July 1, 1968
As one of the first signatories Iran becomes a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
August 14, 2002
The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, reveals that Iran has been building secret nuclear facilities.
February 2003
Iran is forced to admit the mining of uranium and the development of facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment [see Glossary].
June 6, 2003
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issues a report stating that Iran has violated its responsibilities under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency [see Glossary].
June 19, 2003
The IAEA Board of Governors issues a statement expressing "concern" that Tehran failed to report nuclear "material, facilities, and activities as required by its safeguards obligations." The statement urges Iran to remedy its failures, "resolve" open questions about its nuclear activities and sign the Additional Protocol [see Glossary].
September 12, 2003
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution setting a deadline on October 31 for Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency's investigation. Again it requests Iran to sign and implement the Additional Protocol.
October 21, 2003
Foreign Ministers of the EU-3 (consisting of France, Great Britain and Germany, see Glossary) visit Tehran for the first time. As a result of this meeting the 'Tehran Declaration' is published. The joint visit marks the beginning of the so-called "EU-3"-process whereby the three governments negotiate with Tehran on behalf of the European Union.
December 18, 2003
The Iranian Government signs the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors in a formal statement re-emphasizes "the importance of Iran moving swiftly to ratification and also of Iran acting as if the Protocol were in force in the interim".
February 24, 2004
The IAEA Board of Governors in a formal statement expresses concern that Iran's previous statements still contain a number of omissions and have not provided a complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear program.
June 18, 2004
A resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors calls on Iran to refrain from the production of uraniumhexafluorid (UF6), which is a preliminary product for uranium enrichment, as well as from all production of centrifuge components, production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water [on uranium enrichment and fuel-cycle activities see Glossary].
June 19, 2004
As a direct response to the resolution from June 18, Iranian officials claim that the EU-3 have not kept their end of the compromise and that therefore Tehran would move to end its "voluntary suspension", notifying the IAEA that it intends to resume manufacture of centrifuge components and assembly and testing of centrifuge machines.
July 29/30, 2004
In a move to rescue the Tehran Declaration, the EU-3 ministers and Iranian officials meet in Paris. The meeting ends without an agreement.
September 18, 2004
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution tabled by the EU-3 and the United States expressing serious concern that Tehran has not heeded previous calls to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. This resolution contains an implicit threat of referring Iran to the UN Security Council if it does not take significant steps towards meeting the IAEA's demands by the next Board meeting, to be held in November.
September 19, 2004
An Iranian official warns that with referral to the Security Council, Iran would stop implementing the Additional Protocol and would consider pulling out of the NPT altogether.
October 5, 2004
A parliamentary committee in Iran gives approval to a bill obliging the government to resume its uranium enrichment.
October 21, 2004
Ahead of the IAEA Board meeting, officials from the EU-3 meet with Iranian officials to offer a "last chance" by presenting a four-page proposal. While Iran proposes a six-month duration for the suspension of uranium enrichment activities, the EU-3 is pressing for an indefinite moratorium.
November 15, 2004
After lengthy negotiations, the EU-3 and Iran conclude the 'Paris Agreement' which strives for an enhanced and long term cooperation between Iran and the Europeans. Iran agrees to the suspension of all uranium-enrichment activities [see Glossary] for the duration of future negotiations. In addition to this, the text recognizes Iran's nuclear "rights under the NPT" and states that the freeze is voluntary rather than "a legal obligation."
In the context of these negotiations, Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), joins the European delegation for the first time, thus strengthening the direct institutional involvement of the EU. The new format is sometimes referred to as E3/EU.
December 13, 2004
The foreign ministers from the EU-3 meet with an Iranian delegation to open negotiations on a long-term resolution concerning Tehran's nuclear program. Iranian officials indicate that they want the talks to be concluded as quickly as possible.
February 2005
After an official visit of President George W. Bush to Europe, the US-government declares its support for the negotiations of the EU-3 with Iran. Specifically, it offers to consider the export of spare parts for the aging fleet of Iran's civilian aircraft as well as a more flexible stance towards Iran's accession to the World Trade Organization.
March 10, 2005
In a letter to High Representative Solana, the foreign ministers of the EU-3 acknowledge that the negotiations with Iran are not progressing well and that they will propose to the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the UN Security Council if more progress is not forthcoming.
March 23, 2005
During a meeting in Paris, Iranian officials offer a General Framework for "Objective
Guarantees, Firm Guarantees, and Firm Commitments". Because the Framework does not specifically refer to the suspension of the uranium enrichment activities - as stated in the Paris Agreement - the EU-3 calls the offer "unacceptable".
April 29, 2005
The foreign ministers of the EU-3 meet Iranian officials in London. On this occasion Iran threatens to re-start enrichment activities if the meeting does not end with an agreement.
May 9, 2005
Iran confirms the processing of tons of uranium ore which makes the EU-3 consider to stop negotiations. Parallel to this, they call for international support on this topic.
June 24, 2005
Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad is elected Iranian president. In his first public appearances, he expresses scepticism towards the negotiations with the EU-3.
July 14, 2005
While the Iranian government waits for an EU-3 proposal announced in May, the press speculates at an early stage about a proposal to allow Iran enrichment of uranium in Russia (the so-called "Russian proposal", see Glossary). Shortly afterwards, Tehran sets a deadline for August 1st for the Europeans to table a concrete negotiation offer. Otherwise, Tehran threatens to resume enrichment activities.
August 1, 2005
In a letter to the IAEA, the Iranian government states its decision to reopen the conversion of uranium in Isfahan. Tehran justifies this step with the argument that the EU-3 have acted in contradiction to the Paris Agreement and would only strive for the prolongation of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related activities. At the same time, Iran agrees with inspections of the IAEA in Isfahan.
August 2, 2005
For its part, the EU-3 condemns the announcement of the Iranian government as incoherent with the Paris Agreement. In a letter to Director General and to the Iranian negotiators, the EU-3 warn Iran that the Security Council could be called.
August, 2005
The EU-3 submits a 'Proposal for a Long-term Agreement' which would allow Iran to develop a peaceful nuclear programme, while the use of sensitive technologies (enrichment and reprocessing) would have to be suspended for the time being.
August 7, 2005
The Islamic Republic of Iran issues a formal statement as a response to the Long-Term Agreement proposed by the EU-3, calling it a "clear violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the NPT, Teheran Statement and Paris Agreement". Tehran criticizes that the "proposal is extremely long on demands and absurdly short on offers".
August 8, 2005
According to IAEA Director ElBaradei, Iran starts with the conversion of uranium in Isfahan.
August 11, 2005
In a resolution the IAEA Board of Governors again underlines the need for complete suspension of nuclear activities to rebuild the confidence of the international community.
September 24, 2005
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution stating Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. The resolution calls on Iran to "observe fully its commitments and to return to the negotiating process that has made good progress in the last two years".
November 3, 2005
High Representative Solana declares the welcoming of the EU-3 to new talks before the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on November 15. Shortly after this, the Iranian government request the reopening of negotiations with the three European governments.
November 9, 2005
First details about a new European proposal are published. According to these, sensible nuclear activities, especially the enrichment of uranium, would be transferred from Iran to Russia.
November 18, 2005
Information that Iran has dispased of a blueprint for building the nucleus of a nuclear bomb since the 1980s is published.
November 24, 2005
The Chairmans's Conclusion at a meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors defers a report to the UN Security Council. Instead, the EU-3 are requested to continue their negotiation efforts with Iran.
December 21, 2005
Further negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 specifically linked to the "Russian Proposal" end without results.
January 9, 2006
Iran removes the IAEA seals from a number of nuclear research centres in contradiction to the demands of the EU-3 and the IAEA.
January 12, 2006
The Foreign Ministers of the EU-3 and the EU High Representative issue a joint statement to express their conviction that the authority of the United Nations would be needed to emphasize the IAEA demands. They admit that the diplomatic process with Iran has reached an impasse.
January 30, 2006
The 'London declaration' of the foreign ministers of the EU-3, the US, Russia and China calls for consultations on Iran within the IAEA to be reported to the UN Security Council, even though any formal action by the UN is deferred until the publication of another report by IAEA Director General ElBaradei in early March.
February 4, 2006
At an extraordinary IAEA Board meeting, the EU-3 rallies behind a diplomatic solution and presents a draft resolution in line with the 'London Declaration'. The resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors demands Iran to suspend the contested nuclear activities and to ensure complete transparency and cooperation by Iran
March 8, 2006
The IAEA Board of Governors votes to seek formal referral to the UN Security Council of the file on Iran's nuclear program. The report refers to outstanding questions about Tehran's nuclear activities.
March 2006
With the direct involvement of the UN Security Council, negotiations shift towards the "contact group" dealing with Iran. This group consists of the permanent five members of the UNSC (China, Russia, France, Great Britain and the United States) plus Germany. The six countries are unable to agree on a joint policy towards Tehran, because Russia and China refuse to endorse economic or even military sanctions against Iran.
March 29, 2006
The Security Council issues a Presidential Statement (not a formal Resolution) reaffirming the IAEA's demands and requesting IAEA Director ElBaradei to report again on Iran's compliance with these demands within 30 days.
Beginning of May, 2006
After Iran has failed to meet the indicated deadline of the Security Council, the United States, France and Britain draft a Security Council Resolution which would make the suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory for Iran under Chapter VII of the UN-Charta. Russia and China reject this draft because it could lay the ground for economic sanctions which they oppose.
The EU-3 announce to table another proposal for Tehran which would offer more economic incentives as well as prospects for economic sanctions in case no agreement is reached.
June 1, 2006
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) agree on a new package offer to Iran. It includes incentives such as European cooperation on light-water reactor and the prospect of the lifting of some US-imposed sanctions (e.g. on exports of spare parts for Iran's aging civilian aircraft fleet) as well as specific sanctions in case of no agreement (embargo against specific goods related to Iran's nuclear and missile programs as well as a weapons embargo; these are not included in the official version of the offer but can be found in a preliminary version circulated on the internet). For the first tim, the US government declares its willingness to talk directly to Tehran on the issue.
June 5, 2006
High Representative Solana and officials from the EU-3 travel to Tehran in order to present the new offer to the Iranians. Ali Larijani, Head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, calls the talks with Solana "positive" but also speaks of "ambiguities that need to be addressed." German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier says that he expects an official reaction from Iran until June 29 when the G8 leaders convene in St. Petersburg.
July 31, 2006
When the Iranian side announces that it would publish its official response to the international offer only until the end of August, the P5 plus Germany for the first time agree on a draft resolution for the United Nations which is then approved by the Security Council. Resolution 1696 once more demands of Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities (related to uranium-enrichment, including research and development, reprocessing of plutonium, heavy-water technology). As the demand is made under Chapter VII of the UN Charta, it is now legally binding under international law. The resolution announces the possibility of sanctions should Iran not comply until the next deadline on August 31.
August 31, 2006
IAEA Director El-Baradei releases a report stating that Iran did not meet its obligations under UN Resolution 1696.
September 2006
By way of separate initiatives, Germany and France explore ways to introduce more flexibility into the international negotiations. French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy publicly questions the strict principle of European and American policy to demand a suspension of uranium-enrichment as a precondition of further negotiations, stating that there should be more "flexibility" in the timing of suspension (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9.12.2006). Facing opposition from the U.S., Germany and the UK he immediately withdraws this proposition.
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier instead proposes to install a multinational facility for uranium-enrichment under the control of the IAEA and on "extraterritorial" ground. This facility, which had been brought into play by IAEA Director El-Baradei before, would guarantee supply of nuclear fuel to Iran and other interested parties. Steinmeier will repeat this proposal in May 2007.
October 2006
After intense negotiations between the EU-3, Russia, China and the United States, the Council of the EU in a statement calls on the UN Security Council to adopt economic and political sanctions against Tehran for the first time. Iran defies these threats and at the end of October announces that it succeeded to enrich small quantities of uranium to the level of 3-5 %.
December 23, 2006
The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1737 which for the first time contains concrete economic and political sanctions against Iran under Article 41 of the UN Charta. The decision was preceded by difficult negotiations among the EU-3 and US on the one side and Russia and China, which sought to avoid tougher sanctions, on the other.
Resolution 1737 imposes an embargo for "all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems". Moreover, it freezes the financial assets of specific persons and institutions related to Iran's nuclear or missile programs. It stops short of an explicit travel ban on the same Iranian individuals.
February 7, 2007
A restricted report prepared by the staff of High Representative Solana is leaked to the press which acknowledges that the European and international diplomatic efforts have so far been unsuccessful to stop Iran from developing its nuclear program. Delays have to be attributed more to the technical difficulties on the Iranian side rather than to diplomatic efforts or sanctions.
February 22, 2007
IAEA Director El-Baradei releases another report stating that Iran did not meet its obligations under UN Resolution 1737.
March 24, 2007
After another round of negotiations between EU-3, U.S., Russia and China, the United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1747 which further expands political and economic sanctions against Iran. Beyond the measure adopted under Resolution 1737, it contains more committal language on travel restrictions against persons engaged in Iran's nuclear or missile programs as well as an arms embargo. Moreover, it expands the list of individuals and institutions, whose assets are frozen. The resolution sets a new deadline in May for Iran to comply to the Security Council's demands.
April 22, 2007
Iran rejects the UN sanctions and announces a partial suspension of cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian officials state that Iran had begun operating 3.000 centrifuges to enrich uranium.
The Council of the EU adopts its own sanctions against Iran which partly go beyond the provisions of UN Resolutions, but at the same time reaffirms the option of economic and political incentives as laid out in the June 2006 offer.
May 23, 2007
IAEA Director El-Baradei reports for a third time that Iran has not complied with previous UN resolutions and has thus failed to meet the deadline set by Resolution 1747.
Developments since May 2007
Since then negotiations between the "P5+1" and Iran have stalled. Tehran has so far declined a European proposal for a "double moratorium" (suspension of uranium-enrichment for suspension of UN sanctions). Negotiators of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council plus Germany have since then been negotiating on whether or not to initiate a third round of escalating sanctions, but without coming to an agreement so far.