Introduction
The current conflict over Iran's nuclear program began on August 14, 2002, when an Iranian opposition group, the "National Council of Resistance of Iran", publicly claimed that Tehran had been secretly building two nuclear facilities to convert and to enrich uranium in the cities of Isfahan and Natanz respectively. As a member state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, see Glossary) - which it had already signed on July 1, 1968 - and under the complementary Safeguards Agreement (see Glossary) Iran would have been obliged to report these activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Uranium conversion and enrichment (see Glossary) - as well as the reprocessing of plutonium to a lesser degree - are at the core of the current conflict, because from a technical point of view both processes can serve to produce either fuel for civilian nuclear reactors or for the production of a nuclear weapon. The Iranian government has always insisted that its activities are entirely peaceful. The European Union, the IAEA and the USA have called this claim into question.
Since then, the international conflict over Iran's nuclear program and the European involvement in it unfolded in at least four distinct phases. Each phase is characterized by an escalation or de-escalation of the conflict, accompanied by diplomatic moves from the Europeans, the IAEA, the Iranian side and more recently from the informal "Contact Group" (P5 plus 1, consisting of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany). In the following overview, we will briefly sketch the developments along these phases.
Phase 1: Rising Suspicion of Iranian Intentions and the Beginning of European Diplomacy
On February 9, 2003, Iran had to admit that it had in fact been building new facilities as part of its program to develop a nuclear fuel cycle (see Glossary). On June 6, 2003, the IAEA issued a report where it stated that the violations of Iran were against its responsibilities under the NPT. This assessment was reinforced by another IAEA statement from June 19 2003 where the Agency's Board of Governors (see Glossary) expressed "concern" that Tehran had failed to report nuclear "material, facilities, and activities as required by its safeguards obligations." It also urged Iran to remedy its failures, "resolve" open questions about its nuclear activities and sign the Additional Protocol (see Glossary) which would allow the Agency more intrusive inspections in declared and undeclared Iranian nuclear sites. International suspicion was further increased when IAEA-inspectors found traces of highly-enriched uranium (HEU, which is weapons-capable) in the Natanz facility even though Iran had always denied the production of HEU. Iran claimed that the contamination originated from a foreign source where the enrichment centrifuges (see Glossary) had been bought. This claim was later confirmed by the investigation of the IAEA.
As a result of the rising suspicion, the foreign ministers of the EU put Iran on their agenda in April 2003 stating that a pending Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Tehran (see Glossary) would be conditional on the peaceful character of Iran's nuclear program. In July, the EU Council for the first time expressed increasing concern over the development of the Iranian nuclear program and over the proliferation risks implied, in particular as regards closing the nuclear fuel cycle (see Glossary). On September 12, the Council echoed a similar statement of the IAEA Board of Governors (see Glossary) of the same day demanding the immediate suspension of all enrichment activities from Tehran. This Council document had been drafted by the governments of France, Great Britain and Germany, thus marking the beginning of the so-called "EU-3" process (see Glossary) with those three countries negotiating (without formal authorization) on behalf of the EU as a whole.
On October 21 2003, the three foreign ministers of the EU-3 followed an invitation by the Iranians to come to Tehran in an attempt to bring the diplomatic process forward. As a result, the Europeans issued the non-binding 'Tehran Declaration' with Iranian consent. According to the agreement reached, Iran declared its willingness to sign the Additional Protocol (and eventually seek Parliamentary ratification thereof) and to temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities. In return, the Europeans offered economic and technological cooperation and benefits. On December 18, 2003, the Iranian government signed the Additional Protocol. In a formal statement, the IAEA Board of Governors re-emphasized "the importance of Iran moving swiftly to ratification and also of Iran acting as if the Protocol were in force in the interim."
Phase 2: The Coming Apart of the Tehran Declaration and the Conclusion of the Paris Agreement
The Tehran Declaration reflected a certain détente of the situation and gave rise to hopes that a diplomatic solution to the conflict over Iran's nuclear program was within reach. In the following months, however, the weaknesses of the Declaration became apparent and the deal started to come apart. Specifically, the assignments of responsibilities in the Tehran Declaration turned out to be too vague. For instance, it was still contested among the parties which nuclear activities would fall under the suspension and how long this temporary interruption would have to last.
The discord came to the surface when, reacting to a critical IAEA-resolution from the previous day, the Iranian negotiators announced on June 19, 2004, that Iran would end its "voluntary suspension", notifying the IAEA that it intended to resume manufacture of centrifuge components and assembly and testing of centrifuge machines. According to the Iranian side, the Europeans had not kept their commitments of the Tehran Declaration. Even more importantly, Iran announced to resume the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) which is the feed material for uranium enrichment.
The IAEA Board of Governors reacted on its part with a tough resolution on September 18, 2004, co-sponsored by the EU-3 and the US, which for the first time contained an implicit threat to refer Iran to the UN Security Council (UNSC) if Tehran did not take significant steps towards meeting the IAEA's demands by the time of the next Board meeting in November. Iranian officials in turn reacted with a warning that Iran would stop implementing the Additional Protocol and would consider pulling out of the NPT altogether if the conflict would be referred to the UNSC. To underline the Iranian position, a parliamentary committee in Iran gave approval to a bill obliging Iran to resume its uranium enrichment activities on October 5, 2004.
As the diplomatic situation had thus reached a new low, European diplomats started another effort to overcome the deadlock. On October 21, 2004, ahead of an IAEA Board meeting, officials from the EU-3 met with Iranian officials to offer a "last chance" by presenting a four-page proposal which put the offer of technology transfer for peaceful nuclear energy by the EU-3 into the context of a long-term agreement. On November 4/5, the European Council concluded that "a full and sustained suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, on a voluntary basis, would open the door for talks on long-term cooperation offering mutual benefits."
The initiative ultimately paved the way for another accord between Iran and the EU-3 that sought to rectify the identified short-comings of the Tehran Declaration. The 'Paris Agreement' was issued on November 15, 2004. As both sides signed it, the agreement was politically more binding than the former and also more concrete in terms of institutional back-up. It made arrangements for the creation of three working groups on "Nuclear Questions", "Technology and Cooperation" and "Security" and also contained more concrete offers, such as European support for an eventual accession of Iran to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In return, the Europeans demanded "objective guarantees" (see Glossary) for the peaceful character of Iran's nuclear program. While this term is not clearly defined, Iran agreed to once more suspend all its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as long as negotiations on a long-term agreement were underway.
The remainder of this phase of the negotiations was filled by efforts on both sides to spell out such a "long-term agreement". Prospects for a diplomatic solution seemed to improve as these efforts received the explicit backing from Washington for the first time. The Bush Administration abandoned its previous passivity towards the diplomatic mission of the EU-3. After a visit of President Bush to Europe in February 2005, Washington announced to consider the export of spare parts for the aging Iranian fleet of civilian aircraft and to eventually support Iranian accession to the WTO. On March 23, 2005, Tehran tabled its most far-reaching and detailed proposals until than in the form of a "General Framework for Objective Guarantees, Firm Guarantees and Firm Commitments." Iran offered a "phased approach" to the resolution of the conflict which included the implementation and eventual ratification of the Additional Protocol, uranium conversion under the eyes of the IAEA, technological cooperation and reducing sanctions against Iran. It also foresaw, however, the "testing" of some 3.000 centrifuges in Natanz under the eyes of the IAEA. At this point, the incompatible positions of Iran and the Europeans (as well as the US) came to the surface again. While Tehran insisted on its right to enrich uranium on its own soil in principle, the EU-3 immediately rejected the General Framework as it envisaged exactly this (and because it contained no guarantee for the ratification of the Additional Protocol). From that point on, the situation has deteriorated ever since, leading to a diplomatic and political escalation that took the dispute from the IAEA into the United Nations Security Council.
Phase 3: Political Escalation on Both Sides and the Shift of the Diplomatic Stage to the Security Council
(April 2005 until July 2006)
As the negotiations on a "long-term agreement" between the EU-3 and Iran dragged on without tangible results, diplomacy became increasingly affected by the maelstrom of domestic Iranian politics. Ahead of the presidential elections in Iran, Iranian negotiators became more impatient and on April 29 issued the threat towards their counterparts from France, Great Britain and Germany that without an agreement, they will start their enrichment-related activities - referring to uranium conversion as a first step - again. On June 24, the former Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad was elected as Iranian president. He defeated former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who was widely viewed as being more willing to compromise on the nuclear issue. After Ahmadi-Nejad's victory, the Iranians began to replace some of its highest diplomats as well as the top negotiator, Rowhani, by persons more in line with the assertive stance of the new president. By the end of July, the Iranian government issued an ultimatum for the Europeans to table a concrete proposal. As the deadline passed, Tehran, in a letter to the IAEA on August 1, 2005, announced its decision to restart the conversion of uranium in Isfahan and asked the IAEA to resume its inspections at the site. Tehran justified its move with the claim that the EU-3 had only sought to buy time with the prolongation of Iran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities.
At this point, and reacting to the Iranian move, the EU-3 for the first time publicly warned that the conflict could be referred from the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council as a further step of diplomatic and political escalation. Concurrently, however, the Europeans tabled another 'Proposal for a Long-term Agreement' on August 5, 2005, which affirmed Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and mentioned international guarantees for the supply of nuclear fuel for Iran. It also included the offer of economic, political and security cooperation. On the demand-side, the proposal restated the known conditions of the EU, US and IAEA for Iran to stop uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities on its own soil. Tehran rejected the proposal and instead followed its previous announcement to start conversion of uranium on August 8.
As the negotiations stalled, the Europeans turned to another proposal which had been circulated by the Russian government already in July. Moscow had suggested to install a Russian-Iranian joint-venture to enrich uranium in Russia and to ship it back to Iran (the "Russian Proposal", see Glossary). In December, these negotiations ended without any concrete results, however, partly because Tehran insisted on its right to enrich uranium on its own soil. Meanwhile, the international suspicion against Iran had been further fanned by the publication of information in November, according to which Iran had received a 1 ˝ page blueprint for the design of a nuclear warhead in 1987. Tehran later confirmed this but declared that the blueprint had been delivered from an external source without having been requested by Iran.
In January 2006, Iran "crossed the red-line" in the eyes of the European negotiators when it decided to resume uranium enrichment efforts in the context of "research and development" in Natanz. Tehran also removed the IAEA seals from a number of other research facilities signaling that it was no longer willing to voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol. The foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and Germany and the EU High Representative Solana reacted with a joint statement on January 12, 2006 demanding the direct involvement of the United Nations to provide more authority to the IAEA demands. The Europeans managed to win the crucial support of permanent UNSC members Russia and China. Hence, the "London declaration" of the foreign ministers of the EU-3, the US, Russia and China from January 30, 2006, calls for consultations on Iran within the IAEA to be reported to the UN Security Council while any further action by the IAEA Board of Governors or the UN Security Council was to be deferred until the publication of another report by IAEA Director General ElBaradei in early March. At a special IAEA Board meeting on February 4, 2006, the Board endorsed and reaffirmed the London Declaration. The resolution adopted by the IAEA Board demanded Iran to suspend its nuclear activities and ensure complete transparency and cooperation. Crucially, the Board meeting requested El-Baradei to report the Causa Iran to the UN Security Council, even though it stopped short of a formal referral to the UNSC.
After ElBaradei published another report at the beginning of March, which still referred to outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear activities, the IAEA Board on March 8 voted to seek formal deliberations within the UNSC on Iran. With the UNSC playing an increasingly important role, the locus of international negotiations shifted to its permanent five members plus Germany (P5 Plus 1). In March, the six nations negotiated intensively to reach common ground on Iran, but differences remained because China and Russia strongly resisted to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charta as it could open the way for economic sanctions against Tehran. As a compromise, the Security Council on March 29 issued a Presidential Statement (not a formal Resolution) reaffirming the IAEA's demands and requesting Director ElBaradei to report again on Iran's compliance with these demands within 30 days. Despite this diplomatic escalation, Tehran continued to refuse the suspension or termination of its uranium enrichment activities. To the contrary, Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad stated on April 11 that his country had continued to expand its enrichment activities for research and development and that Iranian scientist succeeded in enriching a small quantity of uranium to a concentration of 3.5%.
At the beginning of May, after Iran had failed to meet the previous 30-day deadline, the United States, France, Britain and Germany continued to pursue a two-track approach of enhanced prospects for cooperation coupled with the option of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. On the track of prospective punishments, Washington, London and Paris drafted a UN Security Council resolution which would make the suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory for Iran under Chapter VII of the UN-Charta (thus laying the groundwork for economic sanctions). On the track of incentives, the EU-3 and Washington, supported by China and Russia, tabled a last comprehensive package of political and economic incentives - European cooperation on a light-water reactor and the prospect of lifting some US-imposed sanctions (e.g. exports of spare parts for Iran's aging fleet of civilian aircraft). As a novelty, the U.S. administration for the first time offered direct talks on a political level with Tehran if Iran would suspend uranium-enrichment (thus marking a departure of U.S. policy towards Iran since 1979). Moreover, the package for the first time included the threat of economic sanctions (even though these where not mentioned in the official version, but where only included in a preliminary version of the offer circulated on the internet).
Phase 4: Political Escalation and Sanctions in the UN Security Council
(July 2006 until present)
The Iranian government did not to respond to this last offer until late August 2006 and when it actually did, the official Iranian response remained inconclusive and in the end dismissive. The Iranian rejection of the June 2006 offer and the insistence to continue its contested nuclear program led to a fourth phase in the international dispute which was characterized by a repetitive pattern of escalating sanctions in the Security Council. Each step was preceded by intensive (and controversial) negotiations between the EU-3 and the US which favoured tougher measures on the one side and Russia and China which sought softer reactions on the other. The first step was taken on July 31, 2006 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 which made the demand for Iran to suspend uranium-enrichment, reprocessing and work on its heavy-water program legally binding under Chapter VII of the UN Charta. It also set an August 31 deadline and contained the explicit threat of economic sanctions. When the deadline passed, IAEA-director El-Baradei issued a report stating that Iran had not met the demands of this first resolution, thus triggering the second step which culminated in Security Council Resolution 1737. This resolution for the first time imposed an embargo for "all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems". It also froze the financial assets of specific persons and institutions related to these activities. After IAEA Director El-Baradei reported again that Iran had not met the demands contained in previous UN resolutions on February 22, 2007, the UN Security Council adopted, in a third step, Resolution 1747 on March 24. It further tightened political and economic sanctions against Iran, including a weapons embargo, and extended the list of persons and institutions whose assets are frozen.
On May 23, El-Baradei reported for a third time that Iran had failed to comply with international demands. To the contrary, Iranian officials had already announced in April that their scientists successfully began operating 3.000 centrifuges for uranium-enrichment. Since then, international negotiations between the P5 plus Germany and with Iran have more or less stalled. So far, members of the Security Council have been unable to agree on a fourth resolution which would tighten the sanctions regime even further. The Iranian side has declined the western proposal of a "double moratorium" (to suspend uranium-enrichment for the suspension of UN sanctions).