This newsletter focuses on the Franco-German relationship after the Nice Summit from different national perspectives. We asked our contributors: Is the foundation of their relationship strong enough for them to "redefine" it in such a way as to find new common ground on which to build the future European Union? Is this possible, given the very important differences and the general climate in the EU ahead of enlargement? Is it even still necessary?

It is remarkable how much our four authors agreed among themselves. In a nutshell, their conclusions are twofold:

- Yes, the Franco-German alliance is going through a rough patch,

- But no, this in no way spells the end of this relationship, nor of its crucial role in the future of the European construction.

Franco-German Relations in a changing Europe

Beyond the strictly bilateral level, the state and the quality of the Franco-German relationship has always been measured by the yardstick of their common capacity to impart political direction to the development of the European Union. However, descriptions of their pivotal role in the EU, of their function as "engines" of European integration, which reflected expectations in both countries (as well as in third countries), seem to be less and less justified by the facts. A look at the negotiations and results of major EU summits in the 1990s and of the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) of Amsterdam and especially of Nice make it difficult to maintain the claim of a dynamic Franco-German "couple" working together towards deeper integration in the European Union. The last major step in European integration which corroborates this view of Franco-German relations was the Maastricht Treaty, paving the way to monetary union. Other important advances in European co-operation, especially the steps towards a European military intervention capacity and the set-up of EU-institutions for decision-making in the field of security policy, cannot be attributed to Franco-German leadership but rather to a shift in the British attitude after the military intervention in Kosovo. During the Nice Summit in December 2000 in particular, major differences and tensions between the two countries were clearly visible. It is no coincidence that the issue of formal power distribution inside the EU-institutions - vote weighting, a demographic factor and the distribution of seats in the European Parliament - lay at the root of these tensions. France (and especially her neo-Gaullist President Chirac) made every effort to maintain Franco-German parity inside the Council, a topic of very high symbolic meaning, as the reactions and commentaries in the French press and in the political elite after the Nice summit made amply clear.

If this impression of a weakened Franco-German "tandem" in the European Union is correct, how can it be accounted for? A neorealist interpretation would point to a change in the distribution of power in Europe following German unification and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, making the Franco-German relationship less symmetrical. The consequences of these two major upheavals in the international system, one might argue, are visible in the more assertive style of German post-unification foreign and European policy, Germany defending its interests inside the EU in a less accommodating way, especially where budgetary and distributional issues are at stake. For many French government officials and academic observers alike, such a change in German European policy was to be expected. Since the Second World War realist thinking has always played a much more prominent role in France than in Germany. The French foreign minister Hubert Védrine, for instance, recently developed his vision of an "Europe puissance" in a multipolar world order. This Europe, in his view, should be "multipolaire" internally as well, without the domination of one of its composing units (Cf. his interview in "La revue internationale et stratégique", Fall 1999, p. 61). This is one of many statements expressing more or less openly French fears of becoming a 'junior partner' of Germany in the EU. Indeed, seen from France, the major European developments during the last decade were influenced much more by Bonn/Berlin than by Paris, the terms of monetary union and the basic decision to enlarge the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe being the most important examples. A new kind of German leadership was also visible in discussions about the future of the EU and its institutional shape, starting with the Schäuble-Lamers proposals for a "core Europe" in 1994. The Humboldt University speech of Foreign Minister Fischer in May 2000, calling for a European constitution is the other chief example of this change. It was the German chancellor Schröder, backed by the German Länder and the Christian democrats, who was able to convince his European partners - and a reluctant French government - to address the issue of a European constitution, putting another IGC (to be held in 2004) on the European agenda. Indeed, one might get the impression that France has lost her capacity of agenda-setting inside the Community - alone or in co-operation with Germany. The French European policy of the last years seems hesitant, defensive, unimaginative and - most importantly - to be without a coherent project for the European future - and for the future of French influence inside an enlarged and transformed Union.

However, the capacity of neorealist arguments to interpret the changes in Franco-German relations should not be overestimated. Even if we can indeed observe a more assertive style of German European policy, the European frame of reference of German foreign policy and its basic continuity with regard to major European policies and guiding polity ideas have never been seriously put into question. For France too, there is no realistic alternative to her traditional European policy and the prominent role of Germany as her most important partner, efforts to counterbalance the German weight in the EU by the development of a sort of "multiple bilateralism" with other EU Member States notwithstanding.

Domestic factors should also be taken into account in any explanation of these changes: the coming to power of a "successor generation" in both countries and the fundamental process of politicisation of European integration issues since the Maastricht Treaty ratification process being the most important ones. The "pragmatic" and sometimes robust style of European policy of President Chirac, Prime Minister Jospin and Chancellor Schröder is in part certainly due to the lack of emotional commitment to European integration of a generation that did not experience the Second World War and the post-war efforts to eradicate Franco-German confrontation through a European framework. Even if they were committed to a deepening of European integration in the very same way their predecessors were, they would nevertheless have to face national publics more aware of the importance and impact of Community policies on their everyday lives and more reluctant to follow their leaders in transferring competencies to the EU-level. In Germany, the broad post-war consensus in the national political elite and the major political parties on European policy still exists, but the German Länder and a more eurosceptic public opinion set clear limits to integrative policies on the part of the German government. In France, public opinion does not seem to be as hostile to a deepening of integration as in Germany, but Europe has turned out to be a highly divisive issue affecting party competition more profoundly than in Germany, with divisive consequences inside as well as between the major political parties.

Another part of the puzzle is the effect of the growing number of Member States and the resulting heterogeneity of interests, political cultures and institutional traditions: the Franco-German relationship simply cannot have the same impact on European policies and institution-building nowadays compared to the Community of Six. And last but not least, it is the very success of important integrative steps - common market and monetary union - which leave the political elites in both countries without a common major project for the future of the EU. Joschka Fischer is right in his repeatedly articulated view that the impact of Franco-German relations on the European scene was seldom due to convergent outlooks of both governments on important issues. More often than not it was their capacity to set the European agenda and to overcome clearly conflicting interests in the pursuit of common European goals, their bilateral conflicts reflecting divisions of two "camps" inside the EU, their compromises setting the stage for an overall compromise acceptable to all. The long and rocky road leading to closer monetary co-operation in Europe and finally to monetary union is the most telling example for this important function of the Franco-German relationship. What can now be the predominant objective or the common project helping to bind together conflicting interests and reduce them to disputes about the proper way to achieve a more or less consensual goal? The "reunification of Europe" following the fall of the iron curtain has hitherto proven to be a source of many conflicts of interests and of French misgivings as to its effect on the German power position in Europe. The other major issue ahead, the Post-Nice-process of constitutional engineering must be handled very carefully by both governments. Institution building and constitution drafting touch upon ideas of legitimate and democratic government and upon guiding polity ideas for the EU, deeply rooted in national constitutional traditions and political cultures. These constitutional issues will be very difficult to tackle for yet another important reason: the potential costs and benefits of institutional changes are almost impossible to estimate in any reliable way, which might make governments very reluctant to agree to major changes. As to the reform of important European policies, the programmed mid-term review of the most expansive one, the Common Agricultural Policy, does not promise to be an easy task in times of election campaigns in both countries.

Officials in France and Germany seem to be well aware of the challenges lying ahead and of the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. Their reaction to the crisis of common management of European affairs revealed by the Nice summit did not differ from the past: the common will and the steps taken to improve the consultative mechanisms between them on European matters reflect the enduring force of a normative consensus on the importance and necessity of their bilateral relationship for the future of the EU. Up to now, the rhetoric of a "Franco-German tandem", which was always only part of the story, helped to create, diffuse and stabilise normative expectations in the political elites of both countries and to overcome serious conflicts of interest. The crucial question nowadays is how far reality can diverge from the imagery of the "tandem"-rhetoric without undermining the usefulness of a myth which contributed so forcefully to shaping reality.

This is the shortened and summarised version of an article that appeared earlier in Politique Etrangère ("France-Allemagne: quel après-Nice?", Politique étrangère, n°2, 2001). Summary and translation by Wolfgang Brauner.

Four months after Nice, Paris and Berlin are still pondering the consequences of a European summit that - although it was supposed to lay the institutional foundations of a European Union with 27 members - has above all highlighted the latent misunderstandings and the frustrations that have been held back since November 1989 on both sides of the Rhine. Indeed, "the deterioration of the Franco-German relationship reminds one of the crisis of confidence between 1969 and 1974"(1). At that time, Germany launched unilateral initiatives, both in the EC and in the framework of its Ostpolitik, that translated its increasing international emancipation and implicitly called into question the political leadership of France in Europe.

The Myth of the Golden Age in Franco-German Relations

The deterioration of Franco-German Relations neither started with the arrival of Gerhard Schröder at the Chancellery, nor should one glorify the period 1974-1995 in comparison to the current situation. That would mean to forget the EC's profound crisis at the end of the 1970s and Helmut Schmidt's strong criticism of Germany's "excessive" contribution to the EC budget. If there is a climate of distrust between the countries today, one should remember that such a climate had already existed at the time of the euromissile crisis of 1982/83. Also, French criticism of Germany's "hegemonic" intentions is not new either. This reproach had already been expressed concerning Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and the preparation of the third phase of EMU in the mid-90s. In short, there have been many important divergences between the two countries all through the nineties that should lead us to a more reserved perspective on the quality of the Franco-German engine at that time.

Nevertheless, until 1997 France and Germany were always able to overcome their differences and reach a consensual position in the lead-up to European summits. Obviously, this was not the case in Nice.

Between European Reform and Bilateral Rebalancing

While bilateral summits typically serve to come up with common positions, those of Rambouillet, Mainz, Vittel and Hannover hardly managed to hide major disagreement. Thus, at the Mainz Summit, the two sides agreed to take the demographic factor into account when reweighing the votes in the Council. But this only masked an old disagreement. While France wanted to redistribute votes at the expense of the "small" countries, Germany considered that this redistribution should apply to all countries, thus rejecting the principle of equality between the two countries in the Council as a cornerstone of European integration.

This conflict has triggered yet another crisis between France and Germany. Paris categorically refused Germany's "décrochage", all the more because it suspected the German government thus trying to obtain the political leadership of the EU and "to translate the leading demographic and economic position it has gained through reunification into political leadership"(2). While the positions of both governments on this issue were equally inconsistent, the final result is very complex, requiring a triple majority for qualified majority voting.

The maintenance of the parity, on which France had insisted so much, appears quite symbolic since the demographic safety-net de facto gives Germany a stronger influence. Moreover, Germany is the only one of the four "big" countries to keep its 99 members in the EP, while those of the other three are being reduced to 72. This "décrochage" has at least two consequences. First, it will have a considerable impact on the codecision procedure and the functioning of the EP, "risking to seriously offset the balance of this institution"(3). Secondly and more importantly, it will make it even less unlikely that France or the UK will accept Germany's proposal to strengthen the EP at the next reform of the EU in 2004. In general, the priority Jacques Chirac attached to the maintenance of the parity of votes in the Council clearly expresses his preference for intergovernmental at the expense of supranational institutions such as the EP.

However, it would certainly be unjust to attribute the difficulties of the Nice Summit exclusively to Franco-German differences. They are part of a more general context that has prevailed since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. It is characterised by the preference of all member states to defend above all their national interests and to preserve their veto in sensitive questions. But isn't it precisely the main function of the Franco-German motor to develop a dynamic that is capable to overcome the resistance by the other member states? One has to recognise that the absence of bilateral initiatives and the differences between Paris and Berlin at the Nice Summit have had a paralysing effect and have made it easier for those opposed to the deepening of Community institutions and policies.

The Consequences of Nice

All things considered, it is not surprising that the Treaty of Nice, revealing a Franco-German "malaise" more than ten years old, has provoked strong criticisms on both sides of the Rhine and remains a source of tensions between the two countries. Though not everyone would go as far and qualify Nice a "diplomatic Suez"(4), the feeling that "Europe is no longer the French garden"(5) is nevertheless widespread in France. Opening the way for a Europe less southern and less western, with Germany at its centre and with its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Nice marks a turning point and symbolizes the end of France's intellectual hegemony over European integration(6). This rather pessimistic assessment can also very frequently be found in Germany. While there is certainly a tendency to minimise the advantages of the Mittellage, for many years frequent references have also been made to France's difficulties to adapt to the new European situation(7). While the Germans criticise the French for being nostalgic, they do not seem to understand that for the French, Schröder's Germany represents - rightly or wrongly - a country that is different from the one they have known until 1998, a country that launches an increasing number of unilateral initiatives, that formulates demands without prior consultation(8) and that reduces its solidarity with France, as in the case of BSE. The Nice Summit thus risks to have important consequences to the extent that it represents for France a new German attitude and for Germany the French refusal to recognise the realities of the post-Cold War period.

But perhaps these difficulties will also lead to a more dynamic development that has been lacking since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. As has been recognised by the French Minister for European Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, "the Franco-German couple will be caught in an extremely dangerous fatal spiral, affecting both the EU and the two countries, if a climate of distrust develops and Germany considers the French to be arrogant, stingy and malicious, while the French would have the impression that Germany wants to be the big European power"(9). Conscious of the destabilising effects on the European balance and the risks for l'acquis communautaire of an escalation of tensions between them, the leaders of both countries make an effort to preserve the ties that have been developed since the 1950s and to avoid that the divergences lead to a divorce that nobody wants.

This is why the two countries are willing to "redefine" their relationship, which is far from being easy. According to Germany, the political integration of the EU should be strengthened and the relationship to France should become more pragmatic, based on a common approach to today's and tomorrow's problems. However, according to France, European integration is above all intergovernmental and reconciliation remains the basis of its relationship with Germany.

At their meeting in Blaesheim on January 31st 2001, Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac asked their Foreign Ministers to organise informal meetings at the highest level every six to eight weeks, with the goal of jointly preparing the deepening of the EU. This initiative as well as the debate on a "European constitution", launched by Fischer and Chirac in May and June of last year, move in the right direction. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the two countries will be able bring their visions of the future Europe and its political organisation closer together. The Germans still regret that the French have never responded to the proposals made by Karl Lamers in 1994 and by Joschka Fischer in 2000 to create a federal core with Germany and France at its centre to solve the dilemma of the simultaneous deepening and widening of the EU. But they underestimate the difficulties of France to commit itself to a development that contradicts its republican traditions and values. This is made even more difficult by the domestic political context, characterised by the importance of the "souverainistes" on both ends of the political spectrum and the controversy over the future of Corse. However, could a very heterogenous Union of 27 members be managed otherwise than in a decentralised, confederal or even federal way? This is why France is concerned that Germany, by framing the debate on the future of Europe in these terms, would also like to determine the speed of its development and the structure of its institutions.

Finally, Schröder's recent support for the deepening of European integrations seems to contradict with his demand for clearer delimitation of competencies between the different levels of decision-making. The codification of the principle of subsidiarity would certainly clarify the European treaties and would contribute to the development of a perspective on the "finalité" of the EU. But by satisfying the Länder, that are concerned to protect their prerogatives from the influence of the Commission and the Council, Schröder risks to call into question the progress of European integration and to "renationalise" certain parts of Community policies. If that question, which is at the very heart of the debate on a "European constitution", is not openly discussed between France and Germany, it risks to seriously undermine the dynamism at the beginning of 2001.

Danish perceptions and political positions towards the postwar Franco-German alliance have generally been marked by ambivalent sentiments and complexities of foreign policy interests. As Denmark has been one of the small-nation victims of historical animosities between the two pivotal European powers - and particularly of imperial German policies in the past - the post-war alliance between the two and their joint integration into the European Communities and NATO came as a welcome boon. It liberated Denmark from the unpleasant choice between European rivals and presented the country with an opportunity to exit from its national cocoon and make its voice felt on the international scene. Negative historical stereotypes of Germans and continued trade-related dependence on Germany after WWII (Germany has consistently been one of Denmark's principal export markets and suppliers) initially were balanced by close cultural and economic ties with Great Britain and then, after Danish entry into the EEC in 1973, by the containment of German interests and power which the close partnership between France and Germany within the European integration project entailed.

Given this background, Denmark has normally reacted positively to positions taken by the Franco-German alliance. Lingering fears about German aspirations towards the creation of a "German Europe" (for which the EU might be no more than a springboard) could be alleviated by the comforting thought of the existence of the French counterweight. As long as the two were able to keep each other in a delicate balance of opposing forces, Danes were all for this "axis of integration". Prior to the mid-80s, this attitude found support and relief in the fact that - notwithstanding much French rhetoric to the contrary - pragmatic Danes were quick to detect that at the bottom of their hearts the French nurtured a predilection for a "Gaullist", intergovernmental Europe, rather than for a closer "Union", that France preferred the maintenance of nation-states and their sovereignty and shunned the notion of their gradual disappearance. In this sense, too, France - along with the UK, but with much greater influence on German politics - was perceived as an ally, fighting for the same values and interests as Denmark.

Delors, Mitterrand and the troubles connected with the Maastricht Treaty changed all this, however. The ambivalence which Danes (both at the level of masses and elite) had felt all along, namely that the Franco-German axis of integration was fine as long as it kept Europe from falling apart and contained European nationalist rivalry, but fraught with dangers once it went beyond that: too much agreement might lead the EU down the road of "deepening" too far, too fast - this ambivalence now turned into alarm as developments in European integration seemed to turn exactly in this latter direction. As Head of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors (following the failure of the "socialist experiment" in France in the early 1980s) vigorously pursued policies of deeper integration in the domains of economics, politics and (European) identity. Kohl and Mitterrand held hands at Verdun and later merged two intergovernmental conferences - one on economics, one on political integration - into what became known as the Maastricht Treaty. This Treaty became a turning point for Denmark, dividing the country seriously and changing Danish evaluations of the Franco-German alliance.

The Danish "No" to Maastricht in 1992 saw in the Draft Treaty confirmation of the fact that German clout in Europe, following German Unification, was again on the upswing, while France (and the rest of the EU) was no longer able or willing to exert a moderating influence."Containment" had come to an end, and probably national sovereignty as well, and the very close race in the French referendum on Maastricht in the fall of 1992 in Denmark was seen as confirmation that there was ample reason for such concerns. Even among those in favour of Maastricht among the Danish electorate, there were such fears, but here the prevalent assessment was that the Treaty was necessary both in order to keep the EU on track and to maintain a measure of influence over German policies. For Denmark, the Edinburgh decision marked a compromise between those two assessments, and the ensuing second referendum clinched it: the four exemptions made it possible for Danish domestic politics to remain relatively consensual while taking part à la carte in European integration. As regards the Franco-German axis, the second referendum signalled Denmark's conditional acceptance of the alliance as a core of the future EU, but it reserved the right to keep aloof if worst-case assumptions about a Europe on the fast track towards a superstate were to prove correct. Edinburgh in effect allowed Denmark to have its cake and eat it too.

By 2001, this dilemma has not been resolved, as testified by the Danish "No" to joining the Euro-zone in fall 2000, but its context and Danish evaluations have changed. In particular, Danish concerns about a strong, unified and monolithic EU core, led by France and Germany, speeding the integration process relentlessly toward the abolition of national autonomy, have been tempered (if not removed) by a series of interdependent developments. The most important is the obvious difficulties of mutual understanding and co-operation between Berlin and Paris, and between Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac, about enlargement, institutional reform, and the role and complexion of the Franco-German alliance in the Europe of the future. The Franco-German "integration axis" is undergoing a troublesome period, as the Nice IGC in December 2000 made abundantly clear: the traditional, friendly rapport between the two national delegations was conspicuously absent: Germany was no longer willing to play by the (French) rules of the past, looking to the east and across the Atlantic as much as toward Paris; and France had great difficulties coming to terms with this fact. Le démon, est-il allemand?, as Michel Meyer's recent book pithily synthesises current French perceptions of Germany. In Denmark, the tiff between the partners is observed with a mixture of Schadenfreude, curiosity and concern: "Can a Frenchman understand a German?", as a full-page article in one of Denmark's leading dailies rhetorically asked (Politiken, December 30, 2000), arguing that this lack of communication was not limited to the ruling elites but reached far into culture, history, national identity, as well as a simple lack of interest among the younger generations.

On the face of it, this weakening of the strong core ought to receive a warm welcome in Denmark, as it seems to have its basis in a reassertion of national interests and sovereignty. To some extent this is so, but with an interesting twist: the champion of inter-governmentalism and Denmark's secret hero, France, has now definitively fallen from grace. It is generally seen as arrogant and out-of-touch with political realities, whereas Schröder's Germany is projected as sensible, moderate and reliable. True to this re-evaluation of the two pivotal actors, corruption scandals and other kinds of "public disclosures" in France are seen as proof of the tainted nature of the current French leadership, whereas similar scandals in Germany are interpreted as a feature of the past.

There is a certain logic to this change in assessment: Germany's national interests now stand out more prominently. Germany forcefully champions Eastern enlargement, while France seems to dither; and as Germany is simultaneously experiencing serious domestic problems, it therefore is less persuasive as an object of Danish threat perceptions. Thus, from the Danish perspective it is now Germany which represents pragmatism and intergovernmentalism among the core states, whereas France appears to embody supranational ambitions and a certain outdated arrogance of power. On the other hand, most Danes, and certainly key politicians, opinion-leaders and academics, are fully aware that a waning alliance between France and Germany entails the risk of slipping back into a less prosperous and peaceful Europe, and that a modicum of collaboration and agreement between Germany and France is necessary to stem the forces of economic globalisation and provide the region with leadership, momentum and resources. For the Danes, the Franco-German alliance should thus persist, but in a context of different national interests! According to current Danish thinking, this ideal state could only be achieved if France came to terms with the fact that Germany has changed since the days of the Cold War and is no longer willing to let past sins determine present behaviour. What used to constitute a Danish nightmare thus by now has become pragmatically accepted as the basis for conducting politics in Europe.

Despite occasional storms and squalls, France and Germany have developed a remarkably resilient partnership. During the Cold War, the partnership was balanced by a series of imbalances. Germany had the Mark, France had the Bomb. Germany's role was enhanced by the weight of its economy and reduced by the weight of its history. France's role was heightened by its Four-Power status and diminished by its fading colonial reach. Germany, while bigger, was divided and exposed. France used "Europe" to project its sense of singularity; Germany used "Europe" to avoid any sense of singularity. The French were confident of their culture but obsessed with their status. And the Germans were proud of their achievements but obsessed with their identity.

In this situation both partners turned to each other in historic reconciliation, and together turned into the motor of European construction. A tightly woven network of working relationships between French and German officials cushions misunderstandings and softens periodic clashes of interest and perspective.

The relationship remains strong and significant. But new patterns of relations are unfolding in a Europe no longer bound by the Cold War.

In part, these new patterns are related to generational change. Those assuming leadership roles in each country are accustomed to a close relationship. They approach each other more pragmatically than did the survivors of World War II. There are also issues of personality. Chancellor Schröder has not established the same relationship with President Chirac or Prime Minister Jospin as that enjoyed between Schmidt and Giscard or Kohl and Mitterrand.

But more fundamental currents are at work. Europe is now larger and looser. The Franco-German motor remains crucial. But it is no longer exclusive. Germany is unified; France's Four Power status - and leverage - is gone. Britain under Tony Blair has turned the tandem into a triangle. Finland and the Baltic states, not Germany, are the "east of the west." And Germany, not France, is increasingly at the center of inner-European bargaining.

These changes challenge the notion of a Franco-German "partnership of equals" that has shaped Europe over four decades. The shift in the Franco-German balance toward Germany is uncomfortable for both partners, but it is most challenging for France. Few countries have had as difficult a time adapting to the post-Cold War era. "The French have the most to lose," Hubert Védrine admits with remarkable candor. Yet there is growing concern that French reluctance to come to terms with Germany's new position is creating serious strains for all of Europe.

The Nice Summit last December, which focused on the distribution of power in a larger European Union, underscored the changes under way. Not only did Paris and Berlin fail to agree on their traditional eve of summit joint letter attempting to shape the outcome, in the end a stunned Chirac was presented with an Anglo-German document setting forth the final compromises. While France retained parity of votes in the Council of Ministers, Germany agreed only after securing its other objectives, including greater representation in the European Parliament. France's antics failed to win the confidence of its partners, whereas Germany's consensus-building approach reassured smaller partners.

Schröder is far more comfortable than were his predecessors with the idea that the Franco-German tandem need not be the sine qua non for German initiative and leadership. At Nice he served notice that Germany would speak with a bigger voice and, in the process, would include other players as well.

What might these developments mean for transatlantic relations? Despite occasional rhetoric from some French commentators, Berlin, Paris and Washington all agree that the U.S. presence in Europe remains essential, and cannot be replaced by Franco-German cooperation. But there is also general consensus that the American presence cannot be a substitute for Franco-German cooperation. Fragmentation of power and purpose in Europe would have serious transatlantic consequences, and would not be in American interests. Americans welcome Franco-German reconciliation and partnership as a cornerstone of European stability.

Tensions do arise, of course. As Paris and Washington continue to squabble over issues large and small, each wants Berlin to lend German weight to their respective position. This often presents German policymakers with impossible choices that only reinforce Berlin's prevailing tendency to focus more on balancing the interests of others than on defining Germany's own interests.

On other issues, Paris and Washington tend to share more common ground than either do with Berlin. In the financial world French and American officials would most likely prefer the European Central Bank to pursue more of a higher growth strategy than would inflation-adverse German officials. And because both harbor global ambitions and have a history of global engagement, both tend to have a much broader strategic view than does Berlin. For instance, both Paris and Washington are concerned that current German defense efforts are wholly inadequate to the new challenges facing both Europe and the transatlantic partnership. They are concerned about what they perceive to be flagging German defense reforms - what Francois Heisbourg has termed Germany's "non-revolution in military affairs." They ask loudly how such a demonstrable lack of commitment to enhanced military capabilities can possibly be squared with a rhetorical European commitment to a more cohesive and capable defense effort. And they wonder if German leaders appreciate that Europe's failure to develop capabilities that would allow Europeans and Americans to act together in crises is likely to push the United States further toward unilateral actions.

Germans and Americans, on the other hand, share closer views on the need to resolve trade disputes and liberalize global trade and investment. While transatlantic trade disputes account for perhaps less than 2 percent of overall transatlantic commerce, they have been growing, and bitterness over trade does affect other dimensions of the relationship. Both Washington and Berlin would be likely to support a wide-ranging effort to create a transatlantic free trade and investment area. Such efforts during the Clinton Administration foundered on French opposition.

But France and Germany, together with other European partners, also have renewed doubts about the direction of American policy. There is concern that the Bush team will try to fit Cold War arrangements of transatlantic security into a much more complex post Cold War world and, if they are frustrated in such efforts, will tend toward unilateralist adventures. Despite agreement to proceed with closer consultations on missile defense, for instance, German and French officials policymakers are skeptical of the technological feasibility of such a system, aghast at its potential costs, worried about its implications for broader arms control regimes, and doubtful that a technological fix can solve what they believe to be essentially political problems.

A second area of shared concern is Bush's contention that peacekeeping in the Balkans is essentially a European obligation. European partners are annoyed that key members of the Administration and many in the Congress do not seem to realize that the Europeans already bear the lion's share of the burden. If pressed, they would grudgingly do even more - but their willingness to do so will depend on continued American engagement, even at reduced levels.

Beyond the European agenda, France and Germany are concerned about the Bush team's approach to multilateral organizations and treaty-based commitments. A host of international treaties - ranging from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, and the International Criminal Court - are not supported by the Bush Administration and will not be ratified by the Senate. This is deeply disappointing to Europeans for whom the construction of a rules-based international system is very important, and feeds growing European concerns about American unilateralism.

Bach, Jonathan P.G., Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989, Münster: LIT Verl. 1999
by Sebastian Harnisch

The participation of German troops in several peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations in the 1990s has been interpreted as a sign of the "normalization" of German foreign and security policy. German participation in these out-of-area missions, it has been argued, made a major contribution to NATO's efforts to end several military conflicts in and around Europe, thereby changing NATO's functions and its viability after the Cold War. Responsibility for this significant change of course in military affairs - German governments had abstained from employing military force abroad throughout the Cold War - has been explained either through a desire for power, resulting from an advantageous shift in the balance of power in Europe (realism), or the pressure emanating from security institutions in which Germany is so deeply embedded (institutionalism). Despite these theoretical considerations, most of its partners and neighbours have viewed Germany's participation as constructive - in terms of conflict resolution - and not threatening to their security.

It is the principal conclusion of Jonathan Bach's study that the change of course in German out-of-area participation can be understood best through an analysis of discourses that focuses on the question of identity formation. As there were passionate advocates from what Bach calls normalist and liberal narrative for military interventions abroad - although for different reasons - he concludes that there had been a "historic bloc" in the making. Using this concept of critical international relations and critical political economy theorists, the author argues that both strands of the foreign policy discourse (and their respective protagonists) merge into a powerful argument for expansive foreign interventions. While this conclusion appears debatable, Bach's fresh look at the discoursive structure of the German foreign policy debate in the 1990s in general, and the debate on the Dayton peace agreement in the Bundestag in particular, is interesting and thought-provoking. And yet, the methodological and theoretical foundations of the study do not support its findings. First, the discourse theoretical approach employed, i.e. the main criteria to structure the normalist and liberal narrative are the ontological, epistemological, hegemonic, and counter hegemonic functions, are not connected to the (materialistic) concept of the hegemonic bloc (54-56). Secondly, at the end of the book the hegemonic bloc concept is not only forced upon the post-modern discourse analysis but also on the empirical analysis itself. Thus, the emergence of a limited number of out-of-area-missions reflects, from Bach's point of view, the dominance of a social class of foreign policy intellectuals who strive for world hegemony (196). Neither does the reader learn how the social class of "foreign policy intellectuals" is constituted nor does the author establish a convincing argument that this class has a consensus on other foreign policy issues. Hence, even if most of his conclusions seem far-fetched with regard to German Foreign Policy, Bach's account of the out-of-area debate is an important contribution to the field of critical discourse analysis and the growing field of identity studies.

1.1 Official Statements
1.1.1 Joint Statements
1.1.2 German Perspectives
1.1.3 French Perspectives
1.2 Scientific Views
1.3 Media

2.1 Official Statements
2.1.1 Joint Statements / Other Perspectives
2.1.2 German Perspectives
2.1.3 French Perspectives
2.2 Scientific Views
2.3 Media

1. Franco-German Relations

1.1 Official Statements

1.1.1 Joint Statements

Dîner informel franco-allemand, Blaesheim (Bas-Rhin), 31.01.01
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/dep/2001/province/01-blaes/sommaire.htm

Point de presse conjoint de Monsieur Jacques Chirac Président de la République de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de Monsieur Lionel Jospin Premier Ministre lors de la rencontre informelle franco-allemande Blaesheim - Bas-Rhin, 31.01.01
http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2001/DI010131.html

Deutsch-französisches Außenministertreffen in Stuttgart - Interview mit BM Fischer und AM Védrine in der Stuttgarter Zeitung vom 19.02.2001 (Auszüge), AA 19.02.01
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=1238&type_id=4&bereich_id=17

Dîner franco-allemand, Herxheim, 20.03.01
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/dep/france01_.htm

Déclarations à la presse de Monsieur Jacques Chirac Président de la République, de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de Monsieur Lionel Jospin Premier Ministre à l'issue de leur rencontre, Herxheim- Allemagne, 20.03.01
http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2001/HERX0103.html

Dîner avec le Chancelier allemand Gerhard Schröder à Paris, 11.05.01
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/arch0105/010511/actu_.htm

Déclarations à la presse de Monsieur Jacques Chirac Président de la République, de Monsieur Gerhard Schröder Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de Monsieur Lionel Jospin Premier Ministre à l'issue de leur rencontre, Paris, 11.05.01
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/arch0105/010511/actu_.htm

1.1.2 German Perspectives

Kein deutsches Europa, Interview mit Bundesaußenminister Fischer in der Süddeutschen Zeitung vom 22.12.2000 (Auszüge), AA, 22.12.00
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/index_html?bereich_id=4&type_id=4&archiv_id=1139&detail=1

Die Zukunft Europas und die deutsch-französische Partnerschaft, Rede von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer am 30. Januar 2001 vor dem Frankreich-Zentrum der Universität Freiburg, AA, 30.01.01
http://www.auswaertiges-Amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/index_html?bereich_id=4&type_id=0&archiv_id=1204&detail=1

pdf-Version:
http://www.auswaertiges-Amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r010130d.pdf

French Version:
L'avenir de l'Europe et le partenariat franco-allemand, Discours prononcé par M. Joschka Fischer, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, devant le Centre français de l'Université de Fribourg le 30 janvier 2001, AA, 30.01.01
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r010130f.pdf

"Deutschland sollte Libero spielen", Zum deutsch-französischen Verhältnis, Interview mit dem Koordinator für deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit, Rudolf von Thadden, taz, 31.01.01
http://www.taz.de/pt/2001/01/31/a0088.nf/text

Ein grob vernachlässigtes Verhältnis. Gespräch mit Friedrich Merz (CDU), Vorsitzender der Bundestagsfraktion der Union, über die deutsch-französichen Beziehungen, Die Zeit, 01.02.01
http://www.zeit.de/2001/06/Politik/200106_dlfinterview_0201.html

"Schröder verkannte die Sensibilität des Themas". SZ-Interview mit Karl Lamers (CDU), SZ, 03.02.01
http://szonnet.diz-muenchen.de/REGIS_A11775493

Bundeskanzler: Zusammenwirken von Deutschland und Frankreich ist unverzichtbarer Baustein der Europäischen Union, BPA, 11.5.01
http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_39197_6138.htm

1.1.3 French Perspectives

Extraits du discours prononcé par le Président de la République devant le Bundestag (Berlin), Elysée, 27.06.00
http://www.elysee.fr/europe/debat/ext270600.htm

Rede des französischen Staatspräsidenten Jacques Chirac im Bundestag, "Deutschland soll einen Sitz im Weltsicherheitsrat erhalten", hib, 27.06.00
http://www.bundestag.de/blickpkt/arch_bpk/chir_hib.html

Völkerrecht, Demokratie und Kulturrelativismus. Neue französische Außenpolitik, von Hubert Védrine, Le Monde Diplomatique, 15.12.00
http://www.taz.de/tpl/2000/12/15.nf/mondeText.Tname,a0021.idx,6

French Version:
Droit d'Ingérence, Démocratie, Sanctions, Refonder la politique étrangère française, par Hubert Védrine, Le Monde Diplomatique, 12/2000
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2000/12/VEDRINE/14576.html

Rencontre franco-allemande (Strasbourg, 31 janvier 2001). Déclaration du Porte-parole adjoint du Quai d'Orsay, MAE, 30.01.01
http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actualite/article.asp?cat=1&th=0&ar=1691

Sommet franco-allemand : un rendez-vous "peu tourné vers le passé et vraiment orienté vers l'avenir", Premier Ministre, 05.02.01
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/fr/p.cfm?ref=19574

Interview de Monsieur Jacques Chirac Président de la République aux Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace, Elysée, 05.02.01
http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2001/DNA0102.html

Entretien du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec le quotidien "le Figaro" (Paris, 6 février 2001), MAE, 06.02.01
http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cgi-bin/go_doc.pl?type=bull&cible=20010206.1.html#Chapitre1

Sommet franco-allemand : un rendez-vous "peu tourné vers le passé et vraiment orienté vers l'avenir", Premier Ministre, 05.02.01
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/fr/p.cfm?ref=19574&txt=1

Rencontre franco-allemande (Francfort, 23 avril 2001). Déclaration du Porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay, MAE, 25.04.01
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actualite/article.asp?cat=1&th=0&ar=1995

Intervention de Pierre Moscovici lors de l'ouverture des rencontres des Etudiants Européens (Strasbourg, 26 avril 2001), MAE, 26.04.01
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/avenir/page_0302.html

Intervention de Pierre Moscovici au dîner-débat avec les associations à vocation européenne à l'occasion de la Journée de l'Europe 2001 "L'avenir de l'Europe après Nice" (le 2 mai 2001), MAE, 02.05.01
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/avenir/page_0401.html

Entretien du Ministre délégué charge des Affaires Européennes, M. Pierre Moscovici, avec "France-Inter" - Extraits - (Paris, 2 mai 2001), MAE, 03.05.01
http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cgi-bin/go_doc.pl?type=bull&cible=20010503.1.html#Chapitre2

Visite en Allemagne de M. Hubert Védrine, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères (9-10 mai 2001), Déclaration du Porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay (Paris, 4 mai 2001)
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actualite/article.asp?cat=12&th=0&ar=2042

Entretien du Ministre délégué charge des Affaires Européennes, M. Pierre Moscovici, avec "Europe 1" (Paris, 8 mai 2001), MAE, 10.05.01
http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cgi-bin/go_doc.pl?type=bull&cible=20010510.1.html#Chapitre4

Message du Président de la République à l'occasion de l'ouverture du Forum sur l'avenir de l'Union européenne, Elysée, 09.05.01
http://www.elysee.fr/europe/debat/video/txt010509.htm

Audition du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, par la Commission des Affaires Européennes du Bundestag, (Berlin, 9 mai 2001), MAE, 10.05.01
http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cgi-bin/go_doc.pl?type=bull&cible=20010510.1.html#Chapitre1

Audition du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, par la Commission des Affaires Européennes du Bundestag, reponses aux question des Parlementaires Allemands, MAE, 09.05.01
http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cgi-bin/go_doc.pl?type=bull&cible=20010514.1.html#Chapitre3

Französischer Außenminister äußert Bedenken zu EU-Reformüberlegungen. Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, hib, 09.05.01
http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/hib/2001_126/01.html

Propos du Président de la République sur le Traité de Nice et le débat sur l'avenir de l'Union Européenne, Elysée, 09.05.01
http://www.elysee.fr/europe/debat/ext090501.htm

Rencontre franco-allemande: un échange approfondi, Premier Ministre, 14.05.01
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/fr/p.cfm?ref=23158

Dossier France-Allemagne, MAE
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/europe/pays/allemagne.html

1.2 Scientific Views

Commissariat général du plan & Deutsch-Französisches Institut 2001: Compétitivité globale: une perspective franco-allemande. Rapport du groupe franco-allemand sur la Compétivité
http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr/fic_pdf/plan_franco_allemand.pdf

Center on the United States and France, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
http://www.brookings.org/fp/cusf/center_hp.htm

Deutsch-Französischer Dialog / Dialogue Franco-Allemand
http://www.saarbrueckerdialog.de/

Franco-German Network / Deutsch-Französisches Netzwerk / Réseau Franco-Allemand
http://www.dfjw.org/netzwerk/

Jachtenfuchs, Markus 2001: Deutschland, Frankreich und die Zukunft der Europäischen Union. to appear in: Meimeth, Michael, Schild, Joachim (eds.), Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates in der europäischen Integration, Opladen, (final version, February 2001)
http://www.uni-greifswald.de/~politik/mj/papers/dfi.pdf

Jachtenfuchs, Markus 2000: Germany and the "New Relance Européenne". Paper prepared for Haftendorn, Helga et al. (eds.), Relations in a Strategic Triangle (2nd version, December 2000)
http://www.uni-greifswald.de/~politik/mj/papers/triangle.pdf

Kühnhardt, Ludger, Henri Ménudier, Janusz Reiter 2000: Das Weimarer Dreieck. Die französisch-deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen als Motor der Europäischen Integration, ZEI Discussion Paper C 72/2000
http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c72_kuehnhardt.pdf

Linklist of the DFI on Franco-German Relations - Deutsch-Französische Beziehungen - Relations Franco-Allemandes
http://www.dfi.de/dtfrz.htm

Marhold, Hartmut 2000: Föderale Strukturen für Europa? Aktuelle Beiträge zur Debatte in Frankreich, EZFF Occasional Papers Nr.23
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/ezff/ocp23.pdf

Rill, Bernd (Hg.) 2000: Deutschland und Frankreich: Gemeinsame Zukunftsfragen, Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen Nr. 21, München
http://www.hss.de/upload/master/26/argu21-gesamt.doc

Schild, Joachim 2000: Über Nizza hinaus. Deutsch-französische Debatten über die Zukunft der EU, Deutsch-Französisches Institut, Aktuelle Frankreich-Analysen Nr.16, 08/2000
http://www.dfi.de/PDF-Dateien/Afa16.pdf

Schild, Joachim 2001: "Den Rhein vertiefen und erweitern"? Deutsch-französische Beziehungen nach dem Nizza-Gipfel, Deutsch-Französisches Institut, Aktuelle Frankreich-Analysen Nr.17, 02/2001
http://www.dfi.de/PDF-Dateien/Afa17.pdf

Schwerpunktthema: Nach Nizza - Wo stehen Deutschland und Frankreich? mit Beiträgen von Jean-Pierre Froehly, Ulrike Guérot, Ingo Kolboom, Henrik Uterwedde in: Politische Studien 376, 52.Jg.(2001),März/April
http://www.hss.de/upload/master/26/ps376.pdf

1.3 Media

Das Ende einer Karriere. Einst war Frankreich der Motor Europas. Doch der Nizza-Gipfel zeigt: Die Elite versteht die Welt nicht mehr, Die Zeit 51/00, 14.12.00
http://www.zeit.de/2000/51/Politik/200051_dt.-franzoesisch.html

French and Germans scramble to save axis, 7.01.2001
http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=003820526227914&rtmo=QwaakpHR&atmo=rrrrrrrq&pg=/et/01/1/7/waxis07.html

Komödie der Freundschaft. Frankreich quält sich mit dem Verlust seiner alten Rolle in Europa und Deutschlands Machtzuwachs, SZ 24.01.01
http://szarchiv.diz-muenchen.de/REGIS_A11726341;internal&action=hili.action&Parameter=Chirac|Schröder

L'Europe allemande ? NouvelObs, 25.01.01
http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/idxlist?a=art&aaaammjj=20010125&num=000000949&m1=Allem*&m2=&m3=&host=http://quotidien.nouvelobs.com

L'Europe allemande ? (II), NouvelObs, 25.01.01
http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/idxlist?a=art&aaaammjj=20010125&num=000000950&m1=Allem*&m2=&m3=&host=http://quotidien.nouvelobs.com

"Divorce after all these years? Not quite, but...", For decades, the Franco-German alliance, though often strained, has driven the development of what is now the European Union. The relationship is now under more strain than ever, The Economist, 25.01.01
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=485804

Europe : la France et l'Allemagne doutent, Le Monde, 31.01.01
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--142939-,00.html

Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Magie. Der Streit um die Machtverteilung in Europa hat Berlin von Paris entfremdet - nun soll das Verhältnis neu definiert werden, SZ 31.01.01
http://szarchiv.diz-muenchen.de/REGIS_A11757571;internal&action=hili.action&Parameter=Chirac

Thierry de Montbrial, France-Allemagne: quelle vision partagée? Le Figaro, 31.01.01
http://www.ifri.org/F/Articles/Articles/tdm_0101_allemagne.htm

La France et l'Allemagne essaient de rapprocher leurs visions de l'avenir de l'Europe, NouvelObs, 31.01.01
http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/articles?ad=etranger/20010130.FAP9154.html%5c&host=http://quotidien.nouvelobs.com/

Beim Bau Europas geht es um die Kunst des Möglichen. Ein Modus vivendi ersetzte die Rivalität zwischen Berlin und Paris um die Führung des alten Kontinents - bis zur Wiedervereinigung. Von Arnulf Baring, Die Welt 31.01.01
http://www.welt.de/daten/2001/01/31/0131eu219307.htx

Comment Berlin voit sa politique française et européenne, Le Monde, 31.01.01
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214-3957-142947-,00.html

Paris et Berlin réaffirment leur volonté de préparer ensemble l'intégration européenne, Le Monde, 01.02.01
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214-3957-143324-,00.html

Paris und Berlin vereinbaren eine Inventur. Wiederaufnahme der Nuklearabfall-Transporte, NZZ, 02.02.01
http://www.nzz.ch/2001/02/02/al/page-article75NTY.html

Nach der Versöhnung: Langeweile. Das "Deutsche Forum für Kunstgeschichte" in Paris könnte die anämisch gewordenen deutsch-französischen Beziehungen beleben, SZ 09.03.01
http://szarchiv.diz-muenchen.de/REGIS_A11965429

Paris et Berlin avalent leurs langues. Les deux pays ferment plusieurs instituts d'échange culturel, Libération, 23.04.01
http://www.liberation.com/quotidien/semaine/20010423lunzi.html

Relations franco-allemandes (Dossier), L'Express
http://www.lexpress.presse.fr/Express/Info/Europe/Dossier/franceallemagne/dossier.asp?nom=sauzay

2. Reform of the European Union

Treaty of Nice, Official Journal C 80, 10.03.2001
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_en.pdf

German Version:
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/de/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_de.pdf

French Version:
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/fr/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_fr.pdf

2.1 Official Statements

2.1.1 Joint Statements / Other Perspectives

Point de presse conjoint de Monsieur Jacques Chirac Président de la République et de Monsieur Gerhard Schroeder Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne à l'occasion de la tournée des pays membres de l'Union Européenne, Maison des Hôtes du Land Hanovre - Basse-Saxe - Allemagne samedi 2 décembre 2000, Elysée, 02.12.00
http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2000/UE00HAN.html

La Grande Europe vue par Jacques Delors et Vaclav Havel, Le Monde, 31.01.01
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3230--143154-,00.html

Delors, Jaques 2001: Für eine neue Dynamik im europäischen Integrationsprozess in: Politik und Gesellschaft Online, International Politics and Society 1/2001
http://orae.fes.de:8081/fes/docs/IPG1_2001/ARTDELORS.HTM

2.1.2 German Perspectives

Joschka Fischer: "Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation - Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration", Rede am 12. Mai 2000 in der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, AA, 12.05.00
http://www.auswaertiges-Amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2000/r000512a.pdf

Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Nizza, BuReg, 19.01.01
http://www.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/Schwerpunkte/Regierungserklaerungen/vom_19.01.01_vor_dem_Bundestag/ix5329_29210.htm?script=1','5329'

Zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Nizza, Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 19.01.2001 (Auszüge), AA, 19.01.01
http://www.auswaertiges-Amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/index_html?bereich_id=4&type_id=0&archiv_id=1192&detail=1
pdf-Version:
http://www.auswaertiges-Amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r010119a.pdf

Speech by German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, on the Occasion of the Presentation of the German-British 2000 Award in London, 24 January 2001, Internationale Politik Transatlantic Edition 1/2001, Vol.2
http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip0101/fischer240101.html

German Version:
Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer anlässlich der Verleihung des "German-British 2000 Award" in London am 24. Januar 2001, AA 29.01.01
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r010124c.pdf

Zur EU-Erweiterung, Interview mit Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer in der Märkischen Oderzeitung (MOZ) vom 30.01.01 (Auszüge), AA 31.01.01
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=1205&type_id=4&bereich_id=4

"Begrenzt Europas Macht". Edmund Stoiber trifft Helmut Schmidt: Ein Gespräch über die Zukunft der EU und deutsche Interessen, Die Zeit 07/2001
http://www.zeit.de/2001/07/Politik/200107_stoiber.html

Vortrag von Wolfgang Clement, Ministerpräsident von Nordrhein-Westfalen im Rahmen der Vortragsreihe Forum Constitutionis Europae des Walter Hallstein-Instituts für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin am 12. Februar 2001: Europa gestalten - nicht verwalten - Die Kompetenzordnung der Europäischen Union nach Nizza, NRW.de, 12.02.01
http://www.nrw.de/aktuell/reden/mskr20010212_1.htm

Diskussionspapier des Planungsstabes des AA zur europäischen Verfassungsdebatte, März / April 2001
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/eu/diskuss_europa.pdf

Johannes Rau, "Plea for a European constitution". Speech to the European Parliament, Bundespräsident, 04.04.01
http://www.bundespraesident.de

German version:
"Plädoyer für eine Europäische Verfassung". Rede vor dem Europäischen Parlament, Bundespräsident, 04.04.01
http://www.bundespraesident.de

French version:
"Plaidoyer pour une Constitution européenne". Discours prononcé devant le Parlement européen, Bundespräsident, 04.04.01
http://www.bundespraesident.de

National Conference of the Social Democratic Party of Germany Nuremberg, 19 - 23 November 2001, Keynote proposal: Responsibility for Europe
http://www.spd.de/english/politics/partycongress/europe.html

German Version:
SPD-Bundesparteitag Nürnberg, 19. - 22. November 2001, Leitantrag: Verantwortung für Europa, SPD, 30.04.01
http://www.spd.de/politik/veranstaltungen/bundesparteitag/verantwortungfuereuropa.html

SPE-Kongress: Grußwort durch den Vorsitzenden der SPD, Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, SPE, 7.5.01
http://www.pes-congress.de/de/reden/grusswort_schroeder.html

Speech by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to the 5th PES Congress, PES, 07./08.05.01
http://pes-congress.de/en/schroeder-en.html

Die Zukunft Europas - Wo soll die Reise hingehen?, AA
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/aktuelles/zukunft/index_html

2.1.3 French Perspectives

Délégation française du groupe PPE 2000: Draft for a Constitution of the European Union - submitted for debate - 26.06.00
http://www.europa.udf.org/appel_connexes/constitution_en.rtf

Conférence de presse de Monsieur Jacques CHIRAC Président de la République à l'office fédéral de presse (Berlin), Elysée, 27.06.00
http://www.elysee.fr/cgi-bin/auracom/aurweb/search/file?aur_file=discours/2000/RFA0006G.html

Conseil européen de Nice, Nice - 7 au 10 décembre 2000, Elysée, 12/2000
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/dep/2000/province/12-ue-nice/sommaire.htm

Discours au Parlement européen à Strasbourg, Strasbourg - 12 décembre 2000, Elysée, 12.12.00
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/dep/2000/province/12-ue-strasbg/sommaire.htm

German Version:
Rede des französischen Präsidenten, Jacques Chirac, zum Ende der französischen Ratspräsidentschaft vor dem Europäischen Parlament am 12. Dezember 2000 in Straßburg (gekürzt), in: Internationale Politik, 2/2001, 56.Jg.
http://www.dgap.org/IP/ip0102/chirac121200.html

Signature du Traité de Nice, Nice - Lundi 26 février 2001, Elysée, 26.02.01
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/dep/2001/province/02-traitenice/sommaire.htm

Entretien accordé par le ministre des Affaires étrangeres, Hubert Védrine, a l'hebdomadaire allemand "Focus" (Paris, 9 avril 2001), MAE, 09.04.01
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/dossiers/focus.html

Débat sur l'avenir de l'Union européenne, Elysée, 11.04.01
http://www.elysee.fr/actus/arch0104/010411/actu.htm

Le débat sur l'avenir de l'UE, Elysée
http://www.elysee.fr/europe/index.htm

Débat public sur l'avenir de l'Europe, MAE
http://www.diplomatie.fr/avenir/index.html

2.2 Scientific Views

Bertelsmann Europa-Kommission 2000: Europas Vollendung vorbereiten. Forderungen an die Regierungskonferenz 2000. vorgelegt durch Werner Weidenfeld (Vorsitz), Gütersloh
http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/europakom.pdf

Bertelsmann Forschungsgruppe Politik am Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (C A P) 2000: Ein Grundvertrag für die Europäische Union - Entwurf zur "Zweiteilung" der Verträge, München, 05/2000
http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/grundvertrag.pdf

Cendon, Antonio Bar 2001: Nice and the European Commission: is this the reform that we need? in: Challenge Europe Issue 4
http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/memo.asp?ID=422

Center for European Reform 2001: What comes after Nice, CER Policy Brief, January 2001
http://www.cer.org.uk/n5publicatio/nicetreatyfinal3.pdf

Corbett, Richard 2001: An EU Senate is Superflous, CER Bulletin, May 01, Issue 17
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/issue17_corbett.html

Decker, Frank 2001: Mehr Demokratie wagen: Die Europäische Union braucht einen institutionellen Sprung nach vorn, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ), 5/2001
http://www.das-parlament.de/05-2001/beilage/b-a-5.html

Duff, Andrew, Deubner, Christian 2001: Die EU-Vertragsreform von Nizza: Von "left overs" zum "hangover", SWP-Aktuell 3/01, März 2001
http://www.swp-berlin.org/pdf/swp_aktu/swpaktu_03_01.pdf

Duke, Simon 2001: After Nice: the prospects for European security and defence, in: Challenge Europe Issue 3
http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/memo3.asp?ID=398

Heim, Mathew 2001: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union; Recent Developments Following The Nice European Summit, in: Challenge Europe Issue 4
http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/memo.asp?ID=460

Kühnhardt, Ludger 2001: Towards Europe 2007. Identity, Institution-Building and the Constitution of Europe, ZEI Discussion Paper C 85, 2001
http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c85_kuehnhardt.pdf

Kyaw, Dietrich von 2001: Nice Summit Sets the Course, in: Internationale Politik Transatlantic Edition, 1/2001, Vol. 2
http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip0101/kyaw.html

German Version:
Kyaw, Dietrich von 2001: Weichenstellungen des EU-Gipfels von Nizza, in: Internationale Politik, 2/2001, 56.Jg.
http://www.dgap.org/IP/ip0102/kyaw.html

Mackie, James 2001: Bringing civil society into foreign and security policy, in: Challenge Europe Issue 3
http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/memo3.asp?ID=397

Mertes, Michael 2001: Triumph des nationalen Egoismus. Der EU-Gipfel von Nizza weckt Zweifel an der Kraft der europäischen Vernunft, in: Die Politische Meinung, Februar 2001
http://www.kas.de/publikationen/2001/europa/polmein0102_mertes.pdf

Pernice, Ingolf 2001: Zur Verfassungsdiskussion in der Europäischen Union. Öffentliche Anhörung des Ausschusses für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union des Deutschen Bundestages, März 2001, WHI-Paper 2/01
http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/papers/whipapers201/pernice-bt.pdf

Serfaty, Simon 2001: The Nice Summit: Deciding Without Choosing, U.S.-France Analysis, Center on the United States and France, Brookings Institution, January 2001
http://www.brookings.org/fp/cusf/analysis/nicesummit.htm

Stuth, Reinhard 2001: Der Vertrag von Nizza - eine kritische Analyse, Sankt Augustin, Februar 2001, Zukunftsforum Politik Nr.21
http://www.kas.de/publikationen/2001/europa/zp_nr21.pdf

Vignon, Jerome 2001: European governance - Why does reform matter? in: Challenge Europe Issue 4
http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/memo.asp?ID=436

Weidenfeld, Werner(ed.) 2001: Beyond EU Enlargement. Strategy Paper, Gütersloh 2001
http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/EUk-eg.PDF

German Version:
Weidenfeld, Werner (Hg.) 2001: Jenseits der EU-Erweiterung. Strategiepapier, Gütersloh 2001
http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/EUk-de.PDF

www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de 2000: German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 3, December 2000 (Newsletter on Germany's Role in the Institutional Reform of the European Union as Viewed from Different National Perspectives)
http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/fb3/politik/dtap/newsletter/archive/issue03.html

2.3 Media

Europe's Unification Debate Needs the Sound of Fresh Voices, IHT, 12.01.01
http://www.iht.com/articles/7108.htm

Die Regierung in Paris will ihre Europapolitik neu gestalten. Minister Moscovici: Debatte über die Grenzen der EU anstoßen, Tagesspiegel, 17.01.01
http://195.170.124.152/archiv/2001/01/16/ak-po-au-9920.html

UE : Chirac promet "un grand débat", NouvelObs, 05.02.01
http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/idxlist?a=art&aaaammjj=20010205&num=000000133&m1=Fischer&m2=&m3=&host=http://quotidien.nouvelobs.com/

Après le "compromis" de Nice, le débat s'ouvre sur la "refondation" de l'Union, Le Monde, 27.02.01
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214-3957-152474-,00.html

"Förderation der Nationalstaaten". Jospin geht auf Distanz zu Fischers Europa-Thesen. Französischer Premier für langsame Ausweitung der EU-Kompetenzen, Tagesspiegel 22.03.01
http://195.170.124.152/archiv/2001/03/21/ak-po-au-5516028.html

Français et Allemands poursuivent le débat sur un projet de Constitution européenne, Le Monde, 03.04.01
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--168269-,00.html

3. German Foreign Policy

Baumann, Rainer, Hellmann, Gunther 2001: Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint', and the Quest for Normality, in: German Politics 10:1
http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb03/prof/hellmann/texte/rb-gh-german-politics.pdf

Bertelsmann Forschungsgruppe Politik 2001: "Das entgrenzte Europa. Strategien politischer Gestaltung". Vorlage der Bertelsmann Forschungsgruppe Politik zum International Bertelsmann Forum am 19. und 20. Januar 2001 in Berlin (Auszüge), in: Internationale Politik, 2/2001, 56.Jg.
http://www.dgap.org/IP/ip0102/entgrenzt190101.html

Blinken, Antony 2001: The United States, France, and Europe at the Outset of the New Administration, U.S.-France Analysis, Center on the United States and France, Brookings Institution, March 2001
http://www.brookings.org/fp/cusf/analysis/newadmin.htm

Braunstein, Peter, Meyer, Christian Wilhelm, Vogt, Marcus Jurij, Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit der Bundeswehr im Balkan-Einsatz, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ), 6/2001
http://www.das-parlament.de/20-2001/beilage/b-a-6.html

Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum - Forum Economique Franco-Allemand 2001: Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda. The Future of Banking, ZEI Policy Paper B5/2001
http://www.zei.de/download/zei_wp/B01-05.pdf

Eberlei, Walter, Christoph Weller 2001: Deutsche Ministerien als Akteure von Global Governance. Eine Bestandsaufnahme der auswärtigen Beziehungen der Bundesministerien, INEF Report Heft 51/2001
http://www.uni-duisburg.de/Institute/INEF/publist/report51.PDF

Ehrhart, Hans-Georg 2001: Auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Präventionskultur? Stand und Perspektiven des Stabilitätspaktes für Südosteuropa, in: Wissenschaft und Frieden 2/2001
http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/ifsh/stabil.pdf

Friedrich, Wolfgang-Uwe (ed.) 2000: The Legacy of Kosovo: German Politics and Policies in The Balkans, German Issues 22
http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/legacy_of_kosovo.pdf

Germany and the United States: Considerations for the New Administration, AICGS' Report 2001
http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/commissionreport.pdf

Große Hüttmann , Martin, Knodt, Michèle 2000: Die Europäisierung des deutschen Föderalismus, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ), 52-53/2000
http://www.das-parlament.de/html/suche_anzeigen_text.cfm?ID=3970

Hellmann, Gunther 2001: Precarious Power: Germany at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, in: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein und Karl Kaiser (Hrsg.), Germany's New Foreign Policy. Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, New York 2001
http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb03/prof/hellmann/texte/dgap-engl-final.pdf

Handl, Vladimir 2000: Germany's & the Visegrad countries: Between Partnership and Dependence? (ERSC & IGS Paper), IGS Discussion Papers 2000/14
http://www.bham.ac.uk/IGS/visegrad.pdf

Handl, Vladimir, Longhurst, Kerry, Zaborowski, Marcin 2000: Germany's Security Policy towards East Central Europe, IGS Discussion Papers 2000/12
http://www.bham.ac.uk/IGS/halonzab.pdf

Kaiser, Robert 2000: Die Internationalisierung subnationaler Politik: Gliedstaatliche Interessenwahrnehmung unter den Bedingungen von Globalisierung und regionaler Integration, Arbeitspapier Nr. 3/2000
http://www.pol.wiso.tu-muenchen.de/publikat/ap-03-00.pdf

Messner, Dirk 2001: Globalisierungsanforderungen an Institutionen deutscher Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ), 18-19/2001,
http://www.das-parlament.de/18-19-2001/beilage/b-a-5.html

The Public Debate on the War in Kosovo:

Lutz, Dieter S., Mutz, Reinhard 2001: Offener Brief an die Abgeordneten des Deutschen Bundestages anlässlich des zweiten Jahrestages des Kosovo-Krieges: Mehr Probleme als Lösungen, mehr Fragen als Antworten
http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/ifsh/offenbr.PDF

"Lehren ziehen statt Tribunale veranstalten". Der Krieg in Kosovo: Der Bundestagsabgeordnete Gernot Erler (SPD) antwortet in einem Offenen Brief den Friedensforschern Dieter S. Lutz und Reinhard Mutz, FR, 12.04.2001


Der Kosovo-Krieg im Bundestag. Zum Streit zwischen Friedensforschern und der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion / Stefanie Christmann analysiert die Parlamentsdebatten, FR, 24.04.2001


Vorbeugen, nicht nachkarten. Die Lehren aus dem Krieg um Kosovo: Eine moderne Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik setzt nicht auf die Feuerkraft von Armeen / Von Ernst-Otto Czempiel, FR, 09.05.2001


Elementares Debattendefizit. Die Lehren aus dem Krieg um Kosovo / Der grüne Bundestagsabgeordnete Winfried Nachtwei arbeitet seine Zustimmung zu den Nato-Luftangriffen auf, FR, 15.05.2001

Stephan, Petra 2000: Learning from each other in North and South. Local Agenda 21 in Germany and the Republic of Korea, INEF Report 48/2000
http://www.uni-duisburg.de/Institute/INEF/publist/report48.PDF

• Bizeul, Yves, Schulz, Matthias 2000: Die deutsch-französische Beziehungen. Rückblick und aktueller Stand, (Rostocker Informationen zu Politik und Verwaltung, Heft 13), Rostock



• Fetzer, Joel S. 2000, Public attitudes toward immigration in the United States, France, and Germany, Cambridge



• Froehly, Jean-Pierre 2000: Deutsch-französische Geopolitik: Sicherheit, Grenzen und Diplomatie im erweiterten Europa, in: Dokumente. Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, Heft 4/2000, S. 287-291.



• Guerot, Ulrike 2000: Von Maastricht bis Nizza. Zur aktuellen deutsch-französischen Europa-Diskussion, in: Dokumente. Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, Jg.56 (2000) 4, S. 280-286.



• Hartmann, P 2000: Die deutsch-französische Partnerschaft und die Europäische Union vor den Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts, in: Dokumente. Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, Jg.56 (2000) 1, S. 41-48.



• Jardin, Pierre, Kimmel, Adolf 2001: Les relations franco-allemandes depuis 1963, Paris



• Mc Carthy, Patrick 2001: France-Germany in the Twenty-First Century, New York



• Pedersen, Thomas 1998: Germany, France and the integration of Europe. A realist interpretation, London



• Webber, Douglas 1999: The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union, London

• Bredow, Wilfried von 2000: Demokratie und Streitkräfte. Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen



• Busch, Eckart, 1999: Der Wehrbeauftragte. Organ der parlamentarischen Kontrolle, Heidelberg



• Chrobog, Jürgen 2001: Die neue Bush-Administration - Erste Bewertung aus deutscher Sicht, (Rundschreiben der Atlantik-Brücke e.V. 4/2001), Berlin



• Crudopf, Wenke 2000: Organisierte Kriminalität. Russland-Stereotypen in der deutschen Medienberichterstattung, (Arbeitspapiere des Bereichs Politik und Gesellschaft / Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin Bd. 29), Berlin



• Dietz, Bernhard 2000: Medienberichterstattung, "Öffentliche Meinung" und Außenpolitik. Grundelemente eines interdisziplinären Forschungsansatzes, Braunschweig: Technische Universität



• Dietz, Bernhard / Menzel, Ulrich 1999: "Brandstifter" oder Anwälte des demokratischen Friedens? Die Rolle der Medien in bewaffneten Konflikten. Untersucht anhand politischer Entscheidungsprozesse der deutschen Bundesregierung in ausgewählten militärischen Konflikten der 1990 Jahre. Entwurf eines Forschungsprojekts, Braunschweig: Technische Universität



• Engel, Ulf 2000: Die Afrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1999. Rollen und Identitäten, Münster



• Forsberg, Tuomas 2000: A friend in need or a friend indeed? Finnish perceptions of Germany's role in the EU and Europe, (upi Working Papers 24 (2000)), Helsinki



• Granieri, Ronald J. 1999: Bericht über die XXII. Deutsch-Amerikanischen "Young Leaders"-Konferenz "The United States and Germany in a new century", (Rundschreiben der Atlantik-Brücke e.V. 2001/1), Berlin



• Klein, Paul, Walz, Dieter (Hrsg.) 2000: Die Bundeswehr an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert, Baden-Baden



• Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2001: Dossier: Europa nach Nizza, (Welt-Report. Berichte aus den Auslandsbüros der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Januar 2001), Sankt-Augustin



• Knodt, Michèle, Kohler-Koch, Beate (Hg.) 2000: Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung, (Mannheimer Jahrbuch für Europäische Sozialforschung Bd. 5), Frankfurt/Main



• Lammers, Christiane, Schrader, Lutz (Hg.) 2001: Neue deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik? Eine friedenswissenschaftliche Bilanz zwei Jahre nach dem rot-grünen Regierungswechsel, Baden-Baden



• Oldhaver, Mathias 2000: Öffentliche Meinung in der Sicherheitspolitik. Untersuchung am Beispiel der Debatte über einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Golfkrieg, Baden-Baden



• Peters, Christoph 1999: Deutschland und die Deutschen im Spiegel britischer Tageszeitungen. Die Berichterstattung der überregionalen Presse Großbritanniens 1989-1994, Münster



• Phillips, Ann L. 2000: Power and Influence after the Cold War. Germany in East-Central Europe, Lanham



• Weller, Christoph 2000: Die öffentliche Meinung in der Außenpolitik. eine konstruktivistische Perspektive, Opladen

Wolfgang Brauner, D.E.A.: Research Fellow and Project Manager at the Chair for International Relations, University of Trier

Dr. Daniel Hamilton: DaimlerChrysler Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Dr. Sebastian Harnisch: Associate Professor at the Chair for International Relations, Trier University

Prof. Ulf Hedetoft: Center for International Studies, Aalborg University

Prof. Dr. Hanns W. Maull: Chair for International Relations at Trier University

Dr. Joachim Schild: Research Fellow at the Franco-German Institute, Ludwigsburg

Dr. Hans Stark: Secretary General of the Comité d'étude des relations franco-allemandes (CERFA), Paris