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German Foreign Policy Since Unification - Theories Meet Reality

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1 Introduction

Notwithstanding the newest wave of analytical contributions, the bulk of the literature on post-unification Germany's foreign policy has been of a descriptive and/or prescriptive nature.¹ By contrast, this volume presents a theory-guided empirical analysis of post-unification Germany's foreign policy and thereby aims at contributing to both our knowledge about Germany's foreign policy behavior *and* to the evaluation of the explanatory power of major foreign policy theories.

In the 1990s, the public debate on German foreign policy was dominated by the question whether Germany's improved power position after unification would lead to a change in its foreign policy (cf. ch. Two). Therefore, we have taken neorealist foreign policy theory as our point of departure in designing our research project (section 2.1). In addition to 'Germany's power position', however, we have included two further independent variables, 'domestic interests' and 'social norms', in our research design (section 2.2). In order to test the neorealist prediction that a more powerful post-unification Germany will increase its pursuit of power politics (as well as to examine the explanatory power of 'domestic interests' and 'social norms') we have selected eight cases from a wide range of issue areas. Section 3 outlines our criteria for case selection and gives a brief overview of the sample finally chosen. Sections 4 and 5 present the findings from our research project. Section 4 gives an answer to the empirical question to what extent post-unification Germany has changed its foreign policy behavior and to what extent it has been characterized by continuity. Section 5 assesses the explanatory power of the foreign policy theories under examination. Neorealism's explanatory record is the poorest though the modification of neorealism yields correct predictions at least in most cases of 'high politics', the home turf of neorealism. Whereas utilitarian liberalism has a mixed explanatory record, constructivism correctly predicts German behavior in all cases, is supported by further observable implications in many cases under consideration but,

¹ For recent theory-led research cf., among others, Banchoff 1999, Berger 1998, Duffield 1999, 1998, Katzenstein 1997 and Kirste 1997. For the debate geared towards analysis of and for policy, cf. ch. Two and Hellmann 1996.

in two cases, is weakened by puzzling further observable implications. In sum, post-unification Germany's foreign policy is norm-consistent foreign policy that, at the same time, aims at enhancing its influence in the realm of high politics and seeks to achieve economic gains in the realm of foreign trade.

2 Research question: continuity or change in post-unification Germany's foreign policy?

2.1 Testing neorealist foreign policy theory: does an improved power position lead to increased power politics?

As outlined in ch. Two, observers agree that unification and the end of the East-West conflict opened up opportunities for Germany to step up its pursuit of power politics. Due to the largely policy-oriented character of the debate, participants were divided over the question of whether post-unification Germany's foreign policy *should* embark on such a foreign policy course. Though neorealism has hardly been mentioned explicitly in this debate, the neorealist notion that a state's foreign policy is shaped by its power position has been a major point of reference for the majority of contributors.² Neorealist theory therefore has taken a prominent place in the debate over post-unification Germany's foreign policy.

For a theory-led analysis of post-unification Germany's foreign policy, neorealism is therefore an obvious point of departure. The test of the neorealist prediction that, due to an improvement of Germany's power position, its foreign policy will embark on the pursuit of power politics after unification has therefore been the centerpiece of our research endeavor. Because neorealism is a theory of international politics, however, neorealist *foreign policy theory* had to be (re-)constructed in the first place (ch. Three): In the neorealist view, states

² As ch. Two shows, only a minority of observers has referred to that notion affirmatively. The majority of commentators has done so rather disapprovingly.

are rational actors that adapt their behavior to the structural constraints of the international system. In order to safeguard their survival in an anarchic self-help system, states strive for autonomy from other actors and for influence on other actors. The more powerful a state, the more autonomy and influence it can be expected to seek. A state's power position in turn is determined by the number of great powers and the distribution of political, economic and military capabilities in the international system, i.e. its share in capabilities and the polarity of the international system. Ch. Three examines how Germany's power position has changed from the time before unification to the time thereafter by measuring Germany's share in four key capabilities (GNP, exports, military spending, and armed forces) and by discussing the impact of the transition from a bipolar to a non-bipolar international system after 1989. Though Germany's share in key capabilities has only improved modestly, its room for independent action has increased significantly. Whereas the dependency on the US during the Cold War limited Germany's leverage for independent action, these constraints have lessened with the transition from a bipolar to a non-bipolar international system. Ch. Three therefore concludes that, in sum, Germany's power position has improved moderately. *Neorealism expects Germany to step up its pursuit of power politics after unification, i.e. post-unification Germany will attempt to increase both its autonomy from and its influence on other actors in the international system.*

Ch. Three takes recent debates within the neorealist school of thought into account by distinguishing two variants of neorealist foreign policy theory, i.e. neorealism and modified neorealism. Neorealism holds that states' foreign policies are based on worst-case scenarios and will thus prefer autonomy over influence when the two are at odds. Modified neorealism, by contrast, treats security pressures as an intervening variable. As a consequence, modified neorealism posits that states attribute less importance to autonomy when they are exposed to low security pressures. Thus, whenever the probability of being threatened or attacked is low, states may forgo gains in autonomy whenever substantial gains in influence can be achieved in turn. While both variants concur in their general expectation that a more powerful post-unification Germany will intensify its pursuit of power politics, the (possible) trade-off

between gains in autonomy and gains in influence has to be examined on a case-by-case basis. *Since Germany has experienced a drastic decrease of security pressures over the last decade, modified neorealism expects it to enhance its influence on others rather than its autonomy when the two are at odds.*

2.2 Evaluating the explanatory power of further independent variables: ‘domestic interests’ and ‘social norms’

Though Germany's power position is this project's key explanatory variable, two further independent variables have been included in our research design, i.e. ‘domestic interests’ and ‘social norms’. The inclusion of these independent variables serves a double purpose: First, the impact of our key explanatory variable can be better assessed when we control for the impact of further independent variables.³ Second, the explanatory power of domestic interests and of social norms themselves can be assessed which may yield important findings in their own right.

Of course, in order to serve the purpose of controlling for further causal factors, further independent variables must be carefully selected. Our selection of domestic interests and of social norms reflects the state of the art in (comparative) foreign policy analysis according to which there have been two major debates: First, within the rationalist camp, the primacy of international factors (emphasized by neorealist theorizing) has been questioned by (utilitarian) liberalism which has pointed to the importance of domestic interests as prime determinant of collective action. Second, constructivism has challenged rationalism as the dominant ontology in foreign policy analysis (underlying, among others, neorealism and utilitarian liberalism) by arguing that social action is rooted in intersubjectively shared value-based expectations of appropriate behavior, i.e. social norms.

³ It should be noted, however, that a longitudinal analysis of a single country poses less severe problems of control than the analysis of different countries in different time periods. This is because a broad range of country-specific variables is held constant automatically (Lijphart 1975: 159).

The claim that state behavior is not driven by the international distribution of power but by domestic interests is long established. Going back to Kant, Hobson and Schumpeter, scholars have stressed, albeit in a critical vein, the importance of the domestic decision-making processes and the impact of influential societal groups. Starting with Allison's 'Essence of Decision' (1971; Allison/Zelikow 1999) the research on bureaucratic politics has added the importance of organizational self-interest and intra-administrative decision-making to this strand of foreign policy analysis. Over the course of the last two decades, liberal foreign policy analysis has increasingly been inspired by the theory-development in comparative public policy analysis. Ch. Four assembles these various research traditions into a coherent framework that allows us to derive predictions about post-unification Germany's foreign policy in all cases examined. It distinguishes several types of actors (actors within the political-administrative system and private actors such as companies, economic pressure groups, and political advocacy groups) and attributes basic interests to them. In order to assess each actor's capacity to shape German foreign policy, its level of structural mobilization (i.e. its capacity to assert its preferences) and its level of situative mobilization (i.e. the degree to which its basic interests are affected by the matter under consideration) have to be determined. Moreover, the degree of autonomy of the most assertive actors of the political-administrative system from the most assertive private actors must be ascertained in order to develop propositions about the domestic interests which are held to shape the foreign policy behavior. For each step, ch. Four carefully elaborates criteria that make an empirical test of utilitarian liberalism's predictions possible. *In general, utilitarian liberalism expects post-unification Germany to continue its pursuit of gain-seeking foreign policy in the same form and intensity as hitherto because it assumes that unification did not significantly alter Germany's constellation of domestic interests.*

More recently, rationalist theories of foreign policy (including neorealism and utilitarian liberalism) have been challenged by a growing body of constructivist research (cf., among others, Hudson 1997; Goldstein/Keohane 1993). The constructivist framework assembles a heterogeneous group of scholars who have emphasized the importance of non-

material factors such as ‘identity’, ‘values’, ‘norms’, ‘culture’, ‘ideas’ and the like. As put forward in ch. Five, social norms, i.e. intersubjectively shared, value based expectations of appropriate behavior, are the independent variable in a constructivist foreign policy theory. Though research on international norms, on the one hand, and on societal norms, on the other hand, has traditionally been separated of each other, ch. Five integrates these two research traditions into a single coherent theory. It pays special attention to the discussion of indicators of (international and societal) norms that make the identification of shared value-based expectations of appropriate German foreign policy behavior possible. Because the pattern of continuity and change displayed by social norms may vary across different issue areas and even across specific subjects within a single issue area, *constructivism's general prediction about German foreign policy after unification confines itself to the proposition that German foreign policy behavior will change only if and when the norms pertaining to the issue in question have changed.*

Table 10.1: Major Foreign Policy Theories

	logic of action followed by actors	'level of analysis'	dependent variable	independent variable
Neorealism	logic of consequentiality	systemic (domestic variables don't matter)	power politics: autonomy-seeking policy, influence-seeking policy	power position (determined by a state's share of the capabilities in, and by the polarity of, the international system)
Utilitarian Liberalism	logic of consequentiality	subsystemic (international variables don't matter)	gains-seeking policy (material/ immaterial gains)	domestic interests (derived from the preferences of the dominant actors within a policy network)
Constructivism	logic of appropriateness	includes variables on both the systemic and the subsystemic level (both international and domestic structures matter)	norm-consistent policy	(international and societal) norms

As for the purpose of assessing the key variable's explanatory power, further independent variables should be held constant. This is usually achieved by selecting only cases where the key explanatory variable varies while the other explanatory variables remain constant. Of course, this requires a considerable amount of information about the values of the further independent variables. With regard to 'social norms' and 'domestic interests' - the two further explanatory variables we chose to include in our design - this requirement turned out to be rather demanding. Our initial assumption borrowed from the literature on post-unification Germany that social norms and domestic interests have, by and large, remained unchanged was not substantiated for all cases. In fact, domestic interests and norms have changed in two cases each: In the case of Germany's net contributions to the EU budget both social norms and domestic interests changed. Norms also changed with regard to Germany's participation in out-of-area operations; and domestic interests changed in the case of the liberalization of agricultural trade. However, in this case norms remained the same, but the set of appropriate behavioral alternatives shifted as a consequence of the MacSharry reform which also led constructivism to expect a foreign policy change.

As for the purpose of evaluating the explanatory power of domestic interests and of social norms, a methodological *caveat* has to be added: From a positivist point of view, a strict test of these independent variables' explanatory power is only possible if there is some variation in their values. Conversely, if both independent and dependent variables do not *vary* at all no causal relationship can be established with certainty. However, if either utilitarian liberalism or constructivism correctly predicts continuity of German behavior in a given case because of unchanged domestic interests and/or social norms, this of course serves to enhance our confidence in these theories. What is more, further observable implications may add more evidence to the presumed causal relationship between domestic interests or social norms, on the one hand, and post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior, on the other. Still, it is important to keep this *caveat* in mind because both domestic interests and social norms have both been invariant in the majority of cases.

3 Research design and methodology

Three independent variables (power position, domestic interests, and social norms) have been included in our research design. In order to evaluate the explanatory power of these independent variables (and the corresponding foreign policy theories, respectively) we have conducted a series of structured focused comparisons (cf. George 1979), each consisting of one or more observations of *post*-unification Germany's foreign policy on a certain issue and one or more observations of *pre*-unification Germany's foreign policy on the same issue. We refer to each pair or series of observations as a case.⁴

3.1 Case selection

The case selection was done in two steps: In a first step, a number of issue areas was selected each of which has been examined in a case study. Then, in a second step, between one and three cases were singled out from the universe of cases making up each issue-area.

For the first step, the selection of issue areas, three criteria were applied. Two criteria were designed to ensure a broad coverage of post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior. Our sample of case studies should be representative in terms of issue areas and in terms of macropolitical contexts. The third criterion was theory-led: Our sample should include 'hard' and 'easy' cases for neorealism as the centerpiece of our research design.

⁴ The term "case" has been used in a variety of ways (cf. Ragin/Becker 1992). Following Lijphart's definition of a case as "an entity on which only one basic observation is made and in which the independent and dependent variables do not change during the period of observation" (1975: 160) one could argue that each *observation of Germany's foreign policy on a certain issue at a specific point of time* constitutes a case of its own. However, our research question does not refer to instances of German foreign policy but to instances of German foreign policy *continuity or change*. A single case in the sense Lijphart uses the term cannot give an answer to our central research questions. Only a pair or series of observations can provide an answer to this question. It is thus appropriate to refer to each pair or series of observations as a case.

Czempiel's (1981) distinction between 'security', 'welfare' and 'system of rule' as the three broad policy areas of international politics was the first criterion that guided our selection of case-studies. Following this criterion we selected case-studies from each of the three policy areas: The issue area of 'security' is covered by the study of Germany's security policy within NATO (ch. Six). Germany's foreign policy in the issue area of 'welfare' is analyzed by examining Germany's foreign trade policy within the EU and the GATT (ch. Eight). Finally, this volume includes two case-studies that are concerned with German foreign policy in the policy-area of 'system of rule', i.e. a case study on Germany's EU constitutional policy (ch. Seven), and on Germany's human rights policy within the UN (ch. Nine).

A further, though subordinate criterion was the representativeness in terms of macropolitical contexts: By focusing on Germany's human rights policy in the United Nations, ch. Nine is representative of a global macropolitical context. The three other case studies are representative of different sub-contexts within the Western macropolitical context, i.e. the transatlantic context (ch. Six and, to a lesser degree, ch. Eight) and the Western European context (ch. Seven and, to a lesser degree, ch. Eight).⁵

Finally, our sample of cases includes 'hard' and 'easy' cases for neorealism. This criterion reflects the widely held view that the explanatory power of any given theory (such as neorealism) varies from one issue area to another. The realm of 'high politics' is considered to be neorealism's homeground. Thus, the study of Germany's security policy within NATO (ch. Six) as well as the analysis of EU constitutional policy (ch. Seven) are both considered to provide 'easy' cases for neorealism. By contrast, the 'low politics' of trade and human rights are regarded as 'hard' cases for neorealism.

In a second step, for each issue area or case study, a set of cases was selected. Again,

⁵ We have to acknowledge that our original goal of including a maximum of macropolitical contexts has not been achieved. For instance, cases concerned with Eastern Europe (e.g. German policy on the issue of enlargement of NATO and EU) had to be omitted from our sample of cases because post-unification Germany's policy can hardly be compared to its policy before unification because these enlargement issues were then not on the political agenda.

three criteria were applied to guide this process of selection: First, the issue under consideration should be politically important. Though this is certainly a rather vague criterion, it is meant to ensure that no resources are wasted for politically marginal cases. Second, the issue had to be on the political agenda both before and after unification. This criterion ensured that post-unification Germany's policy could well be compared to Germany's behavior before unification which, in turn, is a prerequisite for deriving conclusions about continuity and change. Third, a meaningful neorealist prediction must have been possible. Though neorealism claims to cover the totality of a state's foreign policy it does not claim to predict every single instance of state behavior. Particularly when different behavioral options cannot be distinguished in terms of autonomy and influence, neorealism cannot predict a course of action. In sum, this volume presents eight cases that are listed in the following Table 10.2.

Table 10.2: Cases Selected for Studying Continuity and Change in German Foreign Policy

Issue and Policy Area	Case	Difficulty for Neorealism
Security policy within NATO (security)	integration of <i>Bundeswehr</i>	Easy
	participation in out-of-area operations	Easy
EU constitutional policy (system of rule)	extension of QMV in the EU Council	Easy
	strengthening of the European Parliament's legislative powers	Easy
	net contributions to the EU budget	Easy
Foreign trade policy within the EU and the GATT (welfare)	agricultural trade	Hard
	EC third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector	Hard
Human rights policy within the UN (system of rule)	strengthening of UN human rights institutions	Hard

3.2 Evidence and inferences

Predictions about post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior are derived from the three theories of foreign policy for each case. For each theory, then, the predicted value can be compared to the observed value of the dependent variable (post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior). According to the congruence procedure (George/McKeown 1985), the explanatory power of the theories can then be assessed by the degree of consistency

between predicted and observed values of the dependent variable (section 3.2.1). Because the predictions may encompass further observable implications, additional empirical evidence will be taken into account to further enhance or diminish our confidence in the explanatory power of the theories (3.2.2).

3.2.1 Evidence based on covariance: the congruence procedure

The congruence procedure is the center-piece of our research design. The degree of consistency between the predicted and the observed values of the dependent variable is our most important indicator of the explanatory power of our theories. If the observed value of the dependent variable turns out to be different from its value as predicted by the theory, the prediction derived from the theory in that case is falsified and the theory more generally is weakened, if not disconfirmed. By contrast, the consistency between predicted and observed values of the dependent variable makes the theory survive in that test case and strengthens our confidence in its explanatory power in general.

The extent to which the explanatory power of a theory can be evaluated on the basis of co-variance also depends on the number of theories that successfully predict a given outcome. If the observed value of the dependent variable is consistent only with a single prediction, the respective theory is, *ceteris paribus*, strongly supported (e.g. constructivism in the case of Germany's policy on UN human rights institutions). By contrast, if two or more theories correctly predict a certain outcome (e.g. neorealism, utilitarian liberalism and constructivism in the case of Germany's policy on contributions to the EU budget) the congruence procedure alone cannot tell us how significant the impact of each variable is in causing that outcome.

3.2.2 Evidence based on further observable implications

For each of the eight cases studied, all three foreign policy theories arrive at predictions about the value of the dependent variable, i.e. about a well-defined part of post-unification

Germany's foreign policy behavior. To varying degrees, the three theories yield additional expectations about German behavior in a certain case or about the processes leading to the predicted policy. The three foreign policy theories do not necessarily generate additional expectations about the *same* phenomena. Rather, the theories generate further expectations about different types of phenomena (such as the policy style or the preferences of actors involved). To the extent that a theory does generate additional expectations about policy or processes, they can be treated as further observable implications which, depending on the empirical evidence, further corroborate or disconfirm the theory in question.

A prominent way of studying further observable implications is *process tracing*. Process tracing 'attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain or causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable' (Bennett/George 1998: 2). It is important to note that process tracing does *not* simply take actors' definitions of the situation as primary evidence. Process tracing 'involves both an attempt to reconstruct actors' definitions of the situation and an attempt to develop a theory of action. The framework within which actor's perceptions and actions are described is given by the researcher, not by the actors themselves.' (George/McKeown 1985: 35). Of course, a necessary prerequisite of process tracing is that the theory under consideration has generated predictions about causal processes, because 'then - and only then - can process tracing assess the predictions of the theory.' (Bennett/George 1998: 19).

The three foreign policy theories under consideration here are suited for process tracing to varying degrees. Out of the three foreign policy theories, utilitarian liberalism offers the most elaborate theory of the composition of the policy-making network, about actor preferences, and about their aggregation into policy. Thus, utilitarian liberalism not only predicts a certain foreign policy behavior but also generates predictions about who is involved in the first place, about the preferences each actor holds and about the preference(s) finally dominating. As the case studies in this volume demonstrate, these further observable implications do serve to further corroborate or disconfirm utilitarian liberalism.

Constructivism holds that (international and societal) norms shape foreign policy

behavior because decision-makers are socialized into both international society and their respective domestic society and thereby internalize the shared expectations about appropriate behavior dominant in these societies. This causal mechanism, however, is difficult to observe. As ch. Eight points out with respect to foreign trade policy, norms and interests may be intertwined to such an extent as to make their distinction, e.g. in expert interviews, impossible. However, in other cases (e.g. Germany's policy on integrating the *Bundeswehr*), interests and norms are easier to distinguish. In these cases, the way preferences are articulated and communicated and the reasons that are given to justify policies may serve to establish the influence of pertinent social norms.

Finally, neorealist foreign policy theory does not specify the processes by which structural influences on behavior make themselves felt (Snyder 1996: 171; Risse-Kappen 1995: 20). Instead, neorealism has black-boxed the decision-making process. Therefore, neorealism is not suited for process tracing procedures. However, neorealist predictions may have further observable implications, too. From neorealist bargaining theory (cf. Krasner 1991) we may borrow the notion that a powerful state uses all means possible to compel other (less powerful) states into agreement. A state is not expected to engage in communicative action with other states but to take advantage of its power position in order to achieve its policy goals. In particular, a powerful state may exploit another state's dependence in non-related issue-areas to achieve its policy goals in a given issue-area. In order to do so, a powerful state may create issue linkages and may use threats and sanctions. Furthermore, whenever neorealism predicts that post-unification Germany increases its influence-seeking policy we may not only expect that policy behavior with regard to our dependent variable (such as keeping the *Bundeswehr* integrated into NATO). We may also expect to observe related efforts of influence-seeking, e.g., by laying claim to additional command posts within NATO's integrated military structure. Taken together, neorealism may be further corroborated or disconfirmed by an analysis of post-unification Germany's policy style during negotiations as well as by an examination of post-unification Germany's efforts to exploit its power position for greater influence on its partners.

The timing of a policy change may also serve as a further observable implication of importance to all foreign policy theories (cf. also Moravcsik 1998: 50). For example, constructivism - though correctly predicting that post-unification Germany will participate in out-of-area operations - is weakened by the fact that pertinent societal norms evolved only *after* the policy change had already been under way.

4 Summary of empirical findings: continuity and change in post-unification Germany's foreign policy

Table 10.3: Continuity and Change in Post-unification Germany's Foreign Policy

Cases of Foreign Policy Continuity:	Cases of Foreign Policy Change:
Post-unification Germany continued....	Post-unification Germany...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to have the <i>Bundeswehr</i> integrated into NATO; - to support the extension of QMV in the Council of the EU; - to support the strengthening of the EP's legislative powers; - to oppose the EC's third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector; - to support the strengthening of UN human rights institutions; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - began to participate in out-of-area operations; - increased its efforts to reduce its net contributions to the EU budget; - no longer opposed but supported the liberalization of agricultural trade.

As Table 10.3 shows, post-unification Germany's foreign policy is characterized by a mixture of continuity and change with cases of continuity in the majority. Cases of continuity can be

found in all four issue areas under consideration, i.e. security policy within NATO, EU constitutional foreign policy, foreign trade policy as well as human rights policy. Post-unification Germany continued to support the further pooling and delegating of its sovereignty including the integration of its military forces and the strengthening of European and global international institutions (be it the European Parliament or the International Criminal Court). Contrary to many observer's expectations, Germany did not embark on a more unilateral foreign policy after unification.⁶ Quite the opposite, post-unification Germany even strengthened its multilateral ties and intensified its participation in multilateral collective action: Whereas it had opposed the liberalization of agricultural trade before unification it changed its policy in the early 1990s and agreed to new GATT provisions including agricultural trade. Moreover, Germany began to participate in multilateral military out-of-area operations after unification. The remaining case in which post-unification Germany changed its foreign policy took also place within the framework of multilateral institutions. Here, post-unification Germany's increased efforts to achieve a reduction of its net contributions to the EU budget marks a gradual intensification of pre-unification Germany's policy.

5 Evaluation of theories

This section discusses the explanatory power of neorealism (in both of its variants, section 5.1), utilitarian liberalism (section 5.2) and constructivism (section 5.3). All three foreign policy theories arrive at predictions for each of the eight cases examined (in four cases, there are two competing neorealist predictions). Moreover, additional evidence to further corroborate or disconfirm the theories has been gathered by observing further implications of a theory's prediction.

⁶ The (in)famous case of the diplomatic recognition of Yugoslav successor states in the early 1990s cannot be dealt with here because it defies the research design of a comparison between pre- and post-unification Germany.

5.1 Neorealism and modified neorealism

5.1.1 Neorealism

Table 10.4: Neorealism's Explanatory Record

Neorealism correctly predicts that post-unification Germany	Neorealism mispredicts that post-unification Germany
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will increase its efforts to achieve a reduction of its net contributions to the EU budget. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will reduce the integration of the <i>Bundeswehr</i> into NATO; - will participate in out-of-area operations in ad-hoc coalitions while keeping its armed forces under national command; - will increase its opposition against the extension of QMV in the Council of the EU; - will increase its opposition against the strengthening of the EP's legislative powers; - will increase its opposition against the liberalization of agricultural trade; - will increase its support for the EC's third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector; - will increase its opposition against the strengthening of UN human rights institutions.

As Table 10.4 shows, neorealism's explanatory record for post-unification Germany's foreign policy is extremely one-sided. It mispredicts German behavior in all cases but one. Contrary to neorealist expectations, post-unification Germany did not strive to enhance its autonomy by opposing the further pooling and delegation of sovereignty. Given the general neorealist expectation that post-unification Germany will change the course of its foreign policy, neorealism's weak explanatory record hardly comes as a surprise since five out of eight cases

are characterized by continuity. It should be noted, however, that neorealism cannot explain even two of those cases in which German behavior indeed changed (participation in out-of-area operations and support for the liberalization of agricultural trade). Moreover, it is important to note that neorealism fails to explain post-unification Germany's foreign policy even in a number of 'easy' cases such as 'military integration into NATO', 'participation in out-of-area operations', 'extension of Qualified Majority Voting in the EU Council' and 'strengthening of the European Parliament's legislative powers'.

Neorealism correctly predicts only that post-unification Germany will increase its efforts to achieve a reduction of its (net) contributions to the EU budget. However, this policy behavior is predicted by all three foreign policy theories. In this case, neorealism is further supported by additional observations (notably Germany's preparedness to use threats and to violate European norms in order to achieve its policy goals). However, the available evidence only disconfirms constructivism but does not allow to discriminate between Germany's improved power position, on the one hand, and intensified domestic interests in reduced EU contributions, on the other hand, as likely causes of Germany's policy change in that case.

In sum, post-unification German foreign policy behavior does not seem to be driven by an (increased) quest for autonomy. In the neorealist variant of the concept, post-unification Germany's foreign policy cannot be explained as power politics.

5.1.2 Modified neorealism

Table 10.5: Modified Neorealism's Explanatory Record

Modified neorealism correctly predicts that post-unification Germany	Modified neorealism mispredicts that post-unification Germany
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will continue to have the <i>Bundeswehr</i> integrated into NATO (though low-key approach toward claiming command posts remains puzzling); - will participate in out-of-area operations (though time lag remains puzzling); - will continue to support the extension of QMV in the Council (though issue area specific preferences disconfirm the theory); - will increase its efforts to achieve a reduction of its net contributions to the EU budget*. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will increase its opposition against the strengthening of the EP's legislative powers*; - will increase its opposition against the liberalization of agricultural trade*; - will increase its opposition against the EC's third country provisions for public procurement in the utilities sector*; - will increase its opposition against the strengthening of UN human rights institutions*.

* Modified neorealism arrives at the same prediction as neorealism.

In order to account for recent debates within neorealism we have distinguished two variants of neorealist foreign policy theory, i.e. neorealism and modified neorealism (cf. ch. Three). In contrast to neorealism, modified neorealism holds that a state's foreign policy is not only shaped by its power position but also by its exposure to varying security pressures. As a consequence of Germany's decreased exposure to security pressures after the end of the Cold War, modified neorealism expects post-unification Germany to forego gains in autonomy

whenever substantial gains in influence can thereby be achieved.

Post-unification Germany faced trade-offs between gains in autonomy and gains in influence in three cases (integration of the *Bundeswehr*, out-of-area operations, extension of QMV). Here, modified neorealism arrives at predictions different from neorealism. In most cases, however, there have been no trade-offs between gains in autonomy and gains in influence, and both variants of neorealism generate the same prediction.

As Table 10.5 demonstrates, modified neorealism's explanatory record is much better than the neorealist one. Modified neorealism correctly predicts post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior in half of the cases examined: In addition to the one case in which the modified neorealist prediction concurs with the correct neorealist prediction (Germany's net contributions to the EU), modified neorealism also correctly predicts the three cases in which a trade-off between autonomy and influence can be observed. With the exception of Germany's policy on strengthening the European Parliament's legislative powers, modified neorealism correctly predicts post-unification German foreign policy in all 'easy cases' for neorealism (including all cases of security policy). At the same time, among the 'hard cases' (i.e. in the issue areas of foreign trade and human rights), modified neorealism fails to predict German behavior in all but a single case. Though modified neorealism, in general, expected an increase in German power politics after unification (i.e. change), the theory accounts not only for two cases of change (net contributions and military out-of-area operations) but also for two cases of continuity (Qualified Majority Voting and integration of the *Bundeswehr* into NATO).

If further observable implications are taken into account, modified neorealism's record becomes less impressive: In one case (military out-of-area operations), Germany's behavior is best explained by modified neorealism, even though Germany's reluctance to participate in these operations up to IFOR remains puzzling (cf. ch. Six). In another case (net contributions to the EU budget), no other theory offers a better explanation though the available evidence does not allow to discriminate between modified neorealism and utilitarian liberalism. In the two remaining cases (integration of the *Bundeswehr* and extension of QMV in the EU

Council), modified neorealism correctly predicts Germany's behavior but is disconfirmed by further observable implications (i.e., Germany's reluctance to lay claim to command posts in NATO and its issue-specific preferences on QMV and unanimity, respectively).

As the explanatory record demonstrates, the modification of neorealism has improved neorealism's explanatory power. The inclusion of 'security pressures' as an intervening variable as well as the ensuing stronger emphasis on influence-seeking rather than autonomy-seeking behavior has enabled modified neorealism to better capture Germany's power politics *within* international institutions. However, post-unification Germany's willingness to *delegate* sovereignty, e.g. to the European Parliament or an International Criminal Court, remains puzzling for modified neorealism. What is more, modified neorealism cannot account for post-unification Germany's preparedness to agree to liberalization in areas where no relative economic gains vis-à-vis the United States could be achieved, i.e. in agricultural trade and in the EC public procurement in the utilities sector.

Taken together, modified neorealism fails to account for Germany's foreign policy behavior in areas of 'low politics' in which relative economic gains and the delegation of sovereignty have been at stake. Conversely, modified neorealism has a strong record in explaining post-unification Germany's foreign policy in areas of 'high politics' in which sovereignty is pooled and substantial influence gains can be achieved.

5.2 Utilitarian liberalism

Table 10.6: Utilitarian Liberalism's Explanatory Record:

Utilitarian liberalism correctly predicts that post-unification Germany	Utilitarian liberalism mispredicts that post-unification Germany
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will continue to have the <i>Bundeswehr</i> integrated into NATO (though the creation of capacities for planning, command and control remains puzzling); - will no longer oppose but will support the liberalization of agricultural trade; - will continue to oppose the EC's third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector; - will increase its efforts to achieve a reduction of its net contributions to the EU budget. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will continue to refrain from participating with combat troops in out-of-area operations; - will continue to oppose the extension of QMV in the Council; - will continue to oppose the strengthening of the EP's legislative powers; - will continue to oppose the strengthening of UN human rights institutions;.

Utilitarian liberalism's overall explanatory record is rather modest. It correctly predicts post-unification Germany's foreign policy in half of the cases examined. Utilitarian liberalism can explain both cases of post-unification Germany foreign trade policy as well as one case of security policy (military integration of the *Bundeswehr*) and one case of EU constitutional foreign policy (net contributions). As this record demonstrates, utilitarian liberalism is well suited to explain both continuity and change in post-unification German foreign policy. However, in all of these cases, at least one other theory is equally successful in correctly predicting Germany's foreign policy behavior. Thus, there is not a single case in which

domestic interests have undoubtedly caused Germany's foreign policy behavior.

Utilitarian liberalism performs especially well in the issue area of foreign trade. This corresponds to two features that characterize this issue area in particular. First, the issue area of foreign trade policy is marked by a particularly high level of private actors' influence on policy. In both cases, there have been 'corporatist policy networks' in which the actors of the political-administrative system were dependent on powerful economic pressure groups that were highly mobilized since their basic interest in improving members' opportunities of increasing their income was directly affected.

Second, material gains are comparatively easy to calculate in foreign trade policy. Though the actors involved in foreign trade policy may not be able to estimate the exact gains or losses resulting from trade agreements they are certainly able to anticipate whether (and to what extent) an agreement benefits them or their competitors. The other two cases in which utilitarian liberalism correctly predicts Germany's foreign policy behavior also share this feature: In both cases (military integration of the *Bundeswehr* and net contributions to the EU budget), actors involved in policy making can easily anticipate whether or not they will have to contribute additional financial resources. However, material losses turned out to be of no explanatory power in the case of post-unification Germany's participation in military out-of-area operations. Here, utilitarian liberalism mispredicts that Germany will not participate in out-of-area operations with combat troops because of the high costs of such operations. Utilitarian liberal predictions *always* proved mistaken whenever *only* PAS actors' interests in retaining their decision-making power was affected. Thus it seems to be a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for utilitarian liberal predictions to prove correct that calculable material gains are at stake. At the same time, the two cases of foreign trade policy indicate that a high level of private actors' influence on policy-making may even be a sufficient condition for utilitarian liberal predictions to prove correct.

In sum, utilitarian liberalism's explanatory power turned out to be modest. However, utilitarian liberalism's explanatory record shows interesting patterns which certainly deserve further attention. Further research is needed to examine the robustness of our finding that

utilitarian liberalism's explanatory power strongly depends on the nature of the policy network as well as on the nature of the gains and losses to be expected.

5.3 Constructivism

Table 10.7: Constructivism's Explanatory Record:

<p>Constructivism correctly predicts that post-unification Germany</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - will continue to have the <i>Bundeswehr</i> integrated into NATO; - will participate in out-of-area operations (though the sequence between the policy change and the evolution of societal norms as well as Germany's participation in the Kosovo air strikes disconfirm the constructivist account); - will continue to support the extension of QMV in the EU Council; - will continue to support the strengthening of the EP's legislative powers; - will increase its efforts to achieve a reduction of its net contributions to the EU budget (though specific policy proposals and the negotiation style disconfirm constructivism); - will no longer oppose but support the liberalization of agricultural trade; - will continue to oppose the EC's third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector; - will continue to support the strengthening of UN human rights institutions.
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Constructivism clearly has the best record in explaining post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior. As far as co-variation is concerned, constructivism predicts post-unification Germany's policy always correctly. The constructivist record is all the more impressive since it comprises not only four easy but also three hard cases for constructivism.⁷ Moreover,

⁷ The liberalization of agricultural trade is difficult to assess in these terms because international (“protect agricultural market!”) and societal (“support trade

constructivism explains cases of both continuity and change. As pointed out in ch. Five, constructivism claims high predictive power when there are convergent expectations of appropriate behavior of a sufficient degree of commonality and specificity on both the international and the societal level of analysis. The integration of the *Bundeswehr* into NATO, the participation in military out-of-area operations as well as the extension of both QMV and the EP's legislative powers are such easy cases in which the international community of states and domestic society hold the same, convergent expectations of appropriate German foreign policy behavior. By contrast, with regard to the strengthening of UN human rights institutions, to the EC's third country provisions concerning public procurement, and to the EU net contributions there are no pertinent international but only societal norms. These cases are considered hard cases because the constructivist prediction rests on social norms on only one level of analysis.

In three out of eight cases, constructivist foreign policy theory is the *only* theory whose predictions is fully corroborated by the observable behavior: Only constructivism explains post-unification Germany's continued support for an extension of QMV in the EU Council, for a strengthening of the European Parliament's legislative powers as well as for a strengthening of UN human rights institutions. What is more, in the case of the integration of the *Bundeswehr* in NATO, the three competing theories converge in their predictions but only constructivism is not disconfirmed by further observable implications. Thus, constructivism provides the best explanation for half of the cases under examination including one hard case (UN human rights institutions).

All together, constructivism correctly predicts the entire range of post-unification Germany's foreign policy studied and provides the best explanation for half of the cases under examination. Thus, post-unification Germany's foreign policy can best be characterized as norm-consistent foreign policy.

At the same time, however, there is one case in which the constructivist prediction is

liberalization!“) norms may be compatible (though not convergent) (as in the 1990s) as well as contradictory (as in the late 1980s).

only partly correct: Constructivism predicts that post-unification Germany will participate in military out-of-area operations *if* the operation has a firm international legal basis and a strong peace-keeping character. This prediction is entirely correct with regard to half of the out-of-area operations under consideration. As regards German participation in SFOR and KFOR, however, Germany's contribution of combat troops does not fully correspond to the constructivist condition that a strong peace-keeping character is to be expected. Finally, Germany's participation in the air strikes of 1999 against the former republic of Yugoslavia is not in line with the constructivist prediction either since a firm international legal basis did not exist. Taken together, constructivism correctly predicts the *pattern* of post-unification German foreign policy behavior in that case but misses several specific instances of Germany's security policy behavior.

In another case, constructivism correctly predicts post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior but is disconfirmed by further observable implications: Constructivist foreign policy theory correctly predicts that Germany will increase its efforts to reduce its net contribution to the EU budget, but it is disconfirmed by the German government's deliberate violation of EU norms in doing so, namely its demand for a rebate.

Finally, pertinent norms and domestic interests are indistinguishably linked in two cases, i.e. post-unification Germany's support for the liberalization of agricultural trade and its opposition to the EC's third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector. Thus, in the issue area of foreign trade, the societal norm to support free trade and the domestic interest in open markets coincide. In both cases, it has proved impossible to distinguish between the influence of societal norms and domestic interests. Therefore, it remains unclear in these cases whether post-unification Germany's foreign policy is best characterized as norm-consistent or as gain-seeking foreign policy.

Two further *caveats* must be added. First, if we accept that constructivism's explanatory power will be particularly strong in a highly institutionalized environment, our sample of cases may be criticized for having a selection bias because it comprises only cases

of German foreign policy within or toward international institutions.⁸ As a matter of fact, however, Germany has been embedded in an especially dense network of international institutions. Thus, even if we accept that our sample of cases does favor constructivism this is due to Germany as our object of inquiry rather than to a selection bias. Of course, the *caveat* builds on the notion that a highly institutionalized environment is likely to encompass widely shared expectations about appropriate (German) behavior. However, as the occasionally low levels of specificity and commonality of member states' expectations in our sample of cases demonstrate this notion does not necessarily prove correct. In fact, our sample includes four cases in which there are no sufficiently specific and widely shared norms on the international level (contributions to EU budget, agricultural trade, EC third country provisions, UN human rights institutions). Predictions have therefore been generated on the basis of societal norms only which, from a constructivist point of view, constitutes a 'hard case' for constructivism (cf. ch. Four). In one of these four 'hard cases' (the strengthening of UN human rights institutions), constructivism is the *only* theory offering a correct prediction. In two other 'hard cases' (agricultural trade and EC third country provisions concerning public procurement in the utilities sector), constructivism is not disconfirmed by further observable implications though utilitarian liberalism offers an equally plausible explanation. Only in the last 'hard case' (Germany's net contributions to the EU budget) constructivism is disconfirmed by further observable implications.

The second *caveat* addresses our selection of indicators for the identification of norms. Discussants of our project have repeatedly remarked that our indicators might as well serve to identify interests.⁹ In particular, they have questioned whether party programs and election platforms rather point to domestic interests than to societal norms. We do acknowledge that our indicators are not designed to *distinguish* societal norms from domestic interests. By linking the identification of a norm to a certain level of commonality (e.g. a consensus among the major political parties) we did try to avoid mixing up societal norms

⁸ We owe this point to Bernhard Zangl.

⁹ We owe this point to Markus Jachtenfuchs in particular.

and domestic interests to the extent possible. However, domestic interests may simply acquire a high level of acceptance in domestic society and may become part of a society's political culture. Then, our indicators can, of course, not, or only with great difficulty, discriminate between societal norms and domestic interests. It is important to note, however, that our indicators do not mistake domestic interests for societal norms but may simply be unable to distinguish between the two because the two may indeed be indistinguishably intertwined (the case study on foreign trade policy is a case in point). After all, adherents of constructivism do not argue that norms *replace* interests as a causal variable. Constructivism even concedes that norms may originate from interests in the first place. What distinguishes constructivism from rationalist approaches, however, is the former's claim that norms, once established, do have an impact in their own right. In order to evaluate the respective explanatory power of (societal) norms as opposed to domestic interests we would have to select cases in which (societal) norms change whereas domestic interests remain constant. That is to say, we would have to design a new research project which has constructivist (instead of neorealist) foreign policy theory as its centerpiece.

5.4 Summary

The evaluation of the foreign policy theories has yielded a number of remarkable results (Table 10.8 gives an overview of our findings). First, the eight cases examined strongly disconfirm neorealism. The modification of neorealism clearly improves its explanatory record. However, modified neorealism's explanatory power remains limited to, but does not include all, cases of 'high politics'. Second, social norms turned out to yield the best explanation of post-unification Germany's foreign policy behavior capturing both cases of continuity and change as well as hard and easy cases for the theory. Finally, utilitarian liberalism's explanatory power seems to depend on the policy network structure dominating in the issue under consideration. Though its overall explanatory power may be modest, it can be regarded as a useful theory which is suited for the explanation of those cases of foreign

policy in which PAS actors do not dominate the policy network (sufficient condition) and costs and benefits are material and calculable (necessary condition).

Table 10.8: Overview of Foreign Policy Theories' Explanatory Records

Theory Cases	Neorealism		Utilitarian Liberalism	Constructivism
	Neorealism	Modified Neorealism		
Integration of the <i>Bundeswehr</i> in NATO	disconfirmed	correct prediction but puzzling further observables	correct prediction but puzzling further observables	confirmed
Participation in military out-of-area operations	disconfirmed	correct prediction but puzzling further observables	disconfirmed	correct prediction but puzzling further observables
Extension of QMV in the EU Council	disconfirmed	correct prediction but puzzling further observables	disconfirmed	confirmed
Strengthening of the EP's legislative powers	disconfirmed		disconfirmed	confirmed
Net contributions to the EU budget	confirmed		confirmed	correct prediction but puzzling further observables
Liberalization of agricultural trade	disconfirmed		confirmed	confirmed
EC third country provisions concerning public procurement	disconfirmed		confirmed	confirmed
Strengthening of UN human rights institutions	disconfirmed		disconfirmed	confirmed

6 Conclusion

Contrary to the expectation that post-unification Germany was about to step up the pursuit of power politics (cf. ch. Two), post-unification Germany's foreign policy was marked by a

mixture of continuity and change with cases of continuity in the majority. Notwithstanding an increased preparedness to participate in multilateral military out-of-area operations and a more assertive policy on financial burden sharing within the EU, post-unification Germany continued to support the establishment of new international institutions (e.g. the ICC), the strengthening of existing international institutions (e.g. the European Parliament), and the pooling of sovereignty (e.g., by keeping the *Bundeswehr* integrated in NATO and by supporting the extension of QMV in the EU Council). In the area of agricultural trade, post-unification Germany turned to a more co-operative policy.

Neorealism's record in explaining post-unification Germany's foreign policy, even in its modified variant, turned out to be comparatively weak. Of course, adherents of neorealism may point to a time lag between a change in a state's power position and a change in its foreign policy behavior. They may also point to the fact that the two most obvious cases of apparent power politics (post-unification Germany's policy on military out-of-area operations and on net contributions to the EU budget) have taken place in the second half of the 1990s.

Critics of neorealism, however, may well regard the neorealist reference to time lags as yet another attempt to escape empirical falsification.¹⁰ Adherents of constructivist foreign policy research, in particular, may suggest to jettison neorealism as an 'obvious first cut' and instead to concentrate on the elaboration of constructivist foreign policy theory and analysis. Since constructivism's explanatory record turned out to be exceptionally strong, a research design with constructivist foreign policy theory as its center-piece appears warranted. Such a research design should include both 'hard' and 'easy' cases for constructivism (the criteria of which certainly require a more detailed discussion). Moreover, the interaction between social norms and domestic interests deserves further scrutiny. As the case study of Germany's foreign trade policy shows, societal norms and domestic interests may be closely intertwined. To trace this entanglement back to its origins promises to enrich our understanding of the

¹⁰ For a discussion on neorealism as a degenerative research program cf. Vasquez 1997, Legro/Moravcsik 1999 and the ensuing debates in *American Political Science Review* and *International Security*.

explanatory power of both constructivism and utilitarian liberalism. Finally, the causal mechanisms by which internationally and domestically shared, value-based expectations about appropriate behavior shape the foreign policy behavior of states certainly deserve further attention.

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Annex:**Table of Contents of Volker Rittberger et al.: Foreign Policy of the New Germany: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester University Press, forthcoming (2001).**

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