

## German Foreign Policy in Dialogue

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### Still of Some Standing? Red-Green Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the Second Term



# **German Foreign Policy in Dialogue**

**A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German Foreign Policy**

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This internet project on German foreign policy was established in 1998 at the [Chair of International Relations at Trier University](#) and is funded by the [ASKO EUROPA-FOUNDATION](#) and the German Foreign Office. Its mission is to respond to the increasing interest in Germany's foreign policy by improving research, analysis and teaching in this field through the use of the internet. The project also aims at strengthening the democratic discourse on German foreign policy among researchers and analysts, decision-makers and the wider public. Our information services integrate media perspectives, official documents and sound secondary analysis.

The project is presently headed by Marco Overhaus. Current staff members are Constantin Grund, Simon Musekamp, Christine Normann, Isabel Teusch, Thomas Zastrow and Christof Zintel. Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.

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## **Editorial: Red-Green Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the Second Term: International Standing Turned Around?**

*By Hanns W. Maull*

Surely the most fascinating development in German foreign policy over the last few months has been the collapse of German influence and standing in European and world affairs over Berlin's refusal to participate in any military action against Iraq. "Relegated into the second division", for example, was the headline of a survey by Arnulf Baring in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of recent articles in periodicals on this topic.<sup>1</sup> Less than a year ago, German power and influence in European and, indeed, in world affairs was still judged to be on the rise by many shrewd observers. The Red-Green coalition government had just shown its mettle by dispatching the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan and in the maritime region between the Horn of Africa and Yemen in the US-led war against international terrorism, and it had successfully hosted a major international conference to rebuild war-devastated Afghanistan.

Now, with the decision to depart from America's strategic shift of focus, which aims to take the war against terrorism into Iraq and topple that old American nemesis, Saddam Hussein, all that power and influence seems to have vanished: the same shrewd observers who previously diagnosed the rise of Germany to pre-eminence in Europe and beyond, now find Berlin reduced to playing second fiddle behind a revitalized France and that perennially faithful ally of America, Great Britain.<sup>2</sup> Rarely has the (perceived) standing of a major player in international affairs turned around more rapidly than Germany's since August 2002 – or so it could appear.

Yet this perspective is profoundly misleading. In fact, it probably tells us more about others' attitudes to power and influence than about Germany itself, and perhaps also something important about the fragile, evanescent qualities of power in today's realities of international relations. Power and influence, of course, have always partly been in the eyes of the beholder: reputation and perceptions matter as much as, if not more than, the ability of a state to

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<sup>1</sup> FAZ, Jan. 7, 2003

<sup>2</sup> A striking example for this is provided by the reporting of John Vinocur in the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune. Vinocur is one of the most experienced and well-known American journalists in Europe. See, for example, his articles in the IHT: „Peace in Kabul or not, Berlin wins on global stage", IHT, Dec. 7, 2001 and, "The big winner in the EU expansion: Washington", in: IHT, Dec. 9, 2002, where he writes: "While the German economy has remained predominant in commerce with eastern Europe, its power diminished overall in European and international terms".

mobilize resources to get its way. In this sense, perceptions of German power were exaggerated then, and probably are underestimated now. More importantly, the ups and downs of German power and influence can be seen to reflect efforts by the media and by scholars to “construct” realities – which is why they can change so rapidly.

At the same time, some of those constructions have been remarkably shoddy. There has been very little effort, for example, to systematically explore the conditions on which Germany’s reputed power and influence might rest. Even well-known scholars, such as Gunther Hellmann, have been remarkably uncertain in their analysis of Germany’s relative power: while Hellmann in the mid-1990s (rightly, in my view), cautioned against the simplistic assumption that Germany had become more powerful through unification, he had joined the camp of those who saw Germany’s rise as an indisputable reality.<sup>3</sup> A more circumspect assessment of power and influence of the Berlin Republic would start from the qualification: “it depends”. That is to say, the degree to which Germany will be able to exercise influence will depend a) on the circumstances, and b) on the skill and wisdom with which Germany collects and plays its diplomatic, economic and military cards.

Seen from this angle, the perceived rise and decline of German influence under the Schröder-Fischer coalition governments since 1998 appear due as much to changing circumstances as to deteriorating performances by the key players in Berlin’s diplomacy. In this issue of our quarterly newsletter, which focuses on the perspectives of German foreign policy under a new Red-Green coalition government against the background of an assessment of achievements and shortcomings of Red-Green foreign policy since 1998, we explore both the conditionalities of German power and influence and its exercise by the Red-Green coalition. As such, this newsletter also forms part of a larger exercise conducted by the Chair of Foreign Policy and International Relations at the University of Trier to assess the performance and the prospects of German foreign policy since the advent of the Red-Green coalition government in 1998.

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<sup>3</sup> Hellmann, Gunther (1998): Die prekäre Macht: Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert. In: Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter/Kaiser, Karl (ed.): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen, Oldenbourg, pp.265-282; ders.: Der "deutsche Weg", Eine außenpolitische Gradwanderung. In: Internationale Politik 57(9) (September 2002), pp.1-8. It says on page 1: „Der beträchtliche Zugewinn an Macht und Sicherheit haben die deutsche Außenpolitik verändert...Deutsche Außenpolitik konnte erstmals gestaltend agieren statt lediglich auf Vorgaben anderer zu reagieren“. From my point of view this claim misses the results of German diplomacy before 1990 as well as its freedom of action after 1990.

Two key conditions for past successes of German foreign policy have been strong and understanding partners and vibrant multilateral institutions. The contributions by Charles Heck and Nikolas Busse look at the recent turbulences in the German-American partnership, and conclude that those turbulences are far from resolved. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: first, Berlin will continue to suffer from constraints on its ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives as long as those turbulences last, and second, Berlin must try to remove or at least reduce those constraints by recasting its relationship with Washington. This need not imply capitulation to American requests, but will certainly require more care, circumspection and attention than Berlin was willing to give this critical relationship in the heat of the summer election campaign. Josef Janning looks at the record and the prospects for the Red-Green foreign policy in and through the European Union. His is a rather more nuanced picture of both achievement and failure. Yet he also makes it clear that the bilateral partnership with France has been, and will continue to be the key to Germany's influence in the wider context of European integration. It is thus good news that the Franco-German tandem seems to be back on its wheels, and it is entirely compatible with Berlin's interest that Paris should be seen as leading this new effort. It also underlines a fundamental change in German foreign policy circumstances since unification: while good relations with the United States are still highly desirable and important, only the partnership with France is existential and indispensable. Germany's future, for better or worse, lies with Europe; but whether the transatlantic security partnership can endure as a key element of Germany's foreign policy remains to be seen.

The contribution by Martin Agüera looks at one particularly important aspect of Germany's foreign and security performance under the Red-Green coalition governments – its efforts to reform the Bundeswehr. While Agüera credits the government, and particularly its previous Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping, with the right intentions, he also shows how Berlin failed to invest, both literally and figuratively speaking, in this important tool of German foreign and security policy. His findings can be generalized: by and large, the Red-Green coalition has neglected to carefully husband and develop the resources and the bilateral and institutional foundations of its foreign policy, and has thus contributed to a decline in Germany's ability to shape its external environment. On the other hand, it is also clear that changes in the policies of Germany's key partners in Washington and Paris have played an important role in both the rise and the decline of Germany's perceived power and influence. The bad news here are what may well turn out to be a rather fundamental change of course in

American foreign policy, and the growing signs of wear and tear in both NATO and the enlarging European Union. The good news is that European integration, via the constitutional convention, may still come out of its travails of “deepening and widening” successfully, and that France once more seems determined to use its close partnership with Berlin for advancing the European cause.

## **The “Poison” in the Relations Between Berlin and Washington**

*By Charles B. Heck*

At the October 2002 NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Warsaw, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described relations between Washington and Berlin as “poisoned” and refused to shake hands with the new German Defense Minister, Peter Struck. Against tradition, President Bush had refused to telephone Chancellor Schröder to congratulate him on the SPD’s victory in the September 22 election. German-American relations, at least at the very top political level, were at their lowest point in decades. Both the Schröder government and the Bush Administration, at the highest levels, contributed to the “poison” that had infected relations between these two long-standing and close allies.

This was a stunning deterioration in an enormously important political relationship. German-American cooperation and the wider trans-Atlantic partnership of which it is part have been remarkably productive over the past several decades. Without the common threat provided by the Cold War in Europe, the partnership has become less compelling for political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. But it remains vitally important, in this observer’s view, and it would be an historical mistake of the first order to let it decay. Nevertheless, decay is not an implausible scenario, particularly if the Iraq crisis goes badly wrong.

### ***Iraq, America, and the German Election Campaign***

Chancellor Schröder declared Germany’s “unconditional solidarity” with the United States after the September 11 attacks last year. It was less widely noticed across the Atlantic that he also warned against unwise military “adventures” in the wake of those attacks. By November 2001, while the German government was preparing to participate militarily in the U.S.-led campaign against global terrorism centered in Afghanistan, word crossed the Atlantic that Iraq was the next target for some in the Bush Administration.

In Europe, the prospect of such an extension of the “international war against terrorism” was met with serious skepticism from the beginning, most notably in Berlin. A former cabinet member of the Schröder government, Michael Naumann, in a lead article in *Die Zeit*,

foreshadowed later developments.<sup>4</sup> Schröder, Naumann argued, was “*kein Salutierer*”. His article made clear that the German government was already very uncomfortable about the extent to which its military participation in Afghanistan would give it any role in military decision-making. Chancellor Schröder’s argument to German sceptics for participation in the Afghanistan anti-terrorist campaign was one of alliance loyalty. But this would not apply to Iraq. As Naumann put it in the subtitle of his article: “*German loyalty towards the Atlantic Alliance has its limits.*”

Meanwhile, public statements played down differences between the two governments and emphasized common ground. In their private discussions in Berlin in May 2002, President Bush and his team assured Schröder that there would be no military action against Iraq until well after the German election. Thus, from the American perspective at least, the issue could be avoided in the German election campaign. President Bush and Chancellor Schröder later met with the press, and the transcript of the press event shows two allies playing down their differences.<sup>5</sup>

But the Chancellor could not have been reassured by some of the statements of leaders of the U.S. Administration in the weeks and months following the Berlin discussions (see below). Meanwhile Schröder and his party were trailing badly in the polls looking toward the September elections, and in great need of issues that could turn the domestic political tide. It became irresistible to set aside the ban against public “speculation” about an Iraq campaign. Thus, in early August, Schröder sharply and publicly rejected any American request—a request that had not yet been made—for German participation in a military operation against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. He quickly found that this issue “had legs,” in American political parlance, and it then became a major theme of a campaign that went on to a successful conclusion for the incumbent government in the September 22 vote.

It is understandable and legitimate that Iraq became an issue in the German campaign. Across the Atlantic some Americans, disappointed of the absence of prominent dissenting voices in the parallel American debate and campaign, welcomed public German opposition to a war in Iraq. But there were four international problems attached to the Chancellor’s approach.

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<sup>4</sup> Michael Naumann: “Ein Krieg wider Willen, Mit Amerika gegen den Terrorismus, aber nicht gegen den Irak: Die deutsche Bündnistreue hat ihre Grenzen,” *Die Zeit*, November 8, 2001.

<sup>5</sup> President Bush Meets with German Chancellor Schroeder, Remarks by President Bush and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany in Press Availability, Kanzleramt, Berlin, May 23, 2002  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05>.

One was the tone of some statements about the American Administration and its imagined plans for Iraq. The most bitter high-level “poison” was injected in this way. The Chancellor tapped a deep well of German anti-war sentiment, which was not necessarily anti-American. But the U.S. Administration and President Bush personally were cast in the role of prime war-mongers. This tone found its climax a few days before the election, at least in American eyes, in the casual but ridiculous parallel drawn by Justice Minister Däubler-Gmelin between President Bush’s and Hitler’s strategy to distract attention from domestic policy failures. It was very much noted in Washington that the Minister was not relieved of her duties until the day after the election.

Three other aspects of the Chancellor’s approach disappointed even those Americans who held particular sympathy for Germany and the important steps Berlin had taken in recent years to assume broader responsibilities:

- The German government declared that Germany would not participate in military action against the Saddam Hussein regime even if that action was sanctioned by the United Nations. Among the major North Atlantic powers, Germany has been the primary proponent of multilateral approaches to international problems. A multilateral approach, we are told, is deeply embedded in postwar Germany’s approach to the world; and many of us look to Germany to help uphold that standard. But here is an example of the very unilateralism that Germany has otherwise decried.
- In an era when the German government (among others) has given considerable support to the development of common European foreign and security policies, Schröder’s approach to Iraq diverged from that taken in Paris or London (or Rome or Madrid) on a central issue of the day. One has the impression that the German government isolated itself from its primary European partners as well as from Washington. London and Paris have carried much more weight than Berlin in recent months in encouraging Washington to work through the Security Council as a means of disarming the Saddam Hussein regime.
- How much of a threat does the Saddam Hussein regime present to whom and in what ways? What are the relative merits of various approaches to dealing with these threats? There were few indications, at least as seen from the other side of the Atlantic, that the

Chancellor's choice of a campaign theme was grounded in serious analysis of such questions.

The "poison" that these last three aspects introduced is not so sharp and personal, but all three have tended to undermine Germany's efforts to be taken seriously in international efforts to deal with central security challenges.

***Iraq and the Poisonous Unilateralist Tendencies  
of the "World's Only Superpower"***

But the United States government also exhibits a combination of qualities that must be unsettling for friends and foes alike. On the one hand, the "world's only superpower" is too impressed with what its remarkable military prowess can accomplish in the world. At the same time, the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington have put America on edge, and have created a palpable and unfamiliar sense of direct physical threat. The United States, according to Washington, is "at war." Germany and other partners do not seem to have the same greatly heightened sense of vulnerability to terrorist attack. For them, with regard to Iraq, the agenda is as much one of restraining and channeling American military power as it is dealing with an Iraqi regime that has flouted a series of UN Security Council resolutions and surely continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. If the United States carries out a unilateral attack on Iraq and things go badly wrong, far more than German-American relations will be "poisoned."

U.S. military capabilities are indeed extraordinary, but Americans themselves need to keep these capabilities in perspective. One helpful perspective was offered by Joseph Nye a few years ago:

We need to think of a much more complicated structure of international power, a little bit like three-dimensional chess. On the top chess board, the military board, yes, the world is unipolar....At the middle level..., the economic level, the world is already multipolar....At the bottom level of this three-dimensional chess game, the area of transnational relations that cross international borders outside the control of any

government (which can include everything from foreign exchange to international terrorists), there's really no structure of power. There's total diffusion of power.<sup>6</sup>

Even in those situations where military capabilities can be applied or threatened, they are generally insufficient in themselves to solve the central problem. For instance, America's extraordinary military capabilities were absolutely vital for the operations in Afghanistan in the last months of 2001, but U.S. military strength did not prevent the September 11 attacks. The U.S. military cannot by itself guarantee the stability and progress of the new Afghanistan or the destruction of Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks with a global reach (or even the capture of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar). These are tasks with a multitude of dimensions and for which a great many partners are vital. At the deepest level, the struggle is in part one within Islam for which the banner must be carried by politically moderate outward-looking Muslims who will depend more on the outside world's respectful patience than its active intervention.

Already before September 11 the Bush Administration had been remarkably dismissive of a variety of multilateral accords and arrangements, while at the same time often claiming to be acting in the real interests of the wider world. The palpable sense of physical threat felt by Washington after September 11 seems to have made the Bush Administration more prone to stress "moral clarity" in its approach to the world, a "moral clarity" too often defined in Washington with little attention to the perspectives and sensibilities of others.

Most of America's allies and friends expressed their solidarity with the United States after the September 11 terrorist attack and offered some measure of assistance in the war against terrorism with a global reach. The United Nations Security Council acted swiftly and strongly. With the initiative coming from Europe, NATO for the first time invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty, declaring that this attack on one was an attack on all. Washington won international respect for its initial patience in preparing a response against the perpetrators of the attack. At the same time, Washington was ambivalent in its response to the invocation of Article 5. Some early offers of military assistance from NATO partners were not even responded to, and Washington kept the alliance itself out of the military action it was

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<sup>6</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1997): U.S. International Leadership in President Clinton's Second Term. In: Tokyo 1997: The Annual Meeting of the Trilateral Commission, Trilateral Commission, pp. 76-77. The image of a three-dimensional chess game is also presented in Joseph Nye's most recent book (2002): *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press.

planning. Over time a remarkable number of countries have taken on tasks in and around Afghanistan. German contributions have been outstanding, particularly when viewed against the backdrop of Germany's postwar history.

The solidarity expressed to the United States in the war against global terrorism was far less evident when the Bush Administration began talking about military action—unilateral military action if necessary—to accomplish “regime change” in Iraq. Yes, the Iraqi regime has violated a series of Security Council resolutions growing out of the earlier Gulf War, but where is the imminent threat that calls for military action now? The Administration made no convincing argument that an attack on Iraq would reinforce the war on global terrorism, or even that Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein are substantially linked. Washington's talk about a democratic Iraq in a transformed Middle East seemed superficial at best.

Washington's rhetoric was particularly strong in the weeks and months following the Schröder-Bush meeting in Berlin in late May. On June 1 at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, President Bush presented his new foreign policy doctrine based on preemptive action.<sup>7</sup> And in an August 26 speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vice President Cheney declared himself for military action against Iraq without waiting for any further U.N. inspections which he deemed fruitless.<sup>8</sup>

Happily, some leaders in Washington, with help from the British government in particular, convinced President Bush to take the issue of Iraq to the United Nations. The President gave an excellent speech to the General Assembly on September 12, describing the challenge presented by the Saddam Hussein regime as a problem for the international community. Eight more weeks of intensive diplomacy led to the unanimous Security Council resolution of November 8. As this essay is being completed, the Iraqi government has produced its report and the UN inspectors have begun their work. We stand at a critical juncture for the international system of the new century.

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<sup>7</sup> President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1, 2002.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06>. In a less widely noted part of the same speech the President recognized unprecedented opportunities for great power cooperation in the current context

<sup>8</sup> Vice President Speaks at VFW 103<sup>rd</sup> National Convention, August 26, 2002

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08>.

***The Road Ahead: Iraq, the War on Global Terrorism, Israelis and Palestinians***

How will relations between Berlin and Washington proceed from here? Much will depend on how the Iraq crisis works out. If the Saddam Hussein regime is successfully disarmed (or removed) with means sanctioned by the Security Council, the international system will be strengthened, Washington's willingness to actively utilize the Security Council will be enhanced, and Berlin will join the consensus approach. Germany's seat on the Security Council from the start of the new year will offer useful opportunities. If Washington undertakes unilateral military action and things go badly wrong, much more than German-American cooperation will be "poisoned."

German assistance in the war against global terrorism continues to be outstanding, including Berlin's decision to take command (along with the Netherlands) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) based in Kabul and to draw NATO planning capabilities into the process. Hopefully active and visible German-American cooperation in this context will continue and the long-term struggle against Al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks will make substantial progress. If there is another attack on American soil of the same or larger scale as the September 11 attack, transatlantic differences in threat perception and appropriate military responses (in a context of sharp disparities in military capabilities between the two sides of the Atlantic) may widen. If there is a large attack on German or other European soil, the dynamic will be different.

Another key part of the equation will be the evolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States must resume a more active role as peacemaker, and the "Quartet" provides a useful framework for significant European participation in this process.

***The Road Ahead: Germany and America in the World***

One can make a good argument that Berlin's contribution to recent sharp high-level differences between Berlin and Washington was a temporary interruption, driven by domestic political necessity, of an otherwise largely positive story. That story is comprised of several significant steps forward in recent years by Germany in addressing security challenges beyond its own borders. That positive story will also hopefully be one of serious efforts to develop a common European security and defense policy, and of vigorous European involvement (in whatever precise form) on the wider stage of world politics.

But one's hope that this will be the story of the next ten or twenty years are mixed with qualifications and doubts. Europe's future priorities are likely to be within the European continent itself.

And America's contribution to recent differences may be systemic and long-term, though greatly heightened by Washington's understandable shock about the September 11 attacks on American soil. Helmut Schmidt in a recent article for *Die Zeit*, sees unilateralism with the upper hand in Washington for a long time, probably for decades.<sup>9</sup>

For much of the era after World War II, American "leadership" was generally seen in a positive light. Washington helped develop and worked through a variety of multilateral institutions and arrangements that made America a more "user-friendly" superpower (as John Ikenberry puts it<sup>10</sup>) for European and other partners. Washington articulated shared values and objectives. Today's American political leaders appear more prone to mistake unilateralism for leadership, assuming that others will follow the self-evidently right approach of the world's only superpower. But today's Western European political leaders are less in need of American protection and less prone automatically to follow. Alas, this seems like a prescription for a decaying partnership.

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<sup>9</sup> Helmut Schmidt: "Europa braucht kein Vormund," *Die Zeit*, August 1, 2002.  
[http://www.zeit.de/2002/32/Politik/200232\\_unilateral.html](http://www.zeit.de/2002/32/Politik/200232_unilateral.html).

<sup>10</sup> For one of many useful Ikenberry essays see G. John Ikenberry (2002): *America's Imperial Ambition*. In: *Foreign Affairs* 81(5), pp. 44-60.

## **Struggling with the Realities of World Politics: Transatlantic Relations Under Schröder and Fischer**

*By Nikolas Busse*

After four years of being in power, the Red-Green coalition in Berlin has created a rift in German relations with the United States which is unprecedented in post-war history. At no time in the last fifty years has a government in Washington openly talked about “poisoned relations” with Germany. Never before have American secretaries or presidents publicly refused to meet their German counterparts as it happened at this autumn’s NATO meetings in Warsaw and Prague. And no German government has ever run a campaign with such clear anti-American undertones as did the Schröder/Fischer coalition when it made the Iraq issue one of the central themes of the national elections in 2002. For many observers of German foreign policy, the surprising fact was not only that the Berlin government was willing to put a relationship at risk which had secured West Germany during the Cold War and later helped to bring about the unification of the country. An equally stunning revelation was that the German government acted as if the alliance with the leader of the Western world, who still contributes most of the military security of Europe, was - at least partly - dispensable.

In order to understand these developments, one has to look at the historical and intellectual background of the coalition which came to power in 1998. Shortly after the victory in the national elections, the new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated that his government would pursue a “German not a Green foreign policy”. This was meant to allay concerns that Fischer’s Green Party, which has strong roots in the peace movement, would question Germany’s membership in NATO or even its commitment to European integration since the EU was on the verge of acquiring defense capabilities of its own. And although they prided themselves with the legacy of Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*, the Social Democrats of Chancellor Schröder also had a mixed record in foreign policy. Sentiments against the Western alliance had been running high in the party at times, especially during the debate over the deployment of Pershing missiles in Western Europe in the early eighties. The Kosovo war in 1999, however, seemed to show that the two parties were willing to accept a new international role of enhanced responsibilities for Germany. The Bundeswehr took active part in the air campaign against Milosevic’s troops in Serbia and Kosovo. Since this was the first participation of German soldiers in a war after 1945, many observers felt that probably a left

government with an anti-militaristic history could best explain the need of military action to the German public which still harbored many reservations against the use of force.

Unfortunately, the truth of the matter was more complex. The government did not portray the Kosovo air campaign as a strategic move to avoid destabilization on the Balkans. Instead it argued that stopping Milosevic was necessary to avoid another “Holocaust” with the Albanian minority in the Kosovo being the victim. This helped to calm down critics in the coalition parties, especially among the Greens. But like so many times before in Germany, it also had the effect that the question of the legitimacy of war was debated only in moral terms. With the benefit of hindsight, one can argue that since this time the Schröder/Fischer government has taken a stance on foreign policy issues which more often was dominated by idealistic arguments than by strategic rationale. It was only a question of time until this would bring the German government in direct confrontation with Washington since the only remaining superpower has long been an adherent of realpolitik.

One of the first examples was the debate over National Missile Defense (NMD). The German government, as well as most think tank experts, did not understand that proliferation had become a major concern in the American defense community from the beginning of the nineties. It was especially Fischer who was heading European resistance against the American project by taking the position that NMD would initiate a new arms race. This was not only a misreading of Russian capabilities and tactics in the debate, it also unveiled the conceptual divide between America and Germany: The Red-Green government was still thinking in big power terms like in the cold war, while people in Washington were starting to pay much more attention to diffuse threats which came from small countries in the Third World. Another example for the difference in approaches was the debate over the Kyoto protocol. In Germany, the American refusal to ratify the treaty was not only criticized as a blow to environmental standards. The government and many voices in the public debate also saw the case as a good example of American arrogance and neglect of multilateralism, a principle which enjoys almost religious status among most members of the German foreign policy elite. September 11<sup>th</sup> did not change these basic attitudes at their core. Notwithstanding the public and official display of solidarity with the American people, the government found it very hard to get support in parliament for the participation of the Bundeswehr in “Enduring Freedom”. Schröder actually had to use a non-confidence vote to get approval for sending German soldiers abroad. It were mostly fringe members of the Green party who were opposed to

committing German soldiers, but their views were echoed by many commentators and ordinary citizens: The fight against terrorism should not include the use of force, American foreign policy was a root cause of terrorism.

In the summer of 2002, the Iraq issue made these feelings explode like a volcano. In opinion polls before the elections, more than eighty percent of the Germans were against any kind of military action against Saddam Hussein. This had different reasons in the two parts of the country. In the West, big parts of the electorate were still supporting the view that foreign policy should be ethically grounded and therefore not involve the use of force at all. To a large degree, this is probably a reflection of the self-image that was conferred upon the people by the public discourse of the old Federal Republic: After Hitler, Germany should never invade other countries again, "civilian" means of conflict resolution should be preferred. In the East, many people still held anti-American views as a result of their communist education during the Cold War. It was in the East, where Schröder could win most votes with his Iraq campaign. After he foreclosed any German involvement in an eventual war, his Social Democrats enjoyed big gains in opinion polls. By exploiting these sentiments, Schröder did not only win the elections. He also managed to get around the difficult question of German military participation in a future war which could have seriously threatened the survival of his coalition.

All in all, this makes for a rather pessimistic outlook on the future of German-American relations. The Red-Green government's intellectual difficulties in coping with the new security issues of terrorism and proliferation will make dealings with Washington not easier in the future. Germany might well become a notorious critic of American foreign policy which seems to be headed towards preemptive action against new threats. After the elections, the government did not even try to tune down its rhetoric on the Iraq issue for the sake of harmony in the Western camp. Thus it should not be expected that Germany will support tough measures against countries like North Korea or Iran either. Given the deep seated moralistic attitude towards foreign policy in the general population, major shifts are even unlikely if the government changes. Germany has regained its full sovereignty only recently, after the unification. It still has to learn how to play a constructive role in a world where not everyone is acting according to peace corps textbooks.

## **Germany's European Policy Under a "Red-Green" Government A Mid-Term Review**

*By Josef Janning*

When the new German center-left government under Chancellor Schröder succeeded the 16-year-old center-right government in the autumn of 1998, it was the first elected coalition that did not have senior members with international experience. It was the first government with ministers from the Green party, whose political convictions included strong anti-centralist, anti-military, and even anti-Western notions. With the advent of this political generation, it was also the first government in which the Chancellor, Foreign, and Defense Minister came from the cohort born after World War II. Finally, Schröder's coalition was the first to be confronted with a demand from its most important partners for German military engagement outside NATO's defense area, even before it officially took office.

Despite of these changes the first "Red-Green" coalition program, 'Change and Renewal', reflected the inertia of foreign policy in the 1990s by seeking to alter Germany's international engagement only at the fringes. Practically from day one of the new government, Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer adhered to the continuity principle. From the first moment he operated as if to the manor born. He and his staff were fully engaged, they skillfully developed useful relations with the powerful formers of opinion—and every one of Fischer's facial expressions mirrored the gravity of the situation and the serious nature of his policy. His metamorphosis from rebel to statesman assured him international attention and earned him good marks. His importance in Germany's international representation grew as the substance of his European ideas, developed over many years, was fully recognized, along with his active - and not tactically motivated - engagement in resolving the Yugoslav conflict.

For Fischer, both of these developments were the result of lessons learned from German history. The EU provides a framework for the nation-state, but eliminates nationalism and supplies the necessary means to neutralize any inclination to commit genocide or mass murder of the kind Nazi Germany committed. Fischer's European policy, especially in the area of security, was far ahead of many in his own party and also of many of his coalition partners,

who viewed the deepening of European integration above all as a project of Helmut Kohl and continually saw Washington's crisis leadership as a means of imposing US hegemony.

### *A Mixed Balance Sheet After Schröder's First Term in Office*

So much for the firm intentions and respectable beginning. By contrast, the actual results of the last four years are rather mixed. The successful management of the double challenge of the war in Yugoslavia and the EU presidency in the first half of 1999 were indeed impressive. In that test the coalition, despite various doubts about its competence in European policy, demonstrated decisiveness, direction, and negotiating ability, even as its parallel domestic policy stumbled.

Yet the early successes also demonstrated the limited scope of Germany's European policy, especially with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Within the Contact Group of the US, Russia, and several European countries, Germany took a major role in the crisis management of the Yugoslav conflict, but Berlin was less involved in the key military decisions than Britain and France. Consequently, Germany had to stand by and watch as other EU powers, drawing conclusions from Berlin's marginalization, vigorously pursued initiatives such as the British-French proposal at St. Malo in 1998 to europeanize defense efforts.

The Kosovo experience made agreement on the goal and basic principles of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) possible—but this was based more on the NATO format of voluntary national contributions than the integrated EU approach. The sort of foreign- and defense-policy integration that Germany would have welcomed never developed. France and Britain did not want such integration, and Germany was unable to muster the critical mass to drive such an initiative forward.

As concerns internal affairs of the European Union, however, Schröder's first term of office was characterized by considerable ambiguity. On the one hand, the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister confirmed Germany's pro-integrationist stance in the debate on the future shape of Europe, thus signaling continuity and reliability vis à vis its EU partners. On the

other hand, Chancellor Schröder tended to put a stronger emphasis on Germany's national interest as net payer to the EU budget than did his predecessor and contributed to the impression of an ongoing "britannization" of German European policy.

This holds true for Schröder's early remarks on the "ailing Euro" and the "German marks" wasted by Brussels as well as for his scolding of the European Commission when it announced to initiate the early warning procedure against Germany due to the increase of the national budget deficit in 2001. Another source of frictions was Schröder's repeated criticism on the practice of European competition and industrial policies blaming the Commission for not paying due regard to the German economic situation.

### *A Partnership Gap*

Both, the list of lost opportunities and the Chancellor's stronger emphasis on national interests, refer, respectively contribute, to a fundamental deficit in Red-Green European policy in the dearth of strategic partnerships and coalitions. There has been no solid strategic alliance with any of Germany's Western partners—nor any strong personal relationships—during the last four years. The Chancellor himself bears responsibility for this deterioration. In the case of Paris, after Berlin's proposal in 1999 to cut the EU's generous farm subsidies (which the Germans largely pay for and France largely benefits from) encountered a French veto, the relationship between the two leaders soured. French maneuvering at the Nice Summit of 2000 then snuffed out what was left of any personal chemistry. Neither routine joint meetings of foreign ministry planning staffs nor the periodic Franco-German summits held to pacify critics were able to overcome this problem. Kohl's earlier maxim of almost always conceding priority to French sensitivities may prove, by comparison, to have been the more successful policy, but it neither fit the style of the Schröder government nor the new circumstances of European politics.

As for London, it seemed initially that the Red-Green foreign policy could, by deepening the British-German relationship, achieve some leverage vis-a-vis the conventional Franco-German axis in driving European policy. German policy toward Europe initially took on a more British hue in becoming more pragmatic and less emotional. Policies were more coordinated; Schröder's personal relationship with Tony Blair seemed to function well; and

earlier British reserve toward Europe seemed to have vanished for good. But neither in the question of EU reform (which would have required a revisiting of Britain's budget rebate) nor in that of institutional development (where the British are less constitutional and integrationist than the Germans), nor yet in European security policy did an opportunity present itself for the two countries to join together to influence developments in Europe. The open coordination set in motion by the Lisbon summit call for swift economic liberalization in the EU and a benchmarking system for public services remains the only result of this German-British relationship.

Other personal relationships—like Schröder's good initial understanding with Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar—have remained episodic, or else they have come too late to have any real effect. By contrast, the Chancellor's careful attention to Russian President Vladimir Putin achieved positive results—but, on the other hand, also contributed to the somewhat confused German attitude to the second NATO enlargement project that is now proceeding. In the end, of course, Russia's relationship to the West is now better than at any time since the end of the Soviet Union; this certainly owes something to Germany's special efforts.

### *What Traces Have Been Left?*

What, then, is the bottom line? What traces have the last four years of German European policy left on the international scene? What would have been different if the Red-Green coalition had not been in power?

German policy has certainly made a contribution to important international operations—in Kosovo and Macedonia, and also in the aftermath of 9/11. But real influence has been denied the government, as the German and European attempts to deescalate the violence in the Middle East and Fischer's efforts to develop a specifically European policy for Iran have demonstrated.

The Red-Green coalition has had to face up to the fact that even a normal, self-confident Germany does not have much room for maneuver, especially when its traditional partners continue to follow their old ways of thinking. Even ten years after the end of the old order,

"negative power", the ability to block decisions, remains the prevailing mood around EU governments—to the detriment of more creative thinking. Yet even though the Red-Green coalition has been unable to solve the structural and procedural problems of integration, it has steadily pushed the process forward, against opposition from other EU capitals. The coalition's support for the Charter of Basic Rights, the ongoing European Constitutional Convention, EU enlargement to take in ten new Central European and Mediterranean members, and strengthening of the EU's powers has kept it aligned with postwar Germany's integration policy. And Joschka Fischer's Humboldt University speech of 2000 calling for a federal Europe and the Social Democrats' subsequent endorsement of this goal at a party conference stimulated German thinking about the desired end goal of European integration—an issue that Germans had not addressed since the withering away of the traditional vision of a United States of Europe. As now defined, the desired German model is a federation of nation-states that will combine elements of both former and current German thinking on Europe.

***Perspectives of Schröder's Second Term in Office: Revival of the Franco-German Motor?***

Only one month after the re-election of the Schröder government there are clear signs that the "Red-Green" coalition has learned its lessons with regard to building strategic partnerships. At the Brussels summit of October 2002, Germany abandoned its previous position of demanding an immediate reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. In spite of the detrimental effect to the net payer position of Germany, Chancellor Schröder accepted the French interest in not curbing farm spending in the enlarged European Union before 2007 and came to an agreement with President Chirac. The agreement itself appeared to be rather of tactical nature since it did not bring the UK's position or that of other "net payers" closer to the German policy line. On the other hand, it clearly helped to reach a common position of two other crucial elements of the integration project: security and defense as well as justice and home affairs. Thus, Schröder and Chirac announced a revival of the "Franco-German motor" by preparing "common positions" in the on-going Convention on the future of Europe. As a first result of this "rapprochement", on November 22 the French and German Foreign Ministers de Villepin and Fischer presented a joint initiative on how to develop the ESDP into a Security and Defense Union and how to apply the principle of "closer co-operation" to its implementation. The initiative draws from yearlong debates about a fresh approach to the increasing gap between territorial defense postures on the one hand and the requirements of

force projection and crisis management on the other hand. In essence, the Franco-German proposal calls for an integrated defense of all participating EU-members, built on joint development and procurement. A week later, the ministers issued a second proposal on justice and home affairs, calling for greater harmonization in the fields of police cooperation. To date, however, no full agreement has been reached on immigration policy and laws of asylum – a consensus on common policies and majority rule in this area would certainly help to push forward the overcoming of the pillar structure established a decade ago by the Maastricht Treaty.

However, in order to create a solid basis for the re-establishment of the Franco-German political leadership role in European integration there are mainly three challenges the second Schröder government has to face. The first one is the question of how to reform the institutional settings of the European Union. So far, there is no definite German position on how the future Europe should look like. Foreign Minister Fischer's preferences are perfectly in accordance with the new coalition agreement. The coalition agreement takes a federal stance by providing that the European Commission should become a strong, political accountable executive and that its President should be elected by the European Parliament. At first glance, this position seems to be shared by Chancellor Schröder who also pleaded for a strong Commission most recently. However, only a few weeks before he had declared his support for the joint Aznar-Blair-Chirac-Paper proposing a much more intergovernmental model with a President of the European Council at its top, who should be elected by the heads of state and government. Apparently, it will become extremely difficult to elaborate a common denominator between these two institutional models representing the different "Leitbilder" of Germany and France with regard to European integration.

A second topic on the German-French agenda remains the reform of Europe's financing system. The Chirac-Schröder compromise at Brussels has only delayed an agreement on this problem. However, it will be at stake again at the latest in 2005, when negotiations on the "Agenda 2006" are taken up. From a net payer's point of view it would be more promising for Germany to form a strategic alliance with the British government, which could, on the other hand, entail new tensions with France.

And finally, there might loom a German-French conflict on the question of whether Turkey should become a member of the European Union. While Fischer compared the likelihood of Turkey's admission into the EU with Mexico and Central America's admission into the United States, President Chirac stated that "Turkey has its place in Europe", thereby contradicting Convention President Giscard d'Estaing who had predicted "the end of the European Union" if Turkey should become an EU member. Considering these different positions one should keep in mind, however, that behind all the brouhaha over Turkey's accession lies a much more far-reaching problem – the strategic question of the future distribution of power between Germany and France within an enlarged European Union.

## **Bundeswehr Transformation – Is the Second Time The Charm?**

*By Martin Agüera*

### ***Bundeswehr Transformation - Four Lost Years...***

As with most missed opportunities in life you are likely to get a second chance. This rule also applies for the current Red-Green German Administration under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who – by only a small margin – won the national elections on September 22. If the above mentioned rule holds true for political affairs in general, it definitely applies to the Schröder Administration's performance in security and defense. Assessing the first legislative period of the Red-Green government coalition in that specific field means looking at some “ups” but definitely more “downs.”

In retrospective, the Red-Green coalition always stood on shaky ground in terms of security and defense. It continues to do so. Barely elected, the Green party had to swallow “shocks” in supporting a participation of German troops in Operation Allied Force, NATO's first war after 50 years of existence against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. No doubt, Allied Force became the first litmus test of the coalition's unity and it was not to be the last. Germany's troop commitment to the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul this year almost ended the coalition through a confidence vote in the Bundestag. Military issues remain “hot issues” that almost everybody would rather like to avoid. But reality is catching up with Germany's decision-makers. The world and the international system have changed and so has the role of the military and the use of force in general. For too long, Germany had been able to circumvent that debate – but no longer. To be fair, one has to say that the Red-Green government did what its preceding Administration under Helmut Kohl had not done – initiate the so called “steepest reform” of the German armed forces. The necessity of such a reform has been dictated by an ever growing number of Bundeswehr operations abroad.

Then Germany's Defense Minister, Rudolf Scharping, had a favorable start in 1998 since his reform plans spoke many military officers out of the heart. Most military leaders had long been arguing that the Bundeswehr – which had undergone a steep reduction in manpower from over 500,000 soldiers in 1991 to some 320,000 soldiers in 1999 – was lacking enough financial resources to continue to fulfill its job properly. Over 50 percent of the Bundeswehr's

annual budget were and still are being used up by personnel costs. Although maintaining qualified personnel remains of vital importance for the Bundeswehr, today's prospective combat scenarios call for smaller, highly mobile and flexible troops that can operate far away from the homeland. Personnel strength no longer remains the top priority since homeland defense no longer is the prime mission. To meet the new operational requirements, the Bundeswehr was ill-suited since too much of its inventory still largely carried the "old adversary" label. Consequently, the military establishment needed profound plans for the deactivation, modernization or replacement of aging equipment and ill-suited materiel.

### *The Flawed Reform Concept*

Aware of this, Scharping in 1999 called for a commission of experts under the leadership of former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker to assess the transformation needs of the Bundeswehr. In May 2000, the Commission presented the results, which most experts called adequate and far reaching. Important recommendations, for instance, included reducing the overall strength of the armed forces to 240,000; establishing a flexible conscript system which would probably pave the way for a smooth end of the system in a few years; and a so called "Anschubfinanzierung" – a financial boost – of some 1 to 1.5 billion EUR annually over several years to realize the modernization process of the Bundeswehr. However, the Commission's suggestions were neglected by Scharping, who instead tasked his new Chief, General Harald Kujat, to prepare a new concept, which, among other things, called for a personnel end strength of 280,000 soldiers by 2006 including some 80,000 conscripts and a rigorous modernization of the Bundeswehr equipment. That concept then became the official planning guide for the "Bundeswehr-Reform." Kujat, formerly the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff in the Defense Ministry, later in March 2001 presented his "Concept for Materiel and Equipment of the Armed Forces of the Future." His concept well outlined the numerous areas where the Bundeswehr's equipment no longer met current standards and what programs were needed to get the service back on track. However, in the end his concept resembled a mere "wish list" that seemed to completely ignore political realities. For Kujat's most important procurement programs alone, the Bundeswehr would have needed additional funds of some 110 billion EUR over the next 15 years. Basically, the realization of the concept would have meant increasing the existing investment budget of some 4 billion EUR to nearly 8 billion per year.

As a result, the concept of Scharping and Kujat turned out to be a calculation that lacked the political backing of Chancellor Schröder and Finance Minister Hans Eichel, whose primary goals had become to consolidate the federal budget by 2006. Combined with political animosities between Schröder and Scharping, it had become clear after only two years that Scharping could no longer count on desperately needed support from his cabinet colleagues. Left with an enormous reform process that had merely begun, several ongoing international procurement programs that needed financial commitments, Scharping once again felt the cold wind of being left alone in the political arena. This time, however, there was no way out since he had repeatedly committed himself to the reform concept, the modernization agenda of Kujat and to subsequent international collaboration programs like the A400M transport aircraft. In fact, the A400M became a prime example of Scharping's failure – stuck with a commitment to partners to buy 73 airlifters for roughly 9.5 billion EUR, Germany's Defense Minister was left with an unsecured financial status and thereby unable to sign a legally binding contract much to the partner's frustration. In addition to such devastating political knock-outs, Scharping could not generate additional investment resources through the privatization of Bundeswehr installations. In his self-confident manner, the defense minister had announced in public that he would be able to free up 500 million EUR annually through his properly installed GEBB privatization company. But the results after one year were devastating. The GEBB had only generated some 8 million EUR and the director, Annette Fugmann-Heesing, had been dismissed.

### ***Scharping's Dismissal – End of the Bundeswehr-Reform As We Know It?***

Moving closer to the elections 2002, Scharping more and more became an image problem for Chancellor Schröder. A series of factors (the Minister's weak standing on the international scene due to A400M and other procurement woes; a sequence of private affairs which included accusations of having misused the governmental flight service and unlawful payments from the Frankfurt-based lobbyist Moritz Hunzinger) led to Scharping's dismissal only a few weeks before the parliamentary elections in September 2002.

Subsequently, Schröder named Peter Struck to succeed Scharping as Defense Minister. At that point, most observers in Berlin expected Struck only to serve temporarily at this post since his main job was to smooth the political waves Scharping had caused. Still outstanding were signatures on contracts such as the A400M, the six-nation Meteor medium-range air-to-

air missile or the Iris-T short-range air-to-air program. Especially Britain was exerting a lot of international pressure on Germany to sign the contracts and warned that Germany's reputation as a reliable partner in procurement programs was at stake. Struck announced to reassess all procurement programs after the elections on their priority, necessity and overall volume. With that, Struck bought time from its international partners to pave the way for a smooth election final for Schröder.

Struck remained in office after the elections and announced the first results of his procurement review on December 5 to the public. The review, Struck said, will be a first step towards a comprehensive defense review for the mid-term planning. It seems that Struck, in first place, is willing to halt the financial chaos that existed in the Defense Ministry. Appointments of several budget experts such as Peter Eickenboom and Hans-Georg Wagner as State Secretaries seem to support such a view. Struck's main target seems to improve the relations between the Ministry and parliament. Under Scharping, the relations with the parliament had been strained. Complying with recommendations from his military-politico staff, Struck also reduced previous procurement commitments made by his predecessor Scharping. For instance, Struck announced to buy 60 instead of 73 A400M; 600 instead of 1,488 Meteor missiles and 1,250 instead of 1,800 Iris-T missiles. These readjustments make strategic sense since the Bundeswehr was on its way to overspend its investment budget by 2006. After all though, these steps will not suffice to consolidate the Bundeswehr budget. Early next year, the new Chief of Staff, General Wolfgang Schneiderhan is expected to deliver his "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien" – the new defense policy guidelines – to Defense Minister Struck, which should pave the way for a politically acceptable "reform of the reform." Struck announced to rigorously assess the possible deactivation of old equipment, new procurement programs and, what is more important, the current Bundeswehr structure. In order to save money, the Minister will have to take hard and unpopular decisions such as continuing to reduce the military and civilian personnel strength of the Bundeswehr; close more Bundeswehr installations and to take a hard look again at conscription. Struck himself said he would like to maintain conscription but whether this is feasible remains to be seen.

***Struck's Agenda - Prioritization Will Be The Key***

Whatever the outcome of the new concept of Struck and Schneiderhan will be: If the goal is to advance the Bundeswehr transformation process, unpopular decisions will undoubtedly have to be taken. Planning on receiving more money – as did their predecessors – is unrealistic and Struck already acknowledged that there will be no budget increases. Not just will the Bundeswehr have to shrink in size as well as retire much of its aging and expensive equipment. Perhaps it will also have to say “good-bye” to some currently planned procurement programs like the Maritime Patrol Aircraft successor; the tri-national Medium-Extended Air Defense System or others. While all these programs make perfect strategic sense, they will eat up vast financial resources in coming years that are hardly available. There may be ways to safeguard these programs by working on “government-to-government” agreements (exchanging weapons systems), but money-wise it will be hard to free up resources for many more big-ticket programs.

Struck may be able to bring the Bundeswehr forward if he continues his strict and open-minded approach. He has done well so far by avoiding to make promises he cannot live up to. Further, his openness on program cuts and continued reviews has been appreciated. More than ever, Struck, Schneiderhan and others in the Defense Ministry will have to prioritize what capabilities the Bundeswehr should retain in the future according to its most probable missions. Under the current and mid- to long-term financial prospects, it no longer is possible to maintain a “can-do-all” military. Therefore, more than ever, the Bundeswehr leadership will have to coordinate with European partners where to collaborate and how capability shortfalls can be overcome. As Germany, most other European armies will be unable to maintain their “can-do-all” approaches due to budget deficits. Germany’s armed forces are not the only ones which are under-funded, and by no means the worst military establishment in Europe. But with the Bundeswehr being committed in international military operations, equipping its forces with the best materiel to fulfill their missions has to be a high priority if the Bundeswehr is to avoid its “Waterloo” abroad, as some Defense Ministry officials fear. Under-funded, ill-equipped armed forces with a high operations tempo don’t go well. The high operations tempo – which is stretching Germany’s armed forces to the limit already – is likely to increase in the coming years if the European Union tasks its members to deploy forces to peacekeeping missions to show the world that their Rapid Reaction Force truly

functions. NATO's Response Force, initiated recently at the Prague Summit on November 21/22, may well be another chapter yet to be written. In any case, the U.S. will expect even more powerful contributions from its European alliance members in terms of troops and equipment for high-intensity-type conflicts if NATO is to remain politically relevant. This demands careful attention by Germany's leadership which presently is in limbo between shaping up transatlantic relations from its current historic low, perhaps through stronger defense commitments internationally; making sure the Bundeswehr does not collapse; and maintaining its current domestic course to consolidate the budget. Schröder's Administration has to master a very difficult balancing act that could easily fail anytime. The crash of a CH-53 helicopter in Afghanistan shortly before Christmas 2002 due to mechanical problems highlights how risky the Bundeswehr's current path is. Accidents happen and nobody can really prevent them but the odds for old equipment to malfunction are higher. Aging equipment, that the Bundeswehr has en masse, is used, upgraded, and cannibalized to let Germany's armed forces perform in demanding operational scenarios. While much of the equipment abroad is certainly the best that the Bundeswehr has to offer, replacements have to be sought quickly and they do certainly not come without a price tag. Otherwise, Germany's defense establishment is not only on a crash course, it is also irresponsibly subjecting its soldiers to great risk.

Can the current course be averted ? Perhaps. If Struck and his team cannot count on budget increases, they must – more than ever - promote European defense integration and prioritization processes that lead to specialization of military forces. In that way, they could advance Germany's security and defense policy and use the second chance the voters have given them.

## II. Book Reviews

**Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. (2002): *Deutsche Europapolitik von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder*. Leske und Budrich.**

*By Siegfried Schieder*

In recent years scholarly investigation of Germany's European policy appears to have become one of the most productive growth sectors of German foreign policy research. This comes as no surprise. On the one hand, more than under the East-West conflict, European integration may be seen as a central project of German foreign policy; on the other hand, this issue has become far more contentious than ever before. The present edited volume by Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet consists of four individual contributions that seek to trace the policy scopes and options involved in the making of Germany's European policy from its beginnings and the ground-breaking work done under Konrad Adenauer up to the first Red-Green government under Gerhard Schröder.

The contributions that went into the making of the volume are not the results of a joint research project; instead, their aim is to present, in compact form, the broad outlines of Germany's integration policy in the period under consideration. The reader looking for new, or indeed original, interpretations of Germany's European policy will more or less be disappointed (with the possible exception of the chapter on the Red-Green government). The strengths of this volume thus must be sought more in its compact overview of the role played by the European policies of the individual post-war chancellorships, which are analyzed comparatively with an eye to three guiding questions: first, the question of the German contribution to the process of European integration; second, the question whether and to what extent Germany's European engagement mirrors national interests; and third, the (not exactly new) question as to the continuity and/or mutability of Germany's European policy.

*Corina Schukraft* outlines the beginnings under Konrad Adenauer (as well as the maintenance of the status quo in integration policy under Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger). Under the keyword "Sovereignty through integration" she discusses Adenauer's skill in intertwining European and West German interests. She notes that, following the failure of the European Defense Community, Adenauer pursued a markedly pragmatic course in integration policy.

*Nicole Leuchtweis* discusses Germany's European policy under the Social Democratic Chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Despite substantial differences in their respective policy styles – here Brandt the visionary, seeking to embed Germany's European policy in the context of a long-term overall European peace regime; there Schmidt the pragmatist, with his well-honed sense for "realism" and the feasible – both chancellors again and again (and in the face of the economic stagnation and domestic political problems that beset Germany in the 1970s) placed the Community's welfare above the financial interests of the Federal Republic.

*Ulrike Keßler* looks into Germany's European policy under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, who – the author notes – viewed and practiced European integration in terms of a "categorical imperative." As willing as Helmut Kohl may have been to forge on with European integration, the EU balance of the governments he headed was, as a number of recent studies indicate, not the brilliant performance it is often assumed to have been. The reader may question the cogency of the author's assertion that "no one will seriously doubt that Helmut Kohl did great things for Europe" (p. 161). For one thing, completion of the single European market was mainly the result of the convergent domestic preference hierarchies subscribed to by the major member states, and Helmut Kohl and his Finance Minister Theo Waigel were not at all disinclined to assert national interests in important policy fields. On the other hand, Kohl used a variety of different means to foster the transfer of institutions to Europe (here we need to think only of the European Monetary Union). This gave rise to different forms of the assertion of German self-interest and power.

The most interesting section of the volume is without doubt Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet's contribution on the European policy of the Red-Green coalition in Germany. The author discusses in depth the various stages which Germany's European policy has gone through under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, from Germany's Council presidency and the Agenda 2000, to Germany's engagement in the eastward enlargement of the Union and the strengthening of its foreign- and security policy pillar, the Union's new integration policies (justice and domestic affairs) and constitutional issues bound up with the finality of Europe. In the years 1998-2000 the Red-Green government's EU policy was marked by fundamental continuity. In some fields Germany's integration in Europe has even been further consolidated (e.g. Common Foreign-, Security- and Defense Policy). Self-restraint of German power continues to be the prevalent credo of Berlin's European policy,

even though Schröder is far more inclined than his predecessors to play the card of national interest and to cast himself in the role of the "consciously self-confident" leader. Some shifts in German positions that go beyond partial adjustments include a number of German ideas on the future institutional shape of the EU as well as the articulation of German interests in the funding of European integration (keywords: reduction of Germany's "role as a net payer" and the dispute over agricultural policy) and in the process of eastward enlargement.

In sum, despite Germany's unbroken commitment to Europe, a kind of "red thread" running through all German chancellorships, Germany's role behavior, in particular in the 1990s, has been subject to some significant modifications. Until well into the 1990s German governments exercised great caution in dealing with their enlarged power potential. Thereafter Germany's role behavior has shown clear-cut signs of accelerated modification. This – we are told – may be "an inevitable consequence of normalization" (p. 228). "Change in continuity" is, to put it in a nutshell, the outcome of Germany's new European policy.

It is, however, questionable whether it is particularly helpful to scrutinize Germany's foreign and European policy under the aspect of continuity versus change. The dynamic push of integration into more and more new policy fields experienced in the 1990s has not only led to growing problems with the implementation of EU standards, Germany's European policy on the whole is undergoing a fundamental change of character. On the one hand, the interdependencies between Berlin and Brussels are, on the whole, growing in scope (keywords: Europe departments in German federal ministries and the conference of German *Länder*-level Europe ministers). On the other hand, Europe is making itself felt more and more throughout society as a whole, and this is increasingly "Europeanizing" formerly domestic affairs and social actors, making it more and more difficult for them to legitimate their actions. The reciprocal interpenetration of the German and European policy process is not only changing the substance of policies, it is at the same time also altering processes and structures. Germany and German actors are accordingly seen here as plural components of a complex system of European "governance" and not regarded merely in terms of the categories of community "continuity" or as an expression of change driven by "national interest." In focusing chiefly on the (traditional) role of German chancellors, and in largely disregarding the manifold and in part coordination-resistant domestic actors and processes involved in social preference formation, the contributions contained in the present volume miss a good part of what today constitutes the specific character of (German) European policy.

**Axel Lüdeke (2002): „Europäisierung“ der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Konstitutive und Operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht und Amsterdam, Leske + Budrich.**

*By Marco Overhaus*

With this book (which is based on his dissertation), Axel Lüdeke probably contributed one of the most detailed accounts of Germany's foreign and security policy within the framework of the European Union's external relations framework. His central research question is to which degree and in which ways Germany has "europeanized" its foreign policy in the period from 1991 (the beginning of the intergovernmental conference which led to the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union) to 1997 (the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty). The study comprises three case studies. The *constitutive* policy of Germany towards the institutionalization of the EU's external relations within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and later the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the first case study. Here, the author asks, what Germany's central positions in the run-up to the negotiations of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties were and how these positions could be translated into final outcomes. Germany's and the EU's crisis management in the former Yugoslavia and the policies on the national and European level towards Poland in the context of Eastern enlargement are case studies two and three.

According to the author's definition, "Europeanization" in the context of foreign and security policy means a deliberately designed process to formulate and implement political decisions in a European rather than national context which includes the loss of national autonomy up to a certain extent. The definition also entails that the process works in both directions: On the one hand, Germany influences and shapes political structures and policy processes at the EU level, while on the other hand the European institutions (its norms, rules and procedures) have an impact on Germany's foreign policy behavior.

The author applies a theoretical framework which is based on rational institutionalism and the classical regime approach which originated with the work of Stephen Krasner (1982). Within this context, Lüdeke conceptualizes the EPC/CFSP as a specific regime with all the constitutive features: Durability, stabilization of mutual expectations, reduction of uncertainties among the cooperating countries and so on.

The principal value of the study is based on its empirical richness. It offers a very detailed description of positions, negotiations and policies on both levels of governance across all three cases and should therefore be of great value to the reader. Moreover, it undertakes the endeavor to apply the more and more prominent concept of “Europeanization”, which has so far almost exclusively been applied to the “community pillar” of the EU, and much less so to the intergovernmental realm of foreign and security policy.

The concept of “Europeanization” is at the same time the major shortcoming of the book. The theoretical concept (and especially in conjunction with institutionalism and regime theory) postulates that the process is a two-way street which also impacts on national policy behavior. Thus it implies that “states would have acted differently” in the absence of institutions, that is, they stick occasionally to policies which are not in their preference for the sake of the functioning of the institution as a whole. Unfortunately, this concept remains underdeveloped in the empirical chapters. Most often, the author simply treats the degree of Germany’s willingness to take its policies to the European level as the sole proxy for “Europeanization” which makes this approach very static. In this vein, “Europeanization” is simply defined as the opposite of “re-nationalization”. Moreover, it does not always become clear to which degree Germany was forced by European institutions and policies to adapt its national policies when the former and the latter contradicted each other. A good example is the analysis the German-Polish relations in the context of EU enlargement. Lüdeke acknowledges that the “historical burdens” in this relationship (forced labor, expulsion of ethnic Germans after World War II) are at times at odds with the overall principles and policies of EU Eastern enlargement. However, based on statements at the top foreign policy level in Germany, he assumes that both issue areas are not linked by the German government and thus omits the bilateral “historical burdens” almost completely. It might have been interesting to see, for instance, whether Germany was forced by European norms, rules, and procedures to moderate its demands on historical “hot potatoes” vis à vis Poland.

In sum, the book clearly has its strengths in the rich empirical chapters but unfortunately does not substantially contribute to the further development of regime theory or the refinement of the “Europeanization” approach as applied to the realm of foreign and security policy. To be fair, however, the study does not claim to do so in the first place.

### III. Online Resources and New Publications on German Foreign Policy

#### 1. German Foreign Policy of the Red-Green Government in General

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A plurality of official resources (as well as media coverage and analyses) are accessible through the online archive of [www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de](http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de) at:

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Hellmann, Gunther (2000): Deutschlands Kraft und Europas Vertrauen, oder: Die Selbstbewußten, die Befangenen und die Betroffenen der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik, in:

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