Evaluation of Germany's Role in the Resolution of the Kosovo conflict
by Wolfgang Brauner
The role Germany played during the resolution of the Kosovo crisis corresponded to the expectations of its "elites" and the German population as a whole, as well as to those of other members of the "international community". Internally, the majority of the German population and politicians supported the government's policy. Externally, Germany's main partners expected it to contribute to the definition and implementation of an effective policy within the relevant international institutions. Thus, Germany acted according to its identity as a "civilian" and European power. This identity shaped its perception of the conflict and its preferences for its resolution. It can be said that Germany acted according to the so-called "logic of appropriateness" within a highly institutionalized multilateral context (NATO, UNSC, EU, OSCE, G-7/8, Contact Group). This concept implies that Germany's behaviour in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict was shaped by the norms and rules of international organisations and by the expectations formulated by other members of these institutions.
Germany´s role concept implied that Germany (and others) do the utmost to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but it also included a willingness to participate in the use of force once all other measures had been exhausted. Thus, Germany played an important part in making Rambouillet possible. And it was Germany that brought Russia back into the negotiations, that accelerated the peaceful settlement of the conflict and that initiated the long-term stabilisation of the entire region of Southeast Europe. The fact that Germany held two Presidencies in 1999, that of the EU and that of the G-8, helped in this regard.
The German initiative for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, also called "Fischer-Plan", illustrates Germany's policies towards the resolution of the war in Kosovo very well. On April 14 1999, Foreign Minister Fischer proposed this plan, which was based on six interconnected steps. Its main points included the formulation of a Security Council Resolution based on the demands agreed upon by the G-8 and a Chapter VII-Resolution including a date for the withdrawal of Serbian troops and a verification mechanism. This United Nations Security Council Resolution would provide an international peace-keeping force with a "robust" mandate and the KLA would commit itself to end the hostilities. Other aspects of the plan concerned the return of the refugees, the work of the humanitarian organisations, the reconstruction of the Kosovo and the creation of a UN administration.
This initiative combines, in what has been called a "double strategy", diplomatic and military aspects in order to accelerate the negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict. By focusing on the UN Security Council, it also tried to bring Russia back into the negotiating process aimed at resolving the crisis.
The subsequent developments proved that this initiative did indeed provide fresh impetus and a perhaps decisive push to the termination of hostilities. During its Washington Summit (23-24 April 1999), the Alliance took up the German initiative and stressed its five essential demands.
The Kosovo conflict also loomed large in Germany's Presidency of the EU. The meetings on the Petersberg and in Cologne, as well as Ahtisaari's mission in Moscow, marked important episodes in the resolution of the conflict. The conflict was also a major subject at the European Council meetings in Berlin and Cologne. Germany not only initiated and coordinated measures taken by the EU during the Kosovo conflict (sanctions, Stability Pact, humanitarian assistance), but also contributed successfully to the definition of a common policy and represented that policy effectively in international negotiations.
Most importantly, Germany succeeded in contributing substantially to the definition and maintenance of a common policy of the EU, including unanimous support of NATO's Operation Allied Force and extensive sanctions. The EU considered NATO's intervention to be "necessary and justified". The extent of this unity contrasts starkly with the divisions between the member states that largely paralysed the EU during the first three wars in former Yugoslavia.
In spite of this rather positive diplomatic record, the war in Kosovo also showed the EU's deficiencies in the field of crisis management and accelerated the process towards the strengthening of the EU's capacity to act in this field. In fact, Operation Allied Force highlighted the widening financial and technological gap that exists between the military capacity of the United States and that of the other European Allies. The EU members simply lack the means to mount an effective peace-keeping operation without the participation of the United States. In order to close that gap and develop an autonomous military capacity, the European Council in Cologne (June 1999) decided to integrate the WEU into the EU by the end of 2000 and the European Council in Helsinki (December 1999) decided to create a rapid reaction force of about 60 000 troops by the end of 2003. Only by better sharing and coordinating their military resources within the EU can member states expect to increase their capacity to act in crisis management operations. This was the conclusion they drew from the role they played during NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Germany fully supports this development but also stresses the need to strengthen the non-military aspects of the EU's crisis management as well.
During its Presidency of the EU, Germany also initiated the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe as a Common Action of the EU which later was to be transformed into a Common Strategy. The Stability Pact aims at the stabilisation and transformation of the entire region by offering the perspective of eventually joining the EU. This perspective is considered to be a major incentive for the countries of the region to reform and cooperate. In this sense, Germany and the other member states of the EU explicitly use the attractiveness of the EU to help stabilise and transform these countries. The strategy is based on the assumption that the region's problems cannot be solved with one big stroke but require instead a long-term engagement by the international community and especially by the EU.
Based on the model of the CSCE negotiating process at the beginning of the 1970s, the Pact includes three so-called "baskets": regional security cooperation, economic reconstruction and democratisation and the development of the rule of law, including in particular the effective protection of ethnic minorities.
With the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the EU explicitly recognizes this region to be an integral part of Europe and takes responsibility for its stabilisation, reconstruction and transformation. The Stability Pact is based on the premise that only the politics of integration can create a peaceful and stable order in all of Europe. The Stability Pact also recognizes the fact that a task of this magnitude can adequately be addressed only by the EU as a whole, and not by any single member state. Both concepts are central to Germany's view of the EU and of its own role in it.
To sum up, Germany's behaviour in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict once more shows how tightly it is integrated into multilateral institutions. This high degree of integration found expression in both the procedural and the substantive aspects of Germany's behaviour. As far as procedure was concerned, Germany once more expressed a clear preference for multilateral coordination of various institutions, capitalising on their respective strengths. In substance, Germany's foreign policy remained "civilian", trying to exploit every conceivable option for a negotiated settlement before resorting to the use of force.
The fact that Germany took part in a military intervention against Serbia without a mandate by the United Nations Security Council could be interpreted as contradicting this evaluation that Germany acted according to the role concept of a civilian power. Several arguments nevertheless tend to support this assessment. First, Germany's participation in combat does not represent such a radically new development as some appear to think. Though not directly involved in the actual bombing, Germany already participated in NATO's intervention against Serbia in 1995. Moreover, since the early 1990s one can observe a rather continuous development towards Germany's participation in military operations. Secondly, for the German government Operation Allied Force represented an extremely rare exception and in no case set a precedent. Third, there is a considerable number of experts of international law who argue that NATO's intervention can be legitimised in spite of the fact that the Security Council did not provide a mandate for it. In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly in fall of 1999, Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer implicitly referred to this controversy when he pleaded for a debate that should lead to a reform of the Security Council and a new balance between the sovereignty of nation states and humanitarian law in favour of the latter.
top |
|
|
|