Additional Protocol (IAEA)
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a so-called Model Additional Protocol on May 15, 1997, with the aim to strengthen and expand its inspection regime (see IAEA safeguards). The adoption and ratification of the Additional Protocol is a voluntary act, yet the IAEA urges the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to do so. If it is ratified by the NPT member state, it provides the IAEA inspectors with the authority to inspect declared as well as undeclared nuclear facilities at no or only short notice.
For detailed information see: [ link ]
Contested Nuclear Activities Related to Uranium Conversion, Enrichment and Reprocessing of Plutonium
The Paris Agreement (of November 15, 2004) between the EU-3 and Iran defines "enrichment related and reprocessing activities" as follows: "the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation." The bone of contention between the parties has long been the temporal dimension: The EU-3 insist that Iran shall suspend these above-mentioned activities permanently, which Iran rejects to do. As a compromise, the Paris Agreement provided that enrichment related and reprocessing activities should be suspended "while negotiations proceed on amutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements."
As the Paris Agreement subsequently fell apart, Iran has started to convert and enrich uranium in smaller quantities.
For detailed information see:IAEA (2004): Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004 (INFCIRC/637).
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Enrichment Centrifuges
Gas centrifuges are used to enrich the gas uranium hexafluoride (HF-6). In rotating cylinders, containing the HF-6, the isotope uranium 235 is separated from uranium 238. Because of its higher weight, uranium 238 accumulates at the outside of the rotating cylinders. The slightly enriched uranium gas with a lower content of the isotope uranium 238 could then be separated from the gas centrifuge. For a higher enrichment capacity a large number of centrifuges have to be interconnected in cascades.
The P-1 centrifuge has an aluminium rotor and the technically more advanced P-2 a maraging steel rotor, which is stronger and spins faster. With the P-2 more uranium can be enriched in every centrifuge than with the P-1. There has been international concern that Iran could acquire the technology for P-2 centrifuges as their use would considerably accelerate the enrichment process.
EU-3 and E3/EU
In September 2003 Germany, France and Great Britain formed a non-institutionalized core group within the European Union, the so-called "EU-3", to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program on behalf of the EU as a whole. By decision of the Council of the European Union from October 11, 2004, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, was included into the EU-3 format. Subsequently, the grouping was sometimes referred to as the E3/EU in order to emphasize the more prominent involvement of EU institutions (High Representative and the Council). For the sake of simplicity, this dossier generally refers to the "EU-3".
IAEA Board of Governors
Apart from the General Conference, the Board of Governors is the most important body of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is composed of 35 representatives of the 139 member states, which are elected for two years by the General Conference. The Bord of Governors has to supervise the realization of and adherence to the IAEA's agreements (like the Safeguards Agreements). Moreover, it has the competence to develop the agency's budget and programme and is in charge of the applications of membership to the IAEA.
Nuclear Fuel-Cycle
The processes involved in producing electricity by using nuclear fuel in reactors are called nuclear fuel-cycle. This contains mining, conversion and enrichment of uranium, reprocessing and disposal of waste.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The NPT entered into force in 1970 and has achieved almost universal membership of States Parties (189 countries as of 2005, with only India, Pakistan and Israel remaining outside). The NPT acknowledges only five official nuclear weapon states (NWS): USA, UK, France, Russia and China. Articles I and II posit that these states would not hand nuclear weapons to others while the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) refrain from acquiring them. Article VI commits the NWS to nuclear disarmament. The current nuclear conflict with Iran is centered around Article IV which acknowledges the "inalienable right" of NNWS to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Inherent Conflicts
Against this background, the NPT contains two inherent conflicts which have become manifest in the conflict over Iran's nuclear program: a.) The NPT seeks to simultaneously support the civilian use of nuclear energy and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of those components needed to produce them. Many elements of the nuclear process can have peaceful as well as military implications, however. B.) The NPT is at least implicitly based on the "deal" that the five official Nuclear-Weapons States (NWS) commit themselves to the "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early stage and complete disarmament" (Art. VI) in exchange for the Non-Nuclear Weapons States' (NNWS) commitment to prevent the "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Art. III). Iran has repeatedly called legitimacy of international demands on its own nuclear program into question as long as the United States and other NWS (as well as Israel which is not a party to the NPT) did not disarm their own stockpiles more substantively.
"Objective Guarantees"
In the "Paris Agreement" the EU-3 and Iran agreed to negotiate a long term agreement, which "will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes." Definitions of "objective guarantees" differ fundamentally. Iran sees the implementation of the Additional Protocol as an objective guarantee. The EU-3 in contrast define as the only objective guarantee "the effective cessation of all activities leading to the production of nuclear materials (i.e. uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and heavy water technologies)" on Iranian territory.
For more information see:
- IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency (2006): Iran sees Additional Protocol as objective guarantee, Europeans do not. Tehran, February 19, 2006.
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- Errera, Philippe (2005): The E3/EU - Iran negotiations and prospects for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue: a European perspective. March 5-6, 2005.
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- Statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson. Paris, January 3, 2006.
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Plutonium and Plutonium Reprocessing
Plutonium is a human-made material that contains 15 different isotopes (from 232 to 246). Plutonium 239 is one of two fissile materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Under natural conditions not existent, plutonium 239 is made of uranium 238. The plutonium has to be as pure as possible to produce nuclear weapons.The process of chemically separating plutonium 239 from other materials is called reprocessing.
Plutonium is classified by the content of plutonium 240. "Supergrade" plutonium has a content of 2-3 per cent of plutonium 240, "weapon-grade" plutonium contains at the most 7 per cent. Both can be used to produce nuclear weapons. The content of plutonium 240 in "fuel grade" and "reactor grade" plutonium is too high for the use in a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless it can be used to produce a "dirty bomb" (or radiological dispersion weapon) which contamines the environment with radioactive fallout without a nuclear explosion.
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The PSI was launched by the Bush Administration on May 31, 2003, and was initially joined by ten other countries: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. It constitutes an effort to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by interdicting shipments - by land, sea and the air - of WMD (biological, chemical, nuclear), their components (also dual use) and related goods (most notably missiles) to terrorists and countries of "proliferation concern". The Initiative does not expand national competences beyond the existing legal status quo, yet participants of the PSI permit their own vessels and aircraft to be interdicted and pledge to share information more quickly.
"Russian Proposal" for a Joint-Venture to Enrich Uranium in Russia
The Russian Government has proposed to establish a Russian-Iranian joint venture for uranium enrichment on Russian territory. According to this proposal Iran could convert uranium into uranium hexafluoride (HF-6) on its own soil. For enrichment, the gas should then be transported to an enrichment facility in Russia. The enriched fuel could be (re-)imported from this facility and used in Iranian reactors.
The proposal is in line with an earlier suggestion by IAEA Director-General ElBaradei to "multilateralize" the nuclear fuel-cycle. It could thus be complemented by the participation of other countries (e.g. China or European countries).
Safeguards Agreement / IAEA
According to Article III of the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with the verification of the nuclear activities of the State Parties as well as of the transfer of nuclear material and technologies.
To this end, the NPT obliges States Parties to conclude so-called Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Safeguards include, among other measures, inspections, remote monitoring and seals. The concealment of clandestine nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and North Korea demonstrated the weaknesses of traditional safeguards. Against this background, the IAEA drafted the Model Additional Protocol to improve and expand the inspection regime (see Additional Protocol).
Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran
The Trade & Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and Iran shall be "a non-preferential Agreement focussed on economic and financial co-operation and on greater trade liberalization […]. In the light of Iran's stated objective of accession to the WTO, the Agreement will support Iran's adaptation to WTO rules, particularly in areas such as intellectual property, public procurement and health and safety standards." [Information by the European Commission]. The negotiations for the TCA began on 12 December 2002 and were suspended because of "perceived limited Iranian progress in four areas of concern focusing on weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the Middle East, and human rights, with a particular emphasis on outstanding questions relating to the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme."
For more information see:
European Commission (2005): EU/Iran Negotiations for Trade & Cooperation Agreement to restart on 12 January, Brussels, January 11, 2005.
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Uranium Conversion and Enrichment
The content of the fissile isotope uranium 235 in natural uranium is about 0,7 per cent. For economic use in civilian reactors to produce electric energy, the content of uranium 235 should be between 3 and 5 per cent. For the construction of nuclear weapons the uranium must contain more than 80 per cent of uranium 235. The process of increasing the content of uranium 235 by separating the isotope uranium 235 from other isotopes with technical means is called uranium enrichment. Uranium with a content of more than 80 to 90 per cent of uranium 235 is called highly enriched uranium (HEU). HEU is weapons-capable.
For the enrichment process by gas diffusion or in gas-centrifuges uranium in a gaseous form is needed (UF-6). The production process from natural uranium to UF-6 is called uranium conversion.
Urenco
Urenco is a company registered in the United Kingdom that provides enrichment services and technologies worlwide. Its core activities are the development and production of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment and the production of enriched uranium for commercial use. Plants are situated in the UK, the Netherlands and in Germany. Urenco is generally seen as a model case for the multilateralization of uranium enrichment as a means to prevent misuse of this process by any single country.