURING THE COLD WAR AND THE FUNCTIONS OF NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION

The following chapter will first examine Germany's Strategic Culture during the Cold War. Briefly, the foundational elements leading to the security policy standpoints will be identified. This cannot be done in full length as Germany's Strategic Culture is manifold². Rather it will focus on those aspects which, in the next step, lead to the different functions of security webs for Germany. In the following section the set of functions of NATO and the European security cooperation after the Cold War will be discussed. The chapter will close with an analysis of the new Strategic Culture derived from a new set of functions and it will compare this with the old Strategic Culture examined in this chapter.

4.1 GERMANY'S STRATEGIC CULTURE DURING THE COLD WAR

After the Second World War Germans found themselves traumatised by the fact that their former core beliefs about Germany's role in world politics were wrong because they had led to a devastating war that killed millions. As a consequence, the old German Strategic Culture promoted by the Nazi-regime was strongly rejected. Change needed to be fundamental and a new Strategic Culture was about to be formed.

Table 1: Foundational elements and security policy standpoints of Cold War-Strategic Culture of Germany

Foundational elements	Exhaustion of nationalism	Multilateral action preference	Deep scepticism of the use of force
Security policy standpoints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sphere of action limited on Europe</i> • <i>Westorientierung</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Prevent a renationalising of foreign policy</i> • <i>Stability</i> • <i>Be perceived as a reliable partner</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Strategy of deterrence</i> • <i>Military as an instrument of foreign policy excluded at all</i>

² Longhurst's examination of Germany's Strategic Culture is an encompassing work which can be recommended at this point. See also Duffield 1998.

Faced with a collective guilt due to the crimes caused by the Nazi-regime Germans were ashamed of their past. Subsequently they were unable to feel any pride in their nation because German traditions were closely related with the Third Reich (Duffield 1998: 61). This *exhaustion of nationalism* was one of the foundational elements that formed the basis for the new Strategic Culture in the post-war era. It shaped security policy standpoints one of which provided that Germany will have no great power ambitions anymore (Kirste 1998: 120). Rather Germany's geographical *sphere of action should be limited on Europe*. Also, there was no "Deutscher Sonderweg" or special German way considered anymore (Duffield 1998: 64). Instead Germany identified itself with the emerging European security cooperation and the Western value community which led to the *Westorientierung* of the young republic (Duffield 1998: 63).

A further foundational element was *the preference for multilateral action*. Never again Germany should be allowed to pursue unilateral power politics that would lead to isolation and conflict (Duffield 1998: 65). Therefore the German Basic Law in article 24 encourages membership in collective security arrangements. This constitutional constraint would guide Germany to act within an institutional framework and at the same time *prevent a renationalisation of German foreign policy* because it offers an alternative foreign policy strategy apart from simple power politics (Duffield 1998: 65). This institutionalisation would bring *stability* within the Transatlantic security community (Longhurst 2000: 120) as clear terms of interaction were established which reduced uncertainty to a threshold that made military conflict between Germany and other members of the security community unlikely. Another security policy standpoint was the desire of the Federal Republic *to be perceived as a reliable partner* again. Germany wanted to re-establish itself in the international community after its horrifying past behaviour (Kirste 1998: 122).

A *deep scepticism about the use of force* forms the last core belief of the German Strategic Culture. This sentiment is also expressed in Germany's Basic Law. In article 26 there is a general ban of any preparation for a war of aggression. Article 87a prescribes that the Bundeswehr is only for defensive purposes within Germany's territory and the territory of its alliance partners. These articles were introduced in the mid-1950 parallel to the decision to rearm Germany by establishing the Bundeswehr. They were meant to limit and clearly specify the tasks of the new German army. These constitutional barriers to use military force were

necessary, because there were strong antimilitaristic sentiments in Germany's population³ and political elite⁴. Thus, a culture of reticence (*Kultur der Zurückhaltung*) emerged that shaped West German security policy during the Cold War. The *military as an instrument of German foreign policy was excluded at all*. Rather non-military instruments such as compromise and negotiation were preferred and viewed as more effective (Duffield 1998: 64). Furthermore Germany's geographic position at the border of the iron curtain forced it to adopt a *strategy of deterrence* (Longhurst 2000: 120). This strategy aimed at preventing military conflict between the two separated parts of Germany and their respective military alliances. Any offensive war-fighting strategies were rejected.

4.2 FUNCTIONS OF NATO AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION FOR GERMANY

After having identified Germany's Strategic Culture we now turn to the question of *how* Germany's post World War II Strategic Culture shaped the institutional choices between NATO and European security cooperation. In particular it will be asked what Germany was able to *give* to and what it expected to *receive* from an interaction with its partners in NATO and the European security cooperation.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Chancellor Adenauer saw the danger of a similar fate for the two separated parts of Germany. The young democracy in West Germany could be threatened by communism as many of the East European states turned towards the Soviet Union and established socialist governments. Germany was at the front line of the upcoming Cold War (Longhurst 2000: 81). The Western part sought protection from the communist threat and thus Chancellor Adenauer promoted the idea of West Germany to join NATO. Founded in 1949 as a collective defence community NATO's founding treaty offered in Article 5 mutual assistance between member states in case of an attack on one member's territory⁵. Hence, *collective defence* was a vital expectation of the Federal Republic vis-à-vis its NATO partners. It was regarded as a security guarantee against the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact countries. In return Chancellor Adenauer was willing to press for German rearmament in order to contribute German troops to NATO defence posture. This caused strong domestic resistance by the social democrats and in the German population (Longhurst 2000: 80). Rearmament raised strong antimilitaristic sentiments, which needed to be addressed by the

3 For some Germans peace was an absolute value that stood above the defence of justice and international law. See Duffield 1998: 63.

4 The Social democrats wanted to prevent rearmament as it was seen as a step backwards on the way to national reunification of East and West Germany. See Longhurst 2000: 84.

5 See NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>], 12.11.2003.

government. As a consequence, rearmament was linked to constitutional constraints and strong control of the Bundeswehr by civilian institutions. Also, the Bundeswehr was integrated in and subordinated to multilateral structures to *limit the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy*. In 1955, after Germany had met the requirements of NATO, it became a member of the alliance. Then, multinational forces were stationed on West German territory to defend the new NATO partner against an attack from the Warsaw Pact. For the Federal Republic this guaranteed that in the case of an attack it would not have to deal with the enemy on its own. Also, the USA as a partner within the NATO was of vital importance to Germany. Both strong US conventional forces on Germany's soil and their nuclear strike capabilities were meant to serve as a *deterrence* for any attack of the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact (Rudzio 2000: 16-17).

Membership within NATO also fulfilled another important function. With NATO membership Chancellor Adenauer hoped to *re-establish Germany in the international community*. This function was shaped by the *desire to be perceived as a reliable partner* (Kirste 1998: 122). NATO was a good vehicle for West Germany to prove that it was willing to take responsibility as a member of the international community. At the same time the Federal Republic expected from NATO membership to regain sovereignty as it would be recognised as an equal alliance member. In addition, new spheres of political action opened up as Germany's opinion had to be considered within the multilateral framework that only allowed unanimous decisions (Kirste 1998: 145).

Since German traditions were instrumentalised by the NSDAP during the Third Reich the young German democracy rejected them and struggled to develop a new and democratic national identity. Democratic values represented an alternative identity but they were not well established in the society (Almond/Verba 1963: 428-429) as the communist threat arose from the East. The German government was willing to identify itself with the Western community of values leading to *Westorientierung*. The resulting limitation of interaction with the East, especially the "other Germany" lowered the chance of a quick reunification of the two separated parts of Germany as the domestic opposition, the social democrats, criticised (Duffield 1998: 63). In return Germany expected from the Western community of values support for *anchoring the democratic values* in German society. This necessity has been institutionalised in NATO⁶ and was subsequently a further function of the organisation for Germany.

One vital function of NATO for the European states and Germany in particular was *transat-*

6 See NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>], 12.11.2003.

lantic cooperation. NATO kept the United States engaged in Europe. At the same time European NATO allies including Germany were able to exert influence on the superpower USA (Theiler 1997: 105). In the German case, this influence was directed only towards policies regarding Europe as Germany *did not want to extend its sphere of influence beyond Europe*. Therefore, Germany was willing to cooperate and offered resources to support the US during the Cold War. In addition to bolstering the credibility of nuclear *deterrence* vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact transatlantic cooperation had more to offer for Germany. NATO very early on institutionalised close German-American relations. Good cooperation in the realm of security policy gave hope for cooperation in other realms such as economics (Theiler 1997: 105) which was vital for the emerging German export nation. Already, Article 2 of the NATO-treaty of 1949 envisioned mechanisms for deeper cooperation in other policy areas⁷ that opened up ways to prosperity and therefore domestic *stability* for post-war Germany.

The young Federal Republic also had a strong interest in promoting *stability* in Europe to prevent war in Europe. Therefore it was also willing to cooperate with NATO to establish mechanisms of interaction that would reduce uncertainty about future German behaviour. Germany integrated in and subordinated its forces to the NATO structure. In return, the Federal Republic expected NATO to reduce mistrust of other European allies towards Germany. With the United States in NATO Germany hoped that balance-of-power thinking would be kept at bay to *prevent a renationalisation of foreign policy of the member states* within Western Europe. Thus, Germany wanted NATO to provide *collective security* and peace among its member states with the United States acting as a “European pacifier”.

Beside NATO, European security cooperation also offered security to Germany during the Cold War. In particular the WEU offered an attractive membership for Germany in the course of rearmament. Article 5 of the WEU treaty committed each member to *collective defence* in case of an attack on the territory of one member⁸. Legally this was an even stronger defence guarantee than the NATO treaty provided, but the following years showed that collective defence would be provided by NATO only. The WEU was not assigned any operative military structure. This was only the case within NATO as military capabilities of member states were subordinated to NATO’s Supreme Command. Thus, during the Post WW II period only NATO was able to carry out this function (Theiler 1997: 142).

However, European security cooperation provided other security functions that were impor-

7 See NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>], 12.11.2003.

8 See WEU, WEU Treaty, article 5, [<http://www.weu.in/treaty.htm>], 12.11.2003.

tant for Germany. Early initiatives in the 1950s such as the ECCS, EURATOM, and the EEC were not explicitly for security purposes (Fritzler/Unser 2001: 18-22). But they implied cooperation that built up confidence between former enemies and thus served the system of *collective security*. Germany was willing to transfer sovereignty to intergovernmental institution. In return it expected to *prevent a renationalising of foreign policy* in Europe. In addition, Germany's commitment to forego nuclear weapons in a protocol to the WEU treaty (1955) also reassured its European neighbours about its future intentions.

In 1970, after French President Charles de Gaulle had resigned, France was willing to deepen the European security cooperation within the EPC initiative (Miskimmon 2001: 85 and Schmalz 2001: 522). At first, this only included coordination of the member states' foreign policies, but in 1981 the EPC-report of the London meeting mentioned for the first time explicitly the political aspect of security as a subject for future cooperation (Fritzler/Unser 2001: 118). This initiative led (among others) to the joint German-French push to revitalize the WEU as a forum for security consultations in the late 1980s (Schmalz 2001: 526 and Theiler 1997: 142).

European security cooperation had two further functions in common with NATO. It also meant *Westorientierung* and, as the cooperation in the alliance, it ensured the *anchoring of Western values* in West German society (Schmalz 2001: 519). European security cooperation also facilitated the *reestablishment of Germany in the international community* (Schmalz 2001: 519). For Germany with its restricted sovereignty cooperation the EPC opened up new spheres of influence within the realm of civilian instruments (Schmalz 2001: 523). Here, Germany was willing to make concessions to the other member states within the EPC. In return it expected from the common coordination of the European foreign policies to improve its own political influence *without the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy*. Thus EPC was thus meant to ensure political influence on other members of the European security cooperation and to *increase the scope of action for Europe as an actor*. In NATO, Germany and the other European states were bound to the possibility of a veto by the US (Miskimmon 2001: 85). However, through EPC, the European states were able to pursue policies more or less independent from the United States. In the early 1980s when US President Ronald Reagan pushed for a nuclear rearmament in Europe as the Soviet Union's nuclear strike capabilities surpassed NATO's capabilities, Germany, through the EPC tried to continue a *détente* policy by urging the Soviet Union and the US to negotiate nuclear disarmament at the CSCE conference in Stockholm 1984 (Schmalz 2001: 527).

5. POST-COLD WAR FUNCTIONS FOR NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION: CHANGING STRATEGIC CULTURE?

With the end of the Cold War the international security environment changed fundamentally, especially for Germany. The East-West antagonism, which had been the greatest threat to West Germany's security, ended peacefully and Germany found itself surrounded by friendly states. For the first time in its history the Federal Republic did not face any direct threat to its territory. At the same time the reunification marked an end of Germany's limited sovereignty. The 2+4 treaty recognized Germany's full right to self-determination in its foreign policy⁹. Would Germany divert from its traditional security policy trajectory? Being the biggest country in Europe apart from the Soviet Union, would it withdraw from Europe's security institutions and renationalise its foreign policy? Would it even extend its military capabilities to project power abroad?

5.1 FUNCTIONS OF NATO AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION FOR GERMANY

This chapter examines first how Germany's traditional Strategic Culture guided German foreign policy in the 1990s by looking at the functions which security institutions fulfilled for Germany after the Cold War. Secondly, it describes how the new security environment posed new challenges for NATO and European security cooperation. As a consequence, new security functions emerged, others were changed and some became irrelevant for those institutions. In comparison to the Cold War period, Europe's web of security functions changed remarkably while Germany's partners expected it to adapt its foreign policy to the new environment. The Federal Republic's commitment to face new challenges within NATO and European security cooperation is characterized by a finely tuned change of Germany's Strategic Culture that will be discussed below.

This chapter will start in 1990 and end with Germany's engagement in the Kosovo war in 1999, since developments after the NATO Washington summit meeting (1999) will be dealt with in second part of this working paper.

Shortly after the events of November, 9th 1989 Chancellor Helmut Kohl introduced his 10-Points-Plan in the Bundestag as a road map to German reunification (Kohl 1990). In his

9 Cf. 2+4 Treaty (Die Verhandlungen über die äußeren Aspekte der deutschen Einheit), Article 6 and 7, [<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/publikationen/zweiplusvier.pdf>], 12.11.2003.

speech he tried to assure neighbouring countries that a reunited Germany would continue to be firmly embedded in both NATO and the European Community. In February, defence minister Gerhard Stoltenberg reaffirmed Germany's continued membership in NATO even after unification (Zur Bonsen 1990). He rejected the idea of Germany as a neutral country and argued for a restructured alliance, because the security environment had changed fundamentally. The government's rhetorical commitment was clearly meant to address the visible concerns of its partners about a possible renationalization of its foreign policy.. Hence, the Kohl government felt that it needed to *confirm its partnership* in both security institutions. Also, by confirming its partnership to its European partners Germany wanted to keep up the transatlantic system of collective security which had been a major function of both NATO and the European security cooperation during the Cold War.

Proving its trustworthiness vis-à-vis its partners turned out to be a difficult task because the Federal Republic was not able to meet their expectations. Military participation in the Gulf War in 1991 was opposed by the German government which argued that Germany's Basic Law "does not allow any deployment of the Bundeswehr beyond NATO territory" (Genscher 1990, translated by author). Nevertheless, Bonn supported Desert Storm financially with 18 billion Deutschmarks. Questions remained, however, whether Germany would be able to face future challenges to NATO alliance that went beyond collective defence. The German government tried to address these remaining doubts by initiating a domestic debate on the revision of the Basic Law. The revision was to allow "any military action within the frame of the United Nations to keep and re-establish peace as well as to preserve international law" (Kohl 1991: 514, translated by author).

On the international level Germany agreed at the NATO Rome summit in November 1991 to NATO's new strategic concept including a commitment to develop more crisis reaction capacities and multinational corps (Baumann 2001: 152). Consequently the German government pushed the domestic debate on constitutional change further and strongly supported deeper integration of NATO's military structures by establishing multinational units¹⁰. It is noteworthy that Germany's forces remained integrated in NATO structures and that forces in the former GDR were assigned to NATO in 1995 as it had been agreed upon in the 2+4 treaty¹¹.

When it came to foreign deployments of its armed forces Germany also proved as ambivalent

10 The US-German corps in 1993, the German-Dutch corps in 1994, the Eurocorps initiated together with France, and the multinational corps North East, comprising Danish, Polish and German forces which were operational in 1999, See Baumann 2001: 154-155.

11 See 2+4-Treaty, art. 5 para. 3.

in European Security Cooperation as it did in NATO. In 1990/91, when the Yugoslavian civil war began the Kohl government pressed unilaterally for a recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states without being prepared to defend their sovereignty. Subsequently, the EPC agreed to recognize the two countries in January 1992, but the Kohl government could not wait that long because of heavy domestic pressure and thus it recognized the two new states on the 23rd of December 1991 (Schmalz 2001: 538). Germany had pushed for a course that immediately met a dead end. On the one hand it had managed to internationalise the Civil War in Yugoslavia so that the United Nations now became an important actor in crisis management thereby reflecting Germany's preference for multilateral institutional contexts. On the other hand, however, the Federal Republic was not able to go further and protect Croatia and Slovenia with military means due to its constitutional limits (Stoltenberg 1991).

As a consequence, Germany together with France initiated deeper integration of the European Community by developing a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The WEU should be integrated in the new European Union as an instrument for European defence policy as Chancellor Kohl stated in December 1991 (Kohl 1992). Germany wanted to reaffirm its partnership within the European Security Cooperation by pushing for deeper integration despite its earlier unilateral action when recognising Croatia and Slovenia. Germany's position got clearer when it decided in 1992 to actually contribute German forces to the NATO and WEU missions in the Adria to monitor the weapons embargo against Yugoslavia. While there was strong domestic resistance by the opposition, the government proved its willingness to deploy armed forces abroad thereby contributing to deeper European and transatlantic security cooperation.

Military deployment as a vehicle to reaffirm its partnership within NATO and European security cooperation re-emerged in 1998, when the Social democrats and the Greens came to power. There was concern among Germany's allies about the red-green coalition's security policy because the SPD and the Greens had strongly rejected any out-of-area deployment of the Bundeswehr as a "militarization of German foreign policy" (Voigt 1993). In the coalition agreement both parties made clear that they wanted to continue the institutional choice of the Kohl government. Hence they supported the development of ESDI within NATO and the integration of WEU in the EU (Koalitionsvereinbarung SPD/Grüne 1998: 56-57).

The Kosovo War then was the first test for the red-green coalition to match its commitment and rhetoric. In March 1999, after negotiations with the government in Belgrade had failed, NATO began air strikes on former Yugoslavia to prevent further war crimes in Kosovo. For

the first time since the Second World War Germany took part in offensive military action against a sovereign country. Furthermore, this was not immediately legitimised by a clear UNSC mandate. Since the WEU was not able to carry out military operations in Kosovo, the EU focussed on a non-military contribution to solve the conflict.

In June 1999, Germany held the EU presidency and the WEU at the same time. Subsequently, the new German government played a major role in solving the Kosovo crisis. In particular, he presented the so-called Fischer-Plan for a solution of the conflict and Germany negotiated for the European Union with Russia to get involved in the Yugoslavian peace process after it had rejected to support a UN mandate for the air strikes of NATO (Schmalz 2001: 559-560). Germany's engagement during the Kosovo War helped to strengthen NATO and European Security Cooperation.

NATO's function as a facilitator of *transatlantic cooperation* remained significant for Germany, but received a different emphasis after the Cold War. The alliance had been relevant as a forum to discuss not only security but also to ensure Germany's political and economic reintegration into the Western world. While this function had already faded over time before 1989, it was taken over by other institutions such as the WTO and G-7, which now serve as preferred vehicles for economic and political cooperation on a global scale. Notwithstanding, for Germany NATO remained the main forum to negotiate with the United States about security issues as Defence minister Volker Rühle stressed in 1994: "Only the alliance can guarantee security [...] NATO is the only functional mechanism that links North America and Europe in one institution." (Rühle 1994a, translated by author) US NATO membership did not only guarantee the political weight of the alliance because of superior US military capabilities, it also preserved Germany's influence on US security policy making (Theiler 1997: 106). The United States was bound to discuss policies regarding Europe with its European partners and to respond to objections raised by its allies. In return, Germany remained willing to offer resources and allow its American partners to deploy US forces on German soil.

European Security Cooperation fulfilled a complementary function to the transatlantic cooperation within NATO. While NATO ensured influence on the US administration, European Security Cooperation was viewed in Germany as a means to deepen cooperation with and to exert influence on European partners (Weißbuch 1994: 328). This held especially true for France which had left NATO military structures in the 1960s. Germany tried to strengthen its influence with several bilateral initiatives to push forward European Security Cooperation. In 1991 Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand initiated a plan to integrate the WEU into the

EU “to work as a channel between the Political Union and NATO.”¹² To translate this intention into action the multinational Eurocorps, including French forces, was established in 1992 as an operative instrument for WEU missions. At the same time the Eurocorps was assigned to NATO military structures and subordinated to the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR). Thus, France got tied closer to NATO as some of its forces were integrated in NATO structure (Rühe 1992). Hence, Germany gained more influence on French security policy through cooperation in the WEU. Beside the build-up of an operative structure that could be used by the EU independently from NATO Germany favoured deeper integration of the CFSP by implementing more flexible decision structures. In 1996 when the European Council debated a revision of the Maastricht treaty Germany’s Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel argued for the introduction of qualitative majority voting in CFSP matters where decisions had to be made unanimously. Also, the Kohl government supported the insertion of the Petersberg tasks of the WEU in the *acquis communautaire* of the EU. The European Council should be able to consign the WEU with military tasks (Kinkel 1996).

Not everything could be realized in the Amsterdam treaty 1997. Instead of QMV constructive abstention was introduced. Now, coalitions of the willing EU member states for a future EU-led military mission became possible (Schmalz 2001: 555). Successfully, Germany had managed to deepen integration and mobilize more of Europe’s political potential. It had been the precondition for Germany to gain more *influence upon other members of the European security cooperation* and to *increase the scope of action of Europe as a foreign and security policy actor*. In return, Germany was willing to contribute resources for an operative structure of the WEU and to transfer more competences to the EU, including the chance to be overruled (Schmalz 2001: 554).

At this point, both institutions NATO and the WEU within the European security cooperation still fulfilled their core function *collective defense*, although Germany as well as the rest of Europe did not face the danger of an attack on its territory by another country anymore. In 1991, NATO members confirmed their new strategic concept that held that “the maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remains central to the alliance’s objectives.”¹³ However, in the following years Germany decided to maintain this preparedness on a much lower level than it did during the Cold War. After 1990 the total number of German soldiers was cut by 50 percent. Also the Defence

12 Cf. Die sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Politischen Union, in: Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, (1991) No. 3.

13 See NATO, NATO Strategic Concept 1991, Article 30, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>], 12.11.2003.

budgets were reduced from 3.2 percent of GNP before 1990 to 1.9 percent in 1997 (Voigt 1997: 34). At the same time, Germany still considered national defence as a “core function” of the Bundeswehr and therefore it maintained the conscription as a very important feature of the German armed forces because in “an emergency the Bundeswehr can double its size – and this is what the alliance partner rely on” (Kinkel 1997, translated by author). In addition, Germany was still willing to contribute to the system of collective defence. In return it relied on its partners in case of an emergency. Meanwhile, the WEU still was not able to fulfill the function of collective defence for Germany because an operative structure for that task was still missing. Hence, the WEU declared in its Petersberg declaration in 1992 that “the Atlantic alliance is an indispensable foundation of Europe’s security.” (WEU 1992, translated by author)

While reducing its defence budget the Federal Republic faced a new challenge that required even more and different resources than Germany was willing to muster: *crisis management*. In the face of the Yugoslavian conflicts the German government thus supported the new NATO strategic concept that called for the build-up of rapid reaction forces in addition to collective defence capabilities¹⁴. Moreover, Germany hosted a WEU conference that agreed to the Petersberg-Declaration that was meant to strengthen the WEU’s position by assigning the new function of crisis management to it (WEU 1992: Part I, article 2). The declaration also contains the intention to transfer crisis management partly from NATO to the WEU (WEU 1992: Part I, article 14). Furthermore WEU members decided to build up its own operative structure that would include multinational units such as the Eurocorps (WEU 1992: Part II, article 7).

During the 1990s, the Federal Republic was generally willing to contribute to crisis management in both, transatlantic and European institutions. However, this was a long and difficult process. Domestically it was strongly opposed by the Social Democrats and the Greens while the Kohl government called in its “Konzeptionelle Richtlinien” (1994) for the transformation of the Bundeswehr to prepare for crisis management tasks. Crisis reaction forces should be built up alongside the Bundeswehr’s core function national defence¹⁵. At the same time, the Federal Constitutional Court judged that no constitutional change was needed for out-of-area deployments of the armed forces if these were mandated by a majority of the Bundestag (BVerfGE 90, 286). Also, the FCC held that an institution for collective defence was equal

14 See NATO, NATO Strategic Concept 1991, article 47, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>], 12.11.2003.

15 See Konzeptionelle Richtlinien, 12.7.1994, [<http://sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/10/24/3.php>], 12.11.2003.

with an institution of collective security, so that Germany was able to participate in NATO or WEU missions that were beyond collective defence.

But Germany was merely able to fulfil this function. It's defence budget had been cut by nearly one half after the end of the Cold War. A large Bundeswehr with a high degree of readiness to defend Germany against an attack from the Soviet Union was not needed anymore. Thus in 1994 the problems of reforming the Bundeswehr for future tasks in crisis management became obvious. As Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann, the highest ranking officer of the Bundeswehr, admitted: "some parts of the German forces [...] are not able to reach their operability anymore" and that there is no money left for future investments due to a yearly shrinking defence budget (Naumann 1994, translated by author). Shortly after that statement Defence Minister Volker Rühle lamented that he does not get "any solid commitments about the defence budgets for the next years to make any concrete plans. [...] The Bundeswehr is underfinanced and its actual structure cannot be maintained." (Rühle 1994b, translated by author) Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated in 1997, that the money being saved in the defence budget is "urgently needed to modernise society", i.e. for the so called 'peace dividend' (Kinkel 1997, translated by author). Until 1999 the German defence budget did not increase and thus the patience of Germany's partners who expected improved contributions to crisis management decreased.

During the Cold War Germany had grown into the community of the Western states and Western values had become firmly embedded in Germany's society. Accordingly the relevance of NATO's and European security cooperation's function to distribute and anchor Western values in Germany faded. After the end of the Cold War Eastern European states needed support in their efforts to transform their political systems from socialism to democracy. NATO and the European security cooperation could perform the distribution of Western values as they did for Germany after the Second World War. And Germany as a bordering country to the former Warsaw Pact had a major interest in *transferring stability* to Eastern Europe. For Germany, Yugoslavia served as a constant reminder how fragile the new political systems were and how a civil war could impact upon Western European societies. In addition, Germany's export-oriented economy wanted access to new markets in the East, so the Eastern European states needed stability in order to gain prosperity.

In order to transfer stability NATO launched cooperation initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace in 1994 and invited Eastern European countries to take part in the NACC process¹⁶.

16 See NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO

Chancellor Kohl reasoned that the NATO members' offer "is encompassing: [They] want to contribute to the build-up of forces [in Eastern Europe] which are committed to democracy. [...] It is of special value that NATO ensures that every active member of this partnership involves in consultations if its territorial integrity, its political independence or security has been threatened." (Kohl 1994, translated by author) At the same time the WEU offered Eastern European countries an association status to get introduced in the European security cooperation¹⁷. Germany contributed to both initiatives as Defence minister Volker R  he emphasised on Germany's special responsibility to support the build-up of democracies in Eastern Europe (Harnisch 2000: 13). It was also R  he who initiated the enlargement debate in 1993 stressing NATO's potential to transfer stability to Eastern Europe (Hyde-Price 2000: 149). At that time the Partnership for Peace and the WEU association status constituted a compromise. On the one hand the Western European states met the desire of the Eastern Europeans to cooperate within the European security web of NATO and European security cooperation. On the other hand Russia's fears of being surrounded by NATO-members were taken into account. To reduce these concerns, NATO invited Russia to participate in decision-making of NACC. In 1998, beside its membership in the PfP, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established and the Russian Federation formally opened its Mission at NATO headquarters also appointing a Senior Military Representative as an integral part of its Mission, to facilitate military and defence-related cooperation¹⁸. In addition, the NATO-Ukraine charter, approved in 1997, served as a confidence building measure that should ensure stability¹⁹.

As a result of these efforts in 1999 the way seemed to be cleared for the first former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted to the alliance which was still committed to collective defence in the case of an attack on one member's territory²⁰. One year before NATO enlargement, the European Union had started accession-negotiations with former Warsaw Pact members to open up the possibility for their economies to benefit from the advantages of the European Union (Fritzler/Unser 2001: 37).

Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110a.htm>], 12.11.2003.

17 See WEU, Kirchberg-Declaration, 9.5.1994, [<http://www.weu.int/documents/940509en.pdf>], 12.11.2003.

18 See NATO-Handbook, The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, (2001), [<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030304.htm>], 12.11.2003.

19 See, NATO-Handbook, The Evolution of NATO-Ukraine, The Charter for a Distinctive Partnership, (2001), [<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030402.htm>], 12.11.2003.

20 See NATO-Handbook, The Process of NATO Enlargement, (2001), [<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0301.htm>], 12.11.2003.

Table 2: The new and old web of security functions fulfilled by NATO and the European Security Cooperation

NATO	European Security Cooperation
Functions of the security institutions during the Cold War	
Collective defence (+)	Collective defence (-)
Distribution of Western values among Germany	Distribution of Western values among Germany
Re-establishing in the international community	Re-establishing in the international community
Collective security	Collective security
Transatlantic cooperation	Political influence on other members of the European Security Cooperation / Increase the scope of action for Europe as an actor
Functions of the security institutions after the Cold War	
Collective defence (-) ²	Collective defence (-) ²
Confirmation of partnership (Re-establishing in the international community) / Collective security	Confirmation of partnership (Re-establishing in the international community) / Collective security
Transatlantic cooperation (-) ²	Influence upon other members of the European Security Cooperation / Increase the scope of action of Europe as an actor (+) ²
Crisis management (+, new)	Crisis management (-, new)
Transfer of stability to Eastern Europe (replaces: Distribution of Western values among Germany)	Transfer of stability to Eastern Europe (replaces: Distribution of Western values among Germany)

(+): function fulfilled by institution weighs heavier than similar function fulfilled by other security institution.

(-): function fulfilled by security institution weighs lighter than similar function fulfilled by other security institution.

(+)²: importance of function increased from the period during the Cold War to the period after the Cold War.

(-)²: importance of function decreased from the period during the Cold War to the period after the Cold War.

5.2 GERMANY'S STRATEGIC CULTURE AFTER THE COLD WAR

In this last section I will examine Germany's Strategic Culture as it is reflected in the functions that NATO and European Security Cooperation fulfilled for Germany after the end of the Cold War. Of course, this will involve a comparison with the Strategic Culture during the Cold War. First, for Germany transatlantic cooperation within NATO, the increase of the European scope of action and the gain of influence upon European states within European Security Cooperation remained important functions after the Cold War. While these slightly changed, modifications have not impacted upon the foundational elements of the Strategic Culture. Still, transatlantic cooperation brought *stability* for Germany and ensured *deterrence* through the US nuclear strike capacity. Although the Cold War was over the United States and Germany continued the military partnership within NATO. This also ensured Germany's influence on US security policy. Both the influence on Washington and on its European partners were preserved by Germany as she continued *a foreign policy that excluded military build up as an instrument to gain influence*.

Secondly, NATO fulfilled the function of collective defence that is still regarded relevant by Germany, but not as vital as it was during the Cold War. This function relates to *deterrence* as one of the key security policy standpoints of Germany's Strategic Culture. While this task moved to the background, the function did not change in Germany's Strategic Culture after the Cold War

Thirdly, there is a new function of NATO and the European Security Cooperation introduced after the Cold War: transfer of stability to Eastern European countries. It replaces the function of distributing and anchoring Western values in German society as Germany found its place in the Western community. While *Westorientierung* of German Strategic Culture is still relevant, there is also a tendency to enlarge the multilateral security framework towards the Eastern European countries. This, of course, relates to Germany's desire for *stability* and is also consistent *Germany's limited geographical security perimeter in Europe*.

Fourthly, it can be said that the reaffirmation of partnership is a new and one of the main functions fulfilled by NATO and European Security Cooperation. It replaces the old function of a reintegration in the international community. This supports the finding that after the Cold War Germany still favoured a *rejection of renationalising its foreign policy* in contrast to what realism might have expected. Rather Germany made clear its *desire to be perceived as a reliable partner* although it struggled to change its opposition to military force and subsequently irritated its partners in Europe and in NATO.

Lastly, crisis management is a new main function fulfilled by NATO, although attempts were made to partially transfer it to the European Security Cooperation. By now, it is also the most critical function. It is related to the function of reaffirmation of partnership as it also relates to the *desire to be perceived as a reliable partner*. In the 1990s Germany wanted to prove its partnership by contributing to crisis management. Also, participation in crisis management bore witness to Germany's *Westorientierung* and its need to defend Western values that had been established in Germany after the devastating experience of the Second World War. Accordingly, General Secretary of the CDU and later Defence minister Volker Rühle realized that "it lies in the consequence of the grown responsibility of the Federal Republic, that German forces help in peace-keeping missions and for the enforcement of international law even out of Europe." (Rühle 1991, translated by author) Furthermore, the new function crisis management could be linked to Germany's desire for *stability*. Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel indicated that participation in crisis management prevents instable situations in countries bordering the EU from turning into war. Subsequently the EU would have to deal with many refugees that affect "Europe's own stability in a bad way." (Kinkel 1997, translated by author)

Although this crisis management seemed to be at least compatible with Germany's Strategic Culture during the Cold War, the security policy standpoints on *rejecting the military as an instrument of foreign policy* and the *strategy of deterrence* needed to be revised as German forces were demanded to join crisis management missions. Still the foundational element of *deep scepticism about the use of force* remained relevant²¹. While it has been reinterpreted in the 1990s, the *military has become an instrument of foreign policy only as an ultima ratio*, after negotiations have failed. Also the strategy of *deterrence* to avoid a war on Germany's territory has been partly replaced as it is reflected in the reform of the Bundeswehr. The other foundational elements, *preference for multilateral action* and the *exhaustion of nationalism*, also remained in place. After the Cold War the preference for multilateral action became the foundational element with highest priority which superseded the deep scepticism on the use of force as the top element during the Cold War. In this phase Germany rather changed its security policy standpoint to *exclude the military as an instrument of foreign policy at all* than its standpoint to *be perceived as reliable partner*. This choice between pacifistic isolation and multilateral partnership indicates Germany's shift of priorities vis-à-vis the foundational elements of its tradition Strategic Culture.

21 Gerhard Schröder stressed after the participation of the Bundeswehr in air strike over former Yugoslavia the uniqueness and the difficulty of the decision. See Schröder, Gerhard, Zur aktuellen Lage im Kosovo nach dem Eingreifen der NATO und zu den Ergebnissen der Sondertagung des Europäischen Rates in Berlin, in: Bulletin, (1999) No. 13.

6. CONCLUSION

In sum, the analysis reveals that it is possible to trace changes in Germany's Strategic Culture in two different periods with regard to institutional choices between NATO and European Security Cooperation. The sets of functions of both institutions differed substantially across the two investigated periods. These modifications reflected changes both in the international and domestic environment that challenged Germany's traditional security institutions in the 1990s.

First, Germany's behaviour was guided by Strategic Culture as described in the cases of the Gulf War and the beginning of the Yugoslavian civil wars. Then, the German government realized that external expectations differed from domestic expectation thus requiring a re-adjustment of security policy standpoints. However, the necessary re-prioritisation of the foundational elements occurred only slowly so that shifting security policy standpoints could match foreign as well as domestic expectations. As the analysis of the debate on out-of-area deployments displayed, the adjustment took place only after the government had started a campaign to reinterpret the meaning of partnership. This included now a commitment to deploy German forces abroad and to prove Germany as a reliable partner. In contrast, Germany's traditional culture of reticence was modified to accommodate this change in priorities. At first only the CDU accepted crisis management as an additional task for the Bundeswehr. In 1994, after the verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court, the FDP shifted its position and finally the SPD and the Greens continued the course initiated by the Kohl government when they came into power in 1998.

As the foundational elements remained intact, if reprioritised, change has been limited to the fine-tuning security standpoints. In particular the security policy standpoints regarding the deep scepticism on the use of force have been revised. The external demands of Germany's partners in the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the European Security Cooperation triggered a debate in German society that slowly changed security policy standpoints. After the Cold War the Federal Republic started to deploy troops in out of area missions to contribute to the new function of *crisis management*: first within NATO and later within the ESDP. This indicated that Germany considerably softened its deep scepticism on the use of force in order to prioritise its multilateral action preference.

To conclude, Strategic Culture proved not only to be a concept that can describe continuity in a nation's security trajectory but also account for change within the context of a wider constructivist research effort.

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PART B: CONSISTENT CHANGE OR CHANGING CONSISTENCY – GERMAN STRATEGIC CULTURE SINCE 1999²²

BY BJÖRN CONRAD

1. INTRODUCTION

Strategic Culture, among other approaches based on the constructivist-culturalist paradigm, has grown to be a major challenge for the neorealist model of universal rationality in the recent past. With its appreciation of a nation's specific cultural and historical background, Strategic Culture approach proved in various studies to be a powerful tool to understand national security policy behavior by elucidating state decisions, where the neorealist theory did not succeed to give fully satisfying explanations. Against this background the Strategic Culture approach therefore fully justifies being subject of further exploration.

This study will be dedicated to a special aspect of Strategic Culture, namely tracing change within the Strategic Culture. Since the Strategic Culture of a nation by definition contains a strong resistance to change, this aspect did not play a substantial role in Strategic Culture research so far. While this study maintains a general resistance to change it nevertheless posits that the possibility and pathway of change have to be explored. Hence it will focus on the question: *“Has there been change in Germany's Strategic Culture and if so, what kind of broader generalizations about Strategic Culture and change can be derived from it?”*

In order to approach the answer to this question, this study will be divided into two parts. The function of the first part will be to set the theoretical framework for a change-based Strategic Culture analysis on the basis of two fairly recent Strategic Culture interpretations, the first by

²² I am also very thankful for the remarks by Hanns W. Maull, Marco Overhaus, Siegfried Schieder und Martin Wagener, which considerably improved this paper, and especially for the help and the intensive editorial work of Sebastian Harnisch.

Kerry Anne Longhurst²³, and the second by Thomas U. Berger²⁴. These two approaches, which do not suggest mechanisms of change by themselves, are modified in order to meet the goals of this study. Therefore, a link between the two concepts of Strategic Culture and the mechanisms of change introduced by the constructivist approach as interpreted by Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner²⁵ will be established. The resulting methodological framework will firstly identify the processes creating the Strategic Culture of a nation in order to clarify the origin of changes within this Strategic Culture. Secondly, it will point out the mechanisms, through which a change of a national Strategic Culture occurs.

The second part of the study will then put this framework of change within Strategic Culture to the test in applying it to a specific field of German security policy. As a consequence of the nation's unique historical setting and experiences in regard to the use of military force and the significance of the cultural and historical background for contemporary security policy making, German security policy represents a field of study, in which the cultural-historic based approaches develop considerable explanatory power.

Due to the limitations of this study, the second part, following a general description of the basic elements of German Strategic Culture and the major developments after the end of the Cold War, will focus only on one part of German security policy, which will be the translation of specified security functions into action. Since Germany primarily performs security functions through the means of international institutions, namely NATO and EU, the distribution of security functions between EU and NATO will be a crucial issue for this analysis. The timeframe for the examination will be the period between the Kosovo-crisis in 1999 and 2004 so as to complement the first part of this working paper by Mario Stumm.

Finally, the empirical data presented in the second section of this study, analyzed by means of the theoretical framework developed in the first part, will lead to a conclusion which provides an answer to the main question of this work as stated above.

23 Longhurst, Kerry Anne, *Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy?*, University of Birmingham 2000.

24 Berger, Thomas U., *Cultures of Pacifism – National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore/London: The John Hopkins University Press 1998.

25 Boekle, Henning; Rittberger, Volker; Wagner, Wolfgang, „Soziale Normen und normgerechte Außenpolitik“, In: *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, No.1, 2001: 71-103.

2. THE PREMISE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE CHANGE

This section will introduce the main features of the Strategic Culture approach and relate it to the wider framework of constructivist-culturalist concepts. Then the reasons for Strategic Culture change and the mechanisms, through which this change occurs, will be explored in order to develop a model of Strategic Culture change.

2.1 THEORETICAL PROLOGUE

Basic elements of the Strategic Culture approach

Since its first appearance in Jack Snyder's "Soviet Strategic Culture" in 1977, the term of Strategic Culture was used by a variety of researchers in differing contexts (Lantis 1999). This study will be founded on the concept suggested by Thomas U. Berger in 1998 and further developed by Kerry Anne Longhurst in 2000. These Strategic Culture concepts are based on the general assumption that current national security policy is significantly influenced by a cultural factor, deriving from historical experiences related to the use of military force. It is therefore part of the broader group of culturalist approaches, which can be understood as closely linked to the group of constructivist approaches. The historical experiences, through a process of socialization, or, as Thomas U. Berger puts it through "the nations struggle to draw lessons from the past" (Berger 1998:10) create specific beliefs, attitudes and behaviors, which accumulate into a set of collectively shared core values regarding security policy issues. This set of values, which can be seen as a subset of a more general political culture, is called Strategic Culture. This Strategic Culture influences the current strategic policy of a country by supplying fundamental goals and norms of security policy, shaping the assessment of the international security situation and determining the ability to mobilize national resources for military purposes.

Following the interpretation of Kerry Longhurst, the Strategic Culture itself consists of two sets of elements. The mentioned core values and beliefs are summed up under the term foundational elements; the security policy standpoints entitle the actual policy goals and practices resulting directly from the formative powers of the foundational elements (Longhurst 2000:58).

Introducing mechanisms of change to the concept of Strategic Culture

As will be discussed in detail in the next section, the concept of Strategic Culture itself does not extensively address the topic of change. For this reason it becomes necessary to identify theoretical concepts of change which lie outside the original concept, but are nevertheless compatible with it. The constructivist approaches to foreign policy analysis gains its attractiveness through its clear distinction from the neorealist school, establishing it as a considerable alternative. Instead of explaining foreign policy behavior on the basis of fixed interests carried by a rational actor, the constructivist approach bases its ability to understand state behavior on the supposition that foreign policy is determined by collectively shared expectation about appropriate behavior, i.e. social norms. The constructivist approach presented by Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner identifies three criteria to define a social norm. According to this, a social norm is characterized by its value-based nature, its direct orientation towards actual behavior and its widely shared, intersubjective acknowledgement by the respective collective, for example the population of a nation (Boekle et al. 2001: 76). The Strategic Culture of a nation consists of a set of values, the foundational elements, as well as their prioritization and finally their translation into security policy standpoints including the strategy and goals of national security policy. The foundational elements, representing the core of the Strategic Culture, clearly qualify as social norms according to the given criteria, which means, that the mechanisms of change regarding social norms can be applied to the foundational elements of Strategic Culture as well. Thus, they provide a theoretical background for the examination of change within the Strategic Culture.

Furthermore, according to this constructivist concept, a process of socialization can be detected, if this social norm develops constitutive power, i.e. it actually and considerably shapes the behavior of the collective. Again, the evolution of the foundational elements of a national Strategic Culture, which by definition significantly impact upon national security policy, can be understood as a process of socialization. This fact is pointed out very clearly by Thomas U. Berger, who sees the foundational elements of Strategic Culture as a product of “negotiated reality” (Berger 1998:13), which means, that it develops from a process of socialization urged by the desire of a society to make sense of historical experiences such as the trauma caused by a war.

A special feature of the interpretation by Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner is that it combines two aspect of constructivism namely the societal constructivism²⁶ and the transnational con-

26 In various studies the alternative term of “domestic learning” is used instead of “societal socialization”. In this study, both terms will be regarded as referring to the same process.

structivism each connected to a specific mechanism of change regarding social norms. The first approach claims that social norms evolve and change as the result of a process of socialization from within a society. The second approach assumes that social norms derive from a process of socialization, which is carried by the international community for example through external expectations. Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner suggest that social norms and the change of social norms are the product of both kinds of socialization processes. This view will be shared throughout this study and will take a crucial role in identifying the mechanisms of change within Strategic Culture.

2.2 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Reasons of continuity and possibilities of change

As a culture-based concept, Strategic Culture is subject to the general understanding that culture, understood as a system of norms, is extraordinary resistant to change (Berger 1998: 15). As Longhurst states, the concept of Strategic Culture “focuses on continuities” not on changes (Longhurst 2000: 31). This resistance to change can mainly be explained by one central element of culture-based approaches, which will be referred to as the cultural lens. This term entails that every part of reality, for example the international security situation, is interpreted by a society through its distinct culture-based set of beliefs. Transferred to the concept of Strategic Culture this means that the “security reality” is perceived by different nations in the light of its distinct historical and cultural background, its values, beliefs and attitude towards the use of force differently. Through this mechanism reality is normally interpreted in a way, which makes changes within the Strategic Culture unnecessary, because the perception through the Strategic Culture lens entails that the solution of security issues always lies within the fixed frame of the Strategic Culture itself (Berger 1998: 12f.).

While the general possibility of change is not denied by the researchers of Strategic Culture, change is understood to be of minor importance. For example, Thomas U. Berger assumes, that “under normal circumstances culture should change only incrementally in response to ordinary historical events” (Berger 1998:20). And yet, Berger, by quoting Lakatos, acknowledges, “even core beliefs [i.e. social norms] will change if they are unable to generate explanatory power to cope with new phenomena or the discovery of new evidence” (Berger 1998:14). Berger as well as Longhurst maintain that this kind of situation is normally limited to the event of traumatic historic shock-experiences.

In contrast to Berger and Longhurst, this study posits that even in the absence of traumatic events and despite the influence of the Strategic Culture lens phenomenon, changes are possi-

ble and, by significantly influencing the prioritization of foundational elements, these changes have considerable influence on security policy behavior.

Reasons and mechanisms of Strategic Culture change

Against the background of the theoretical considerations above this section will develop a model of change for the Strategic Culture approach. The model's purpose is to identify and clarify the reasons and mechanisms that lead to modifications within a given Strategic Culture. It will contain reality as a given variable, which may or may not initiate two separate processes of socialization, societal and transnational socialization. Thus, these two processes may reshape the Strategic Culture in their distinct way.

The process of societal socialization

The process of societal socialization, which entails the formation of a social norm such as the foundational elements of Strategic Culture, is a purely domestic procedure of perceiving reality, (re-)interpreting it through societal negotiation and drawing the conclusion by forming a social norm or, if a social norm related to the experienced reality already exists, by evaluating the validity of the existing norm. In this respect foundational elements of Strategic Culture should be viewed as a set of distinct but interacting social norms that co-develop during a process of societal socialization. The fact that during this process the occurring events are more or less directly experienced by the society, causes a massive influence of the Strategic Culture lens phenomenon on the domestic perception. The distinct way of thought, shaped by the existing Strategic Culture, shapes the perception of reality in the first step and controls the societal negotiation in the second step, which ultimately leads to the confirmation or revision of the given Strategic Culture.

There are only two plausible exceptions to this pattern. The first is the experience of traumatic historic events; in the case of the Strategic Culture this would usually include a major military conflict. In such a case, which is widely recognized as the main, if not only, situation that leads to a change of Strategic Culture, the discrepancy between the experienced reality and the demands of the social norms is so obvious that the given Strategic Culture lens phenomenon cannot reconcile the disturbing reality with the norms and suppositions of cause and effect of a given Strategic Culture. "Shock experiences may force reinterpretation", because "cultures remain vital only if their core principles continue to generate solutions that satisfy human needs and make sense of the world" (Berger 1998:15). If this is not the case anymore, the process of societal socialization is capable of initiating Strategic Culture change.

The second exception to the path-dependency of societal socialization lies in the inner conception of the Strategic Culture. Due to the complexity of the Strategic Culture deriving from the close interaction of a variety of different social norms called foundational elements, situations may evolve in which any national response to reality, even inaction, inevitably causes a violation of at least one of the foundational elements (Lantis 2002: 111). This conflict between different elements of the Strategic Culture thus results in the weakening of one of its parts and a shift of priorities between foundational elements. If this kind of priority shift significantly alters security policy behavior it has to be understood as a modification of Strategic Culture. The permanence and solidity of a reprioritization of foundational elements and policy behavior crucially depends on the depth of the negotiation process within a society, which may lead to a solidification of the modified Strategic Culture. It is probable, that, if a permanent priority shift within the Strategic Culture occurs, this would not lead to the total evaporation of a foundational element. Even with less priority, it would still to some extent have influence on security policy behavior.

The process of societal socialization by itself therefore remains a strong mechanism to ensure the resistance of the Strategic Culture towards change. It may be understood as supporting the assumption that in the absence of trauma Strategic Culture change tends to be insignificant.

The process of transnational socialization

In contrast to societal socialization, the process of transnational socialization does not include the direct domestic perception of occurring events. Instead, reality is perceived and negotiated by other external actors and then passed on to the nation concerned in the form of external expectations and demands. By way of simplification two kinds of perceiving actors can be identified: first, other nations and secondly international institutions.

If the perceiving actor is a nation (from now on called nation B), it naturally experiences and interprets the security reality through its own, distinct Strategic Culture, which may differ significantly from the one of the originally examined nation (from now on called nation A). During the interpretation, nation B does not only decide on its own behavior regarding the security situation, but it also develops expectations about how nation A should or will respond. As a consequence it may articulate concrete expectations in the form of external demands towards nation A. In general, we may assume that the number and specification of expectations increases if and insofar as interdependence between societies grows.

If the perceiving actor is an international institution, e.g. the European Union, its interpretation of the security situation is shaped by the Strategic Cultures of various nations and their negotiations among each other, which ultimately may be combined into a distinct Strategic

Culture of the institution itself. Through this negotiated Strategic Culture, the international institution may also develop expectations about the appropriate response of nation A and articulated these expectations.

Nation A will now evaluate these international expectations and demands in the light of its own Strategic Culture. Assuming that international expectations and national Strategic Culture are not compatible, nation A has the choice between not following the international expectations and changing its Strategic Culture.

Whether or not a change of Strategic Culture is induced depends on the relationship between nation A and nation B (or a nation C) respectively the commitment of nation A towards multilateralism and international institution. If the bilateral ties and interdependence between nation A and B are very strong, a change of Strategic Culture becomes more likely. The same is the case, if nation A itself advocates multilateralism and supports international institutions. Obviously the strongest possibility of Strategic Culture change through the process of transnational socialization exists, if multilateralism and support of international institutions is a foundational element of the nations Strategic Culture itself.

Moreover, it is important whether nation A, in addition to its commitment towards multilateralism, is itself member of an international institution. As mentioned above the behavior of an international institution is shaped by a compromise between different nations and their Strategic Cultures. If nation A, as a member of the international institution took part in the negotiations leading towards the compromise, it may feel obliged have to be loyal towards this compromise even if it is not conform to its national Strategic Culture.

Combining the processes of socialization

To conclude the first part of this study, a brief recollection of the findings up to now is in order. This section served as an evaluation of the elements of continuity and change of Strategic Culture. First, path dependency and continuity characterize the Strategic Culture lens. The closer look at the two processes of socialization that mould the Strategic Culture revealed, however, that this lens has a particularly strong impact on the process of societal socialization making change unlikely unless traumatic events occur. Nevertheless, the possibility of change in the form of shifting priorities through conflicts among foundational elements remains to be considered.

The examination of the process of transnational socialization showed, that the conserving impact of the Strategic Culture lens is considerably weaker, opening the possibility that nations with close bilateral ties, a high level of integration into the international system and a normative dedication towards multilateralism and the strengthening of international institution might

be particularly responsive towards international expectations. Thus, they may be more likely to react to incompatibilities with a change of Strategic Culture rather than the rejection of international demands.

The combination of these findings finally leads to a scenario, which includes both types of socialization processes, supporting each other: If international security institutions creates a situation which leads into a conflict between two foundational elements on the domestic level, and if at the same time the international community demands a change of this nation's security policy behavior, supporting a shift of priorities and thereby triggering an active societal process of reconsideration the nation's Strategic Culture, then a permanent and significant shift of priorities between foundational elements of this Strategic Culture appears to be likely. This combination of societal and transnational factors can be seen as the main mechanism of change within Strategic Culture and therefore will be examined closely in the following section.

3. THE REALITY OF STRATEGIC CULTURE CHANGE

This section starts with a prologue outlining the evolution of German Strategic Culture after World War II followed by a brief description of the changed situation after the end of the Cold War (cf. also Part A of this working paper by Marion Stumm). Then the question will be addressed of how Germany provides for its security and how this relates to its Strategic Culture and Strategic Culture change. Since Germany's security policy is mainly taking place within the international institutional framework of NATO and EU, these institutions will take a leading role in the following considerations.

3.1 HISTORICAL PROLOGUE

German Strategic Culture after 1945

The fact that the German Strategic Culture developed directly out of the traumatic experience of the Nazi regime and the Second World War is surely indisputable. The former Strategic Culture led into catastrophe and ceased to exist with the end of the Third Reich. During the decade following this so called "Stunde Null" ("zero hour") Germany, by drawing its lesson from its history, developed a new Strategic Culture, which was in many respects the opposite of its predecessor (Longhurst 2000: 32). The main feature of this new Strategic Culture was a deep reluctance towards the use of military force, which was backed up by the security policy standpoint of building a broad civil-military framework and the orientation of all military forces towards a defense posture. The foundational element of reticence towards the use of force was accompanied by the strong dedication to Western values, i.e. democracy, rule of law, freedom and respect for human rights. These norms were supported by the strong desire to rehabilitate Germany within the Western civilized world, a strong commitment towards multilateralism, the "institutionalization of security problems and the inclination to characterize its own foreign policy through responsibility, predictability and reliability" (Longhurst 2000: 33-37).

German Strategic Culture after 1989

The end of the Cold War caused a major change in the international security situation with such substantial implications for German security policy, that it could be seen as a serious challenge for the German Strategic Culture. However this event did not have an impact comparable to the end of the Second World War, since it did not raise doubts regarding the Strate-

gic Culture as a whole. Rather the peaceful end of the cold War seemed to confirm the central assumption of Germany's Strategic Culture as the once divided country now lived in peace with its neighbors, reunited, free and democratic.

However, the first test for German security behavior came quickly in the form of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the response of the international community. In line with its culture of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force, Germany decided not to take actively part in the military campaign. This reaction was foreseeable for two reasons. First, the short period of time that elapsed since the end of the Cold War was far from being long enough for any socialization process to take effect; secondly, the complicated domestic and international situation Germany had to face at the eve of unification made it practically impossible to simultaneously engage in a major military conflict.

This situation changed however over the following years creating major transnational expectation towards German security behavior. The two cornerstone institutions for German international involvement, the EU and the NATO, faced big challenges of transformation and adaptation deriving from the new security environment. As a consequence, Germany's allies began to expect Germany to contribute its appropriate share to address these new tasks. Germany's strong commitment towards these international institutions and its willingness to strengthen them collided with the expectation of military contributions, which in turn were incompatible with Germany's traditional culture of reticence. The major framework for the change of German Strategic Culture, corresponding to the scenario suggested in the first part of this study, was therefore set: the social norm of multilateralism and commitment towards international institutions, emphasized by the demands articulated by the international community and bilateral partners stood against the deep skepticism towards the use of military force. Throughout the period between the end of the cold war and the Kosovo crisis in 1999, a slow process of transnational socialization carried by the demands of the international community combined with the societal socialization is discernible. The chain of events leading to this trend started with the Gulf War (1990/91), included the controversial debate about out-of-area deployment of German troops and the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994 and finally led to the decision to participate in military action to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (1999) (Stumm 2004). The following section will consider the developments from 1999 until today, focusing on changes in German Strategic Culture as they relate to institutional choices between NATO and the EU.

3.2 TRANSLATING SECURITY FUNCTIONS INTO ACTION

In the following empirical sections this study will analyze the German government's attitude towards basic security functions and how they relate to institutional choices. The international framework for German security behavior principally consists of NATO and the EU. Both which will be understood as international security institutions as defined by Helga Haftendorn. These institutions firstly have the general function to influence the member's behavior through the means of rules in order to create stable and cooperative patterns of interaction between the members, and secondly have the specific function to support the effectiveness of actions against military threat through the cooperative behavior of the members (Haftendorn 1997:16). As described in the first part, the international framework and especially the membership in international institutions exert, through the mechanism of transnational socialization, substantial influence on Strategic Culture.

The first section will deal with the security function of building a system of collective security. Collective security will be understood as an umbrella function, which, at least partially, contains other functions presented in the following sections. Its examination will therefore reveal the general setting of the performance of security functions and clarify the substantial questions in regard to Germany, the NATO and the ESDP. The following sections will then look at the security functions of crisis management, broadening of the community of values, collective defense and the preservation of the transatlantic cooperation in a much more specific way.

Collective security – the reform of NATO and the rise of ESDP

A system of collective security could be defined as an international community that agrees to respond collectively against any threat to the security of a member, which would be seen as a threat to the community as a whole (Farer 1993: 154f). Compared to a defensive alliance, which is set up to defend itself collectively against an in advance designated enemy, the idea of collective security therefore takes a much wider scope.

During the Cold War, NATO practically acted as a defensive alliance against its opponent, the Warsaw Pact, and as a collective security mechanism against potential threats from among its members (Germany; Greece-Turkey). Thus, NATO as an institution faced a serious crisis regarding its legitimacy after the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. NATO confronted this crisis in the following years by establishing a new self-perception, which did not mean any less than a

total transformation of the institution. This new NATO officially came into existence at the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999.²⁷

The „Alliance New Strategic Concept“²⁸, introduced at the Washington Summit, aimed towards the establishment of NATO as a broad framework of collective security, which would not only provide an alliance for collective defense, but also dedicate itself to peace and stability in the wider Euro-Atlantic area. In order to achieve these new goals, a number of initiatives were implemented, extended or confirmed at the Summit, which may be divided into two general groups. The first group of initiatives was concerned with the ability to respond to the new threats such as failed states, ethnical conflict or the proliferation of WMD. The core of these efforts was the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), which promoted the development of military capabilities towards mobility, sustainability, effectiveness and interoperability between the capabilities of the member states. Special interest was paid towards crisis management capabilities, which through the Balkan engagement and then again the Kosovo crisis gained importance. For the strengthening of crisis management capabilities, “internal reform included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance's missions”²⁹.

The second group of initiatives addressed the issues of Partnership, Cooperation and Dialogue within NATO and between NATO and the states of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. These initiatives included the firm commitment towards the preservation of the Transatlantic cooperation, the extension of the Partnership for Peace program, which provides a forum for practical military cooperation of 27 countries, the confirmation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as the “overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners”³⁰ and the Mediterranean Dialog and the creation of two special arrangements with single states, namely the NATO-Russia Partnership and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Besides that, NATO started a major enlargement initiative with three new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic already taking part in the Washington Summit and the launch of the Membership Action Plan, which serves the purpose to prepare other interested nations for membership. Overall, with the implementation of the Washington agenda, the NATO fulfilled a remarkable transformation from the narrow and static approach of collective defense, corre-

27 “The Washington Declaration”, Washington D.C., April 23th/24th 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm>, [2003/10/14].

28 “The Alliance’ Strategic concept”, Washington D.C., April 23th/24th 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>, [2003/10/14].

29 “The Washington Declaration”, Washington D.C., April 23th/24th 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm>, [2003/10/14].

30 Ibid.

sponding to the circumstances of the Cold War, to the broad and flexible approach of collective security, coping with the challenges of the 21st century.

In contrast, the Western European Union, founded in 1948, represents a security alliance within Europe, which tasks were by definition performed by NATO, reflecting the security situation during the Cold War and the fact that all Members of the WEU were NATO members. The WEU therefore could be interpreted as a de facto part of NATO during the Cold War. With the formation of the European Union, defining a Common Foreign and Security Policy as the second pillar of its conception in the Maastricht treaty of 1992, a general trend towards more European autonomy regarding security issues could be witnessed. As integration deepened, the development of a genuine European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) took shape (Hochleitner 2000: 195-207). Since the mid-1990s this development gained a strong momentum, starting with the British official commitment towards a European Security and Defense Policy in St. Malo 1998, lead into the adjustment and strengthening of the ESDP in Cologne and Helsinki 1999 including the declaration of a Headline Goal concerning military capabilities and the set-up of an EU rapid reaction force.³¹ The meeting of the EU Council in Nice 2001³² decided the establishment of three standing committees and the simplification of decision-making procedures, giving the ESDP a more advanced, political and military setting. In December 2001, the EU Council declared the EU crisis management capabilities to be operational. Since the beginning of 2003 the first ESDP operations have been launched; EU troops are currently engaged in two police mission in FYROM (PROXIMA) and in Bosnia (EUPM). Two military missions, in FYROM (CONCORDIA) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (ARTEMIS), were completed in 2003, but following the agreements of the NATO Istanbul summit in June 2004 and the corresponding decision by the EU Council, the EU will engage in another military mission by replacing the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia with a EU Military Force Mission (EUFOR) in December 2004. EUFOR, comprising of 7000 troops, will be the biggest ESDP mission to date (Keane 2004).

Following developments included the creation of the office of an EU foreign minister incorporated in the text of the EU constitutional treaty currently in the ratification process, the proposal by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to generate an EU-Headquarter in Tervuren as well as an European Security and Defense Union for optional participation in an

31 "Europäischer Rat Helsinki, Anhang IV: ESVP" Helsinki, December 10th/11th 1999, <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=de>. [2003/11/05].

32 "Europäischer Rat Nizza, Anhang IV: ESVP" Nice, December 7th/8th/9th 2000, <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=de> [2003/11/05].

even deeper military cooperation³³, and, perhaps most importantly, an intensifying aspiration to be able to plan and lead EU operations without usage of NATO assets. This ability was agreed upon by Schröder, Chirac and Blair to be an important goal for the future of ESDP.³⁴ Finally, the European Council of June 2004 adopted a series of initiatives focusing on military crisis management and defense capabilities. These initiatives, which are based on the European Security Strategy (ESS) proposed by Javier Solana in June 2003³⁵, were summed up under the name of the new Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010) succeeding the Headline Goal of Helsinki 1999 (Quille 2004).

The deep involvement of Germany in these developments at this point gives a first impression of the shift of priorities within German Strategic Culture from reluctance towards the use of force towards multilateralism. The specific examples of the following sections will further underpin this impression (Overhaus 2004).

The development of the ESDP played and plays an important role for the deepening of the EU integration and the creation of a European Identity, not only related to security issues. It also raised serious concerns in NATO, especially in Washington, which feared, that the ESDP will possibly reduce US influence on European security behavior. This impression appears to be confirmed by France, which may be viewed as trying hard to actually reduce US influence through ESDP. This setting of contradictory interests, represented by the EU-France-Grouping and the NATO-US-Grouping is characterizing the EU-NATO relationship to a significant extent (Moravcsik 2003: 74-76).

From the German perspective, the rise of the ESDP as a more and more elaborate and outspoken system of collective defense and security with political structures outside NATO has to be seen as a threat as well as a chance for NATO. On the one hand, ESDP could develop into a competitor with NATO, disputing about the competences and legitimacy given by the nations to fulfill security task. These would be the typical scenarios describing two institutions duplicating and therefore interblocking each other. The second set of scenarios would be based on a close cooperation between these institutions, which could lead to an efficient distribution of tasks and the sharing of resources without duplicating capabilities. From this perspective the ESDP, by strengthening European military capabilities, could actually be a vehicle to solve one of the biggest problems of NATO, the transatlantic capability gap.

33 "Gemeinsame Erklärung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur ESVP", April 29th 2003, Brussels, In: *Internationale Politik*, 9/2003: 85-88, 2003.

34 Ibid.

35 Cf. Section Collective defense – September 11th and the War against Terrorism (p. 50) in this paper.

In order to avoid the former scenarios of interlocking and to achieve the latter scenarios of interlocking, the Washington Summit established a concept to involve ESDP within the NATO framework³⁶. By this, NATO acknowledges and approves the development of a European Security and Defense Policy and the possibility of autonomous action, “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged”³⁷, but only under the prerequisites of “close mutual consultation, cooperation, transparency” and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication.

The success of these efforts will have a decisive impact on the question, if NATO and ESDP will be two pillars of a common system of collective security or two systems of collective security in competition and mutual hindrance in the future. This question also sets the framework for German security policy and its institutional choice between NATO and ESDP.

Crisis management – Kosovo and the reform of the Bundeswehr

On March 24th 1999, four German ECR-Tornados started at Piacenza airbase to take part in the NATO air strikes against the Yugoslav Federation as part of the operation “Allied Force”. This marked the first active involvement of the German Bundeswehr in an offensive combat operation against a sovereign state since the end of World War II. The cruelties of the Kosovo conflict, especially the ethnic cleansing and the “lesson of Srebrenica”, developed into a shocking experience for the German society. As a consequence, it faced a crucial choice between two foundational elements of its traditional Strategic Culture: the opposition vis-à-vis the use of force and the historical responsibility to prevent genocide. Hence, the lessons of German history “Nie wieder Krieg” (“No more war”) stood against “Nie wieder Auschwitz” (“No more Auschwitz”) (Harnisch 2001: 54-56). When facing this critical juncture, Germans, under intense prodding from its allies, reinterpreted the rank order of the foundational elements of its Strategic Culture and joined the NATO intervention. This process of societal socialization would probably not have developed in this ground shaking fashion, if it had not been supported by the transnational socialization through NATO. Comparable cruelties happened before in other places without triggering any process of socialization. The differences of the Kosovo conflict, besides the geographical proximity and the shocking extent of cruelty, were firstly, that the development of the preceding years had prepared the ground for this kind of societal reconsideration of values in German society. Secondly, it was NATO’s decision to take all measures needed to stop the conflict which increased the international pressure on Germany, speeding up the process of transnational socialization. Seen from this perspective,

36 “The Washington Declaration”, Washington D.C., April 23th/24th 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm> [2003/10/14].

37 Ibid.

the German decision to deploy troops, even without a UN mandate and despite the still existing unease vis-à-vis the use of military force³⁸, was nothing like a shock reaction, but rather another step on a way, that already started years ago.

The Kosovo crisis was not only a shock event for Germany in terms of humanitarian concerns. Kosovo also showed that the EU member states were far from being able to handle such a crisis at its doorsteps without relying heavily on US military capabilities. As a consequence, this also caused the US to demand that the Europeans bear a bigger burden in NATO's deployment (Howorth 2003:81-83). This lesson from the Kosovo crisis, first officially articulated at the EU Council Meeting in Cologne, June 1999, led to a reconsideration among the EU states concerning their military capabilities. The outcome of this rethinking process took shape fairly quickly and accumulated at the EU Council Meeting in Helsinki, December 1999, into the formulation of a Headline Goal for European Security and Defense Policy: Until 2003, the creation of a 60.000 soldiers European rapid reaction force should be completed. A European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was to be deployable within 60 days, able to stay stationed for one year and to carry out military task of low and medium intensity.³⁹

The formulation of this headline goal expressed the willingness of the EU member states to strengthen their military capabilities and meet the US demands regarding military crisis management. More importantly this also meant to develop these capabilities as a part of the ESDP and not as a part of NATO. It implied that the EU members did not want to inevitably rely on NATO, i.e. rely on the US, in questions of crisis management. This decision raised a lot of concerns in Washington an independent ESDP. Not only would an independent ESDP create capabilities duplicating NATO capabilities, but also it would take competences given to ESDP by member states away from NATO, therefore undermine NATO legitimization and weaken it as an institution and ultimately keep the US out of European decision making processes.

Understanding the German role in these developments leads back to the question of Strategic Culture. As mentioned before, the Kosovo crisis marked a climax of a combination of transnational and societal socialization causing a gradual process of change in German Strategic Culture, namely a shift from the priority of reluctance towards the use of force towards the priority of multilateralism. In addition, German Strategic Culture changed in accordance with in-

38 The still existing reluctance towards the use of military force was reflected by Germany's strong commitment towards the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in summer 1999. For further information see "Democracy, Security and the future of the Stability Pact for South Easter Europe", European Stability Initiative, April 2001, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_15.pdf [2003/11/25].

39 "Europäischer Rat Helsinki, Anhang IV: ESVP" Helsinki, December 10th/11th 1999, <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=de> [2003/11/05].

ternational expectations. Thus, when the EU as a whole committed itself to a specific orientation of the ESDP expressed in the Headline Goal, Germany inevitably came to share this commitment, even though it again was not entirely compatible with the traditional interpretation of the foundational element of reluctance towards the use of force. Germany stood fully behind the outcomes of the Cologne and Helsinki Summit meeting (Overhaus 2004). Closely united with France on this matter, Germany therefore, at least on the theoretical and rhetorical basis, is pushing the development of ESDP capabilities with astonishing intensity, risking disapproval of NATO and Washington.

The change of priorities within German Strategic Culture consistently led to an adjustment of security policy standpoints causing the reform of the German Bundeswehr. At least from a theoretical perspective, these were changes of a dramatic extent. The Bundeswehr reform, initiated by the Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping in 2000 (Meiers 2002: 211f.) and carried on by his successor Peter Struck⁴⁰, included a major reduction of troops, a reduction of the percentage of conscripts in favor of a higher degree of professionals and an increase of mobility and effectiveness in accordance with both the DCI of NATO and the Headline Goal of ESDP. Overall, the Bundeswehr reform was intended to transform the Bundeswehr also in its self-perception from a defense force into mission force (*Armee im Einsatz*) in order to meet the guidelines of the Helsinki Headline Goal, but in obvious violation of the most central security policy standpoint of German Strategic Culture, the limited geographical scope for action of the armed forces⁴¹.

From a policy perspective the analysis of the Bundeswehr reform shows a slightly different picture. When it comes to realization the foundational element of the reluctance towards the use of force, even though its priority considerably declined, this foundational element still constrains behavior. Firstly, due to path dependent behavior, the conceptualization of the Bundeswehr reform still lacks innovation, in various fields it still reflects the structure of a traditional territorial defense army (Riecke 2002: 31). Moreover, the conscription system, as a cornerstone of a civilian-military-framework, remains a major part of the Bundeswehr structure (Longhurst 2003). Secondly, since the Strategic Culture determines how much of its resources a nation would use for military purposes, the Bundeswehr still lacks financial resources to actually build up the capabilities of an effective mission force (Riecke 2002: 31). Consequently, from a pragmatic point of view, there seems to be no immediate risk of an interlocking situation between NATO and ESDP in regard to crisis management. In a

40 "Regierungserklärung des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, zur Lage der Bundeswehr", July 25th 2002, Berlin, In: Internationale Politik, 9/2002: 118-120, 2002.

41 "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien", Rede von Dr. Peter Struck vom 21.Mai 2003, http://www.bmvg.de/archiv/reden/minister/030521_struck_vpr.php#4 [2004/09/27].

terblocking situation between NATO and ESDP in regard to crisis management. In a medium-term perspective ESDP will not be able to carry out military operations of high intensity without the direct assistance from NATO, i.e. the United States. In the foreseeable future it will have to rely heavily on NATO assets even for low and medium operations in most areas of the world. Thus, in terms of effective military crisis management, there is obviously no viable alternative to NATO.

Nevertheless, from a more theoretical perspective the issue of crisis management holds a lot of conflict potential for the transatlantic relationship. Germany's traditional role had been to balance between the EU-France-Grouping and the NATO-US-Grouping. As of now, Berlin still holds on to this role, at least rhetorically by assuring its commitment to the ESDI within NATO and the unconditional cooperation of ESDP and NATO. On practical terms it seems, that Germany's association with the EU and the bilateral ties with France have become stronger.

Interpreting this trend from the perspective of Strategic Culture it may be inferred that German influence on the negotiation of a Strategic Culture for the EU is much stronger than on the shape of NATO strategic outlook. Consequently a common Strategic Culture of the EU expressed through ESDP would have significantly more similarities to German Strategic Culture than NATO's approach. This effect would be supported by the generally higher degree of compatibility among the Strategic Cultures of at least a part of EU member states compared to the Strategic Culture compatibility of these European countries and the US. Therefore, Germany, particularly in coalition with France, might favor an emerging EU Strategic Culture, which requires less compromise regarding German security behavior. These effects could explain the German trend towards favoring the "Europeanization" of security issues.

Broadening the community of values – EU and NATO enlargement

Both, NATO and EU, understand themselves as communities of values, which means that their cooperative endeavor is based on a common set of values: democracy, market economy, the rule of law and the commitment to human rights. To promote and strengthen these values in the context of NATO and EU is not only to be seen as an instrument to assure security, but also as a purpose for itself, because the successful promotion of such values abroad may increase their legitimacy at home. Nevertheless the security implication of these values regarding stability, predictability and reliability of an actor proved to be very strong.

The end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in Europe through enlarging this community of values. The European Union as well as the NATO understood this opportunity and reacted in a very similar way, namely the decision to enlarge their

respective institutions by offering membership to various Central East European countries. Due to the resemblance between NATO's and the EU's enlargement approach and purpose the question has to be raised if the two institutions act as competitors or allies.

The EU enlargement addressed thirteen candidates; mostly states of central east Europe, of whom ten entered the Union on May 1st 2004. In order to access the EU, these states had to meet a set of requirements, which obviously included the mentioned core values. In addition to that, the set of requirements comprised the existence of an operational market economy defined by various economic indicators and benchmarks. Concerning the EU enlargement, these socio-economic issues have a clear priority compared to the questions of military integration mainly because ESDP has not reached the level of development to provide an appropriate framework to integrate into.

But military integration is the top priority of NATO enlargement, which combines the prerequisite of meeting the main values with a set of military requirement including issues like a civilian and democratic control over military forces. Through the NATO Partnership for Peace Program and the Membership Action Plan, accession candidates are guided and assisted in their efforts to adjust their military capabilities to the requirements of integration into NATO.

In contrast to the question of crisis management, the issue of NATO and EU enlargement therefore can be characterized by a distinction of priorities within a community of purpose. This could be seen as an ideal situation for interlocking institutions, since NATO is balancing the deficit of the EU in providing the military framework to integrate into, while the EU levels out NATO's deficit in addressing the socio-economic components of security and stability. The combination of both institutions efforts is the reason for the success of stability transfer into CEE-states.

The role of Germany, even though it had trouble balancing the role of an integration deepener with that of an integration widener in the first phase of enlargement efforts, was much more unambiguous and coherent in comparison to its stance regarding the issue of crisis management. The reason is simple: German Strategic Culture never experienced a major conflict of foundational elements on enlargement. Since the EU enlargement process, by promoting democratic values within a multilateral framework and without the use of military force, is in line with traditional German Strategic Culture, Germany took a high-level profile approach towards the EU enlargement and acted as a, if not the, main promoter of the EU enlargement (Tewes 2002: 133-139). This behavior, free from any restraint caused by Strategic Culture conflicts, could be characterized by a self-assuredness that shows a stark contrast to the constrained low-profile behavior regarding crisis management. Germany even took its role as a

socializing actor by successfully involving France in the enlargement process. This was mainly achieved through the instrument of the Weimar Triangle, a trilateral meeting between France, Germany and Poland, which succeeded “to ensure, that the desired multilateral stabilization of Central Eastern Europe was [...] perceived as a multilateral task” (Tewes 2002: 98).

Concerning NATO enlargement, German behavior was not quiet as unambiguous. The mere connection to military issues again raised skepticism, making the support for NATO enlargement a disputed issue (Tewes 2002:142). This skepticism was ultimately overcome by appreciating that NATO actually had changed from a defense alliance to a system of collective security, the enlargement of which was bound to complement the EU integration process.

In conclusion, the enlargement process of NATO and EU has to be seen as an example for the possibility of interlocking and mutual complementation of the institutions. Because of its compatibility with its Strategic Culture, Germany strongly promoted and supported enlargement of both institutions.

Collective defense – September 11th and the War against Terrorism

The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11th 2001 significantly changed the international security situation. Germany’s immediate reaction, declaring “unconditional solidarity”⁴² with the United States, explicitly including military assistance⁴³, gives an idea of the extent to which German Strategic Culture had changed during the combined socialization processes in the 1990s. The perception of 9/11 in Germany led to the conclusion that the commitment towards the bilateral relation with the US and to the international community was more important than the avoidance of the use of military force. This conclusion was only possible after priorities in Germany’s traditional Strategic Culture had undergone change in the 1990s.

After the end of the Cold War, the necessity of collective defense through NATO had, due to the absence of an enemy, declined rapidly. As described above, NATO reacted by transforming into a system of collective security rather than mere defense. September 11th brought the need for defense back on the NATO agenda in a shocking manner. European NATO allies reacted by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states “that an armed attack against one or more” NATO member country “shall be considered an attack against them

42 “Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers Gerhard Schröder zu den Anschlägen in den USA”, September 12th 2001, In: Internationale Politik, 12/2001:83-84, 2001.

43 It needs to be noticed, that at the same time Chancellor Schröder pointed out that Germany would not participate in any military “adventures”.

all”⁴⁴. Germany, following its new Strategic Culture priorities, bore its part of this decision. But aside from deploying NATO-AWACS systems to US airspace to relieve American forces, the immediate consequences of the Article 5 invocation were little. In the beginning, NATO’s role in military operations in Afghanistan as part of “Enduring freedom” remained negligible, limited to assuring overflight rights, naval patrols and access to ports and airplanes for the coalition against terrorism. NATO’s planning capabilities were also not used and NATO’s role in homeland security of its member states also remained small. Overall, NATO did not find its place to contribute significantly to the war against terror, its function as the main carrier of collective defense obviously could not be transferred to a new enemy. This also did not change much after the Prague Summit in November 2002. Even though NATO approved a “comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come”⁴⁵, the settings, in which the War against Terrorism would be fought, was already fixed, leaving only a minor role for NATO (Varwick 2003).

The ESDP, providing the potential means for a common response of the EU as a collective, did contribute even less military resources to the war against terror than NATO. Concerning homeland security, a fundamentally different perception of threats compared to the high profile response of the US lead to reaction, that was partially perceived as a “European lethargy in cooperation on homeland security” (Stevenson 2003: 76). On the other hand it has to be acknowledge, that in fact several, mostly non-military measures were taken on the European as well as the domestic level. The German Counter-Terrorist-Law for example increased funding for border control and intelligence and removed legal obstacles, which hindered the prosecution of terrorist organizations and access to financial data.⁴⁶

Parallel with the implementation of the NATO Prague agenda, Javier Solana as the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced a strategy paper with the title “A secure Europe in a better world” to the EU Counsel at Thessaloniki in June 2003. This concept, now as the European Security Strategy (ESS), identified the most important new threats as terrorism, proliferation of WMD and failing states and proposed an approach

44 “The North Atlantic Treaty”, Washington D.C., April 4th 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> [2003/10/15].

45 “Prague Summit Declaration”, Prague, November 21st 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> [2003/10/15].

46 For a detailed account of German counter-measures against terrorism see Hein 2004 in Harnisch et al. 2004.

based on a more active, more coherent, more capable and more cooperative EU security policy.⁴⁷

The generally small degree of military involvement of NATO as well as ESDP in the War against Terrorism was reflected by their lack of participation in the first phase of “Enduring Freedom”, namely the attacks against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan had a multilateral legitimization, mainly through the UN resolution 1368, in which the United Nations Security Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001” and calls for “full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999”⁴⁸. This multilateral setting was complemented through approval by NATO and the EU to use of military force. But the war in Afghanistan was not fought within this institutional multilateral framework. Neither institution was actually part of the planning process or implementation. The military action was mainly a unilateral US operation backed up by British forces. The other nation’s contributions, including German military assistance, during the hot phase of the attacks was fairly small. Thus, only when the major combat operations were ended and the ISAF troops took over the main responsibility for the rebuilding of Afghanistan, multilateral institutions gained a larger role in the war on terrorism.

Concerning the security function of collective defense Germany and the international community as a whole failed to engage the international institutions, NATO as well as ESDP, with these new tasks, which ultimately led to US unilateral action and therefore seriously undermined NATO as well as ESDP. This development, which can be characterized as a failure of distributing a security function to any institution, only saw its beginning in the Afghanistan war.

To conclude, Germany had its part in this marginalization of NATO and the EU. Through its ambiguous behavior, the assurance of unconditional solidarity on the one hand and simultaneously stating that there was not much it could militarily, Germany limited its options for involvement and influencing the procedure. Instead of claiming a more important role and by keeping the conflict within multilateral frameworks, Germany decided to take a low profile approach veiled in strong rhetoric thereby intensifying the US tendency towards unilateral action. Whether the US would have ever allowed the crisis to be handled in a multilateral con-

47 “A secure Europe in a better world” – Javier Solana at the European Council, Thessalonica, June 26th 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf> [2003/10/22].

48 “United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1368 (2001)”, September 12th 2001, <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement> [30.10.2003].

text is of course questionable. However, that the War against Terrorism, especially in its early stage, was an opportunity for the EU and the ESDP to demand more responsibility as a collective and thereby to maintain the option for a multilateral solution is certain. Germany together with other countries lost this opportunity. Again, this pattern of behavior reflects the incoherence of a German Strategic Culture during a process of change.

Preserving the Transatlantic cooperation – the Iraq intervention

Close ties between the United States and Europe in political, economical and cultural issues based on a common system of values has been the backbone of Euro-Atlantic security for many decades. The preservation of this transatlantic cooperation therefore has to be considered as a primary security function. The difference between the preservation of the transatlantic cooperation and the other security functions described above is, that NATO is by far the most important forum providing for the preservation of the transatlantic cooperation and consequently could by no means be replaced by the ESDP. For that reason, the risk of interlocking institutions will not be caused by a dispute over particular competence and resources, but rather by a general trend towards a competition between NATO and ESDP. Transatlantic cooperation is to a great extent based on deeply rooted, but still relatively indistinct feelings of belonging together. This makes it comparably responsive to subjective (mis)perception. Thus, the mere impression that NATO and ESDP are diverging and moving towards a competition could already pose a threat to the stability of the transatlantic cooperation.

The considerations behind these reflexes have already been mentioned. On one side of the Atlantic, the US opposes the development of an ESDP disconnected from NATO. On the other side, the French position may be viewed as representing the desire to reduce this influence by promoting an ESDP more independent of NATO. Since NATO and the EU are the most important institutions for German foreign and security policy, Germany, driven by the foundational element of multilateralism tries to balance these two contradictory interests.

The War against Terrorism made it increasingly difficult to keep that balance. During the operation in Afghanistan, the War against Terrorism drifted out of the multilateral framework while the Bush administration decided to end the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Woodward 2004). Subsequently, the German foundational element of reluctance towards the use of force experienced an unexpectedly strong revival, materializing in form of Germany's strong opposition to a military intervention in Iraq. This reaction, however, was far less consistent, as it might appear on the first look. Preceding the strict opposition towards any military intervention in Iraq, the German government had adopted various standpoints including the possible support of military action against Iraq under a clear UN mandate suggested by Chancellor

Schröder in March 2002, the recognition of the legitimacy of US military action in Iraq based on the UN resolution 1441 stated by Foreign Minister Fisher in December 2002 and the agreement by the Schröder government, that military action against Iraq might be the last resort in order to reach the implementation of UN resolutions in February 2003.

The fact that the German federal elections were lying ahead and that the Social Democratic Party had decided to openly promote their opposition to military action against Iraq in the election campaign only reinforced the strong opposition of the Schröder government against military intervention. Thus, this domestic factor cannot be seen separate from the important role of German Strategic Culture, since the foundational element of reluctance towards military action was the basis on which it became possible to turn the opposition towards an Iraq intervention into votes. As Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen puts it:

“The German Chancellor may have been moved by tactical considerations rather than deeply held convictions when he chose to run on an anti-war platform. But his success in mobilizing voters on this issue and his subsequent inability to stop the anti-war buzz once back in office had to do with ingrained German beliefs and convictions.” (cited in Harnisch 2004: 2)

Hence, one may argue that the Schröder government, led by “tactical considerations”, deliberately intervened in the process of shifting priorities between foundational elements and, by the means of the election campaign, highlighted the generally fading importance of the reluctance towards the use of force. This short-termed intervention into the ongoing process of Strategic Culture change was only made possible by an especially strong-minded and -toned rejection of military action. In turn this left practically no room for flexibility regarding this issue and thereby considerably limited the German possibilities for political action in the long run.

Another decisive moment for the German Iraq policy was the change of position performed by the French government in January 2003 when President Chirac, originally approving the military implementation of Security Council resolution, came to openly oppose a US military intervention in Iraq. In the same month, at the 40th anniversary German-French Summit Meeting in Paris, Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac officially agreed on a joint position towards the issue, strongly denouncing the position of the Bush administration, declaring their dedication to a “peaceful solution” for Iraq and explicitly linking their common stance to the development of the ESDP. In this way, the controversy over the Iraq policy highlighted the gap between EU and US Strategic Culture, strengthening the trend towards an “Europeaniza-

tion” of Germany’s security policy. Finally, France and Germany, supported by Russia, succeeded in preventing a multilateral legitimization of the intervention in the UN Security Council. However, in doing so, they also lost the chance to keep the War against Terrorism from totally slipping out of the multilateral framework. The reaction of the Bush administration USA was inevitable and predictable: a unilateral intervention of Iraq, further promoting the “Coalition of the willing”-approach as an effective alternative to the burdensome processes of building a broad multilateral cooperation.

In sum, the conflict over Iraq may be interpreted as a continuation of the ambiguous pattern of German security policy caused by the process of Strategic Culture change and the recent drift towards the Europeanization of Germany’s Security Policy. Germany thereby dangerously deserted its position as a balancer between NATO and EU, between the US and France, as well as between the members of the EU, which were also deeply divided over the issue of the Iraq intervention. This struggle caused serious damage to the transatlantic cooperation, to the institutions of NATO and EU and finally to the concept of multilateralism as a whole.

During the Iraq crisis, the foundational element of reluctance towards the use of force, supported by domestic circumstances, experienced a strong revival of its influence on German security policy. Since the end of combat operations in Iraq however, the foundational element of multilateralism quickly moved back to the fore. Subsequently the German post-war policy towards Iraq focused on mending fences across the Atlantic by offering financial contributions, technical assistance, training of Iraqi police forces and, in January 2004, even the deployment of military medical personal. Furthermore Schröder stated that Germany would not block any decision by NATO regarding the Iraq issue. An active involvement of German combating troops, however, due to the strong rhetoric during the election campaign and the lack of political support in the German Parliament, seems to be out of question for the time being.

4. CONSISTENT CHANGE OR CHANGING CONSISTENCY?

“The use of military force can, and sometimes even has to be the final instrument to underpin or secure the realization of political decisions.”⁴⁹ Still in the recent past, this kind of statement, made by the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder during an interview in September 2003, certainly would have caused major concern, probably even an excited national dispute in Germany. But by now, even though the attitude towards the use of military force is still controversial, at least a general working consensus has been achieved that in some cases military action is necessary to serve more important goals, be it humanitarian or alliance-related.

In sum, the findings of this study suggest that a change of German Strategic Culture occurred since the end of the Cold War. This change entailed different processes of societal and transnational socialization. The most important of these mechanisms proved to be the combination of transnational elements, triggered by the demands of bilateral partners and international institutions. These were significantly intensified by the German own commitment towards multilateralism and its active membership in these institutions. During the Cold War, in the cocoon of the East-West stalemate, the development of a fundamental conflict between multilateralism and reluctance towards the use of force could be easily circumvented by a security policy of self-restraint. In the new security situation this was impossible, since the international partners demanded a German contribution thereby creating a situation in which German inactiveness would inevitably weaken the international institutions. The consequence of these processes, which became apparent in German security policy behavior especially vis-à-vis the development of ESDP, the participation in crisis management, the connected reform of the Bundeswehr, and the reaction after the attacks of September 11th, was a substantial shift of priorities between the two foundational elements: Multilateralism moved to primary importance while the reluctance towards the use of force successively moved into the background. But the latter did not fully evaporate, but still kept some of its influence. Germany’s culture of reticence still shapes its security policy, causing incoherent German behavior in different policy areas: being committed and still restrained, clear in rhetoric and tentative in action. This ambiguity widely characterizes German security policy, the promotion of EU and NATO enlargement representing one of the few exceptions.

49 “Für eine kooperative Weltordnung” – Interview with German Chancellor Gerhardt Schröder, In: Internationale Politik, 9/2003: 13-18, 2003, p.13.

The whole process of German Strategic Cultural change takes place within an international framework, mainly consisting of NATO and EU, respectively ESDP. Of course, these two institutions are currently undergoing a process of change themselves and, due to the similarity of purposes, they are constantly facing the risk of moving towards a situation of competition among each other. Hence, basically two developments are thinkable: more ESDP means less NATO, which would imply less influence of the United States on European security policy and thus raising both hopes and concerns on both sides of the Atlantic. Or, more ESDP means more NATO, which would be achieved by close cooperation and would promise a much more stable system of collective security. From a practical perspective, probably none of these developments will occur on a short-term basis, since European countries, especially Germany, will not provide the resources for a more independent ESDP. From a theoretical perspective, the conflict between ESDP and NATO is driven by the trend of the “Europeanization” of security issues emanating from the (growing) gap between European and US Strategic Culture(s). The ambiguity of German security policy considerably affects the relationship between NATO and ESDP. Instead of strengthening both institutions Germany still falls back into the pattern of self-restraint. Unable to find a definite role between the demands of the EU/France and the NATO/US on the one hand and between multilateralism and reluctance towards the use of force on the other hand, it claims political influence without gaining the credibility through practical performance. As a consequence, Germany fails to have a strong balancing impact. The War against Terrorism revealed this pattern of behavior. It is harmful to the transatlantic cooperation and to the integration of the US into the international framework. It undermines the stability of NATO and the European Union.

The findings of this study also suggest that there has been a change within the German Strategic Culture in the form of a priority shift between foundational elements, which did not alter the substance of the German Strategic Culture, but its structural setting. This raises the question of a categorization of Strategic Culture changes: The term of “fundamental change” used by Kerry Longhurst could be characterized by the evolution of a totally new foundational element or the dissolution of an old foundational element. In this sense the change within the German Strategic Culture does not represent a fundamental change. And yet, the term of “fine tuning”, also introduced by Longhurst, does not seem to express the significant change of the German security policy behavior caused by the priority shift between foundational elements. It could therefore be helpful to introduce a third class of Strategic Culture change to name the presented kind of change defined by a shift of priorities without substantial alteration. Due to its character this third class of change may be best described as “structural change”.

And yet, this “structural change” is far from being consistent. The shift of priorities is not fixed, but rather unpredictably altering from one security issue to another as well as over time. The role of multilateralism as priority is undermined by the effects of reluctance towards the use of force, causing ambiguous security policy behavior. Thus, the change of German Strategic Culture does not (yet) result in a new and stable configuration of Strategic Culture, but in an unstable new structure of traditional foundational elements. German security policy is now build on a Strategic Culture of changing consistency rather than a consistent change of Strategic Culture, leaving German security policy on shaky ground, further limiting political options. Germany’s historical experiences could provide the ground for acting as a strong promoter of multilateralism, especially regarding the use of military force. In order to do so and to pay its contribution to the emerging multilateral and institutional framework for international security policy, Germany has to further clarify its priorities by completing its process of Strategic Culture change, winning a new, coherent security policy culture.

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