

## German Foreign Policy in Dialogue

*Newsletter - Issue 14*

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The European Security Strategy  
Paper Tiger Or Catalyst for Joint Action?

### Part II

Perspectives from Italy, Poland, Austria and Finland.

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# **German Foreign Policy in Dialogue**

**A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German Foreign Policy**

*Edited by Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian  
Harnisch*

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The project is presently headed by Marco Overhaus. Current staff members are Michael Lechner, Esther Recktenwald, Jenni Werner, Christine Wetzel and Christof Zintel. Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.

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## **I. The European Security Strategy – Paper Tiger or Catalyst for Joint Action? (II)**

### **Editorial**

*By Marco Overhaus*

The previous issue of “Foreign Policy in Dialogue” (published in June) was dedicated to the European Security Strategy (ESS) which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The central concern common to all our authors was (and still is) whether the Strategy is likely to become a catalyst for joint European action in foreign affairs or whether it might turn out to be a paper tiger. Beyond the concrete contents of the document, convergences of or differences among national interpretations of its provisions will be key in this regard. Therefore in June we compiled four essays reflecting the specific positions of the so-called “Big Three” member countries which so far have given the greatest impetus to the process of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): France, United Kingdom and Germany. These contributions were complemented by a view from the United States which is surely one of the principle addressees of the European Security Strategy.

With this issue we complement this set of perspectives further. As one of the EU’s founding members, it has been *Italy’s* concern not to be excluded by any form of “axis”-formation or “directorate” from European policy-making. Consequently, being adequately involved in the process was at least as important to Rome as the concrete contents of the emerging policies in ESDP, according to *Antonio Missiroli*. As Italy held the EU’s Presidency during the final drafting phase of the ESS, it was especially interested in “the sheer success of the exercise”, a fact which also constrained the Italian position to that of an “honest broker”. This, however, did not prevent Rome to lobby its European partners to pay more attention to NATO-EU cooperation and other issues where it sees a special interest due to its vulnerable geographical position: illegal immigration and stability in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

Sharing the “Atlanticist” outlook with Italy and the other new member states from Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Poland* was keen to include a stronger reference to the transatlantic relationship in the final version of the ESS. In his analysis, *Olaf Osica* stresses two other Polish concerns – again largely shared by other newcomers from CEE – to which the ESS, in Osica’s view, does not pay sufficient attention so far: Russia and the EU’s neighborhood policy, especially towards Ukraine. The author concludes that Poland’s continued role shift

from “a critical observer to a prudent participant” in ESDP will also depend on the EU’s ability to take these specific concerns into account. In this respect, Osica strikes a rather skeptical tone, however: The ESS “was still written more through the prism of old member’s security apprehensions and according to their ideas of countermeasures.”

*Austria* and *Finland* share the status as formerly neutral member states, a position which has also conditioned their post Cold War security policies. The central theme of *Erich Reiter*, *Johann Frank* and *Kristi Raik*’s discussion of the Austrian and Finnish positions, respectively, is the tension between the policy of non-alignment and both countries’ engagement in ESDP. For Finland, Raik states that “[i]t is questionable whether active membership in all aspects of the European Security and Defense Policy leaves space for a credible non-alignment.” Rather than being an obstacle for Finnish support of ESDP and the European Security Strategy, however, Raik sees the policies on the EU level as a catalyst for the adaptation of Finnish security policy in general and the concept of non-alignment in particular (to be reflected in a new Defense White Book). Reiter and Frank describe a similar adaptation process for Austria which is already reflected in the country’s new Security and Defense Doctrine of December 2002. Despite these similarities between the “post-neutrals”, both contributions also point to the specific aspects of the respective country’s position with regard to the formulation and implementation of the ESS.

Our discussion of the European Security Strategy concludes with an interview of Dr. Christoph Heusgen, who, as Head of the Secretariat’s Political Section in the Council of the European Union, was directly involved in the drafting of the document. Rather than the interpretation of the Strategy through national lenses, the interview’s focus is on the genesis of the text. In fact, the method employed – the High Representative being tasked with the drafting process without direct intervention by member countries – might well prove to be a viable model for the future of European foreign policy making.

## **Italy: A Sympathetic Fellow Traveler**

*By Antonio Missiroli*

Italy's position vis-à-vis the European Security Strategy (ESS) was peculiar from the outset. After the initial draft prepared by the Council Secretariat's staff was "welcomed" by the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003<sup>1</sup>, the further elaboration and fine-tuning of the text coincided with the semester of Italy's EU Presidency, which, in turn, was also charged with launching the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) bound to finalize the EU Constitutional Treaty. As a result, during the second half of 2003 three exercises – separate but not entirely separable from each other – unfolded in parallel, and Italy found itself in a pivotal position in at least two of them. What is more, the most significant developments that took place during the Presidency occurred notably in the field of CFSP and ESDP, from the agreement reached among the EU partners on cooperating with NATO in crisis management (so-called 'Berlin Plus Agreement') and setting up operational headquarters, to the partial rewriting of the relevant articles of the draft Constitutional Treaty in the IGC. Even though the ESS exercise was conducted through specific channels, only marginally or procedurally related to the Presidency, it can be argued that similar considerations and motivations also drove especially the last part of the Italian EU Presidency. In a way, therefore, Italy was interested as much in emphasizing certain aspects of the ESS as in the sheer success of the three parallel exercises. The fact that one of them, namely the IGC, turned out to be a (temporary) failure does not fundamentally disprove the point, especially since the reasons for such a failure were not primarily related to foreign or security policy-related factors<sup>2</sup>.

The peculiarity of Italy's position, however, went even further. It can be argued that, from the outset, the ESS' political rationale was twofold: on the one hand, it was meant to try and elaborate a vision that could be shared by all EU member states – and was all the more needed after the sharp intra-European divisions of early 2003 over Iraq. On the other hand, the ESS was also meant to address upfront those issues that shaped the American vision of its own security by acknowledging their relevance while offering a specifically "European" reading of

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<sup>1</sup> Arguably, the most remarkable innovation introduced by Javier Solana at that stage was the decision – once the informal Council of Foreign Ministers tasked him with the drafting of the Strategy in early May 2003 – *not* to negotiate the text with the representatives of the EU member states: As a result, the first draft of the ESS never went through the traditional official channels of EU policy-making and -shaping represented by the COREPER or the Political and Security Committee.

<sup>2</sup> For an overall assessment of the Italian EU Presidency cf. Missiroli, Antonio/ Berlusconi, Dopo (2004): *La presidenza italiana e l'Europa*. In: *Italianieuropei*, 1/2004, p. 108-116.

and response to them. In other words, however limited in its scope, the ESS was launched and intended as an exercise in reconciliation: across the EU as much as across the Atlantic. And this was precisely, at that point in time as well as in broader strategic terms, the main political goal that Italy's EU Presidency had set: hence the special attention with which the drafting of the ESS was followed by the government in Rome. Finally, the Thessaloniki European Council decided i.e. that the further elaboration of the ESS would be supported by a series of focused seminars – to be coordinated by the Institute for Security Studies, the autonomous EU agency based in Paris – involving experts and officials from both Brussels and the member states, with the occasional inclusion of 'external' contributors. And it is not by chance that the first of the three seminars in question, devoted to "Identifying and Understanding Threats" and focused on the first part of the ESS, was held in Rome on September 19, 2003 with the support of the Centro Militare Studi Strategici (CeMISS) of the Italian Ministry of Defence and the Aspen Institute Italy. In part an offer from and in part a tribute to Italy's EU Presidency, the Rome Seminar addressed probably the most delicate bit of the ESS, i.e. the overall threat assessment on which the whole text was to be based<sup>3</sup>.

This being said, Italy did not play a major role in the final drafting of the ESS. Firstly, there is no evidence of any formal statement by Italian officials on the matter: Among the sparse and sketchy comments on the initial draft of the ESS that some 10 EU Foreign Ministries sent (on request, or rather invitation) to the Council Secretariat in the summer of 2003, Rome's were not there<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, and paradoxically, Italy's contingent role as an honest broker at the EU institutional level made it almost impossible to try and influence structure and contents of the ESS too assertively: On top of that, the exercise was not being managed by the Presidency anyway. Thirdly, and more generally, Italy's diplomatic record and style in EU debates and negotiations traditionally show a preference for a mediating and conciliatory role. Even if Rome had not been in the driving seat, therefore, its specific input would probably have been less than controversial and entirely instrumental to meeting the two main goals of the entire exercise. This is all the more true since Italy does not have any official security "doctrine" of

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<sup>3</sup> The other seminars were held in Paris at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) ("Les objectifs stratégiques de l'UE: Multilatéralisme efficace, sécurité élargie", October 6-7, 2003) and in Stockholm ("Coherence and Capabilities", October 20, 2003), the latter in collaboration with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. The official reports on all three seminars can be found at ISS: [www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org).

<sup>4</sup> Nor were, for that matter, those of Paris, London, Berlin or Madrid. Presumably, their respective ministries used other, more informal ways to convey their observations to Solana and his aides. Mostly, the written comments came from the smaller and the new EU member states.

its own, relying as it does rather on a multilateral approach centered upon NATO and the EU, the two main pillars (or rather ‘circles’) of Italy’s post-war foreign policy.

In the end, therefore, the peculiarity of Italy’s position was that the more or less explicit political goals of the ESS *de facto* coincided with Italy’s. After the crisis over Iraq – in which the parliamentary coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi sided with the “Atlanticist” camp but stopped short of taking up a directly ‘belligerent’ role – mediating between the EU members was an intrinsic objective of the Presidency and a condition for its successful conclusion, while reconciling Europeans and Americans was a declared goal of the most “Atlanticist” government Italy had had in three decades. Such objective convergence and commonality of purposes translated into Rome’s extremely favorable and supportive attitude vis-à-vis the effort undertaken by Javier Solana and his staff.

More specifically, Italy’s input into the exercise – as readable from the interventions of Italian officials and experts at the Rome Seminar as well as from other parallel official declarations – was limited to:

- emphasizing the need for giving a sympathetic response to American worries concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction and international terrorism;
- stressing the relevance of organized crime and/or illegal immigration as specific threats, somehow at the crossroads between internal and external security;
- reminding the residual importance of ‘old’ threats, such as those still lingering in the unstable Balkan area or the Mediterranean basin at large;
- pleading for a more capable and coherent EU action, preferably in cooperation with NATO (whenever relevant) and the United States (whenever possible).

Most of these points were also part and parcel of the broader political initiative undertaken by the Italian EU Presidency. Especially since September 2003, in fact, the deep intra-European cleavages of the previous months seemed to be softening, as the growing cooperation between the so-called ‘Big Three’ on ESDP matters showed. Italian political elites tend to have an ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis such ‘formats’ in that they feel unjustly “excluded”: In this case, at any rate, notably the role of EU President made it impossible for Italy to claim a more visible role. As a result, Rome often acted as a facilitator by incorporating most of the proposals elaborated by the ‘Big Three’ in its own ones and submitting them to the 15/25 for

discussion and eventual approval. In most cases, such an approach proved successful. And even the insistence on improving overall EU military capabilities and raising the bar for participation in EU-led operations met an essential Italian priority.

When the final version of the ESS was eventually presented to the Council in early December, therefore, Italy found itself in agreement with the more or less marginal changes that had been introduced into the text, although it insisted on the need for more focused follow-up plans and implementation schemes for the Strategy. In fact, the broader and more articulated analysis of the existing threats met the Italian demands. Even the most debated one – namely the terminological shift, in the English version, from “pre-emptive” to “preventive” engagement<sup>5</sup> – did not really draw any criticism, in part because post-conflict developments in Iraq (where Italy was now present on the ground with a “peace-supporting” contingent and had also suffered casualties) showed that exclusive reliance on “pre-emptive” military action could generate intractable problems, and in part because the general attention of the Italian decision- and opinion-makers was now focused on the IGC. On the whole, it can be argued that also the Italian media, that understandably paid special attention to EU affairs during the semester, did not devote much time nor space to the ESS exercise. The formal “adoption” of the text and its contents were mentioned in passing, at best, and largely on the margins of the wider reporting on the Brussels European Council of mid-December.

There is at least one specific initiative, however, for which the Italian EU Presidency picked up explicitly on the ESS exercise and used it for its own goals. In fact, the Presidency Conclusions of December 12, 2003 included an annex, titled “European Council declaration on transatlantic relations”, whose ten points basically reiterated all the relevant bits of the ESS while emphasizing, of course, its transatlantic dimension. Canada was put in a more appropriate box, since in the ESS it was only mentioned as a potential “strategic partner” alongside Japan, China and India. And the declaration ended with a sentence that clearly evoked the official heading of the ESS: “Now more than ever, the transatlantic link is essential if we want to create *a better world*”. Such conclusive transatlantic ‘spin’ added to the ESS represents perhaps the clearest evidence of the attitude with which Italy followed and supported the whole exercise.

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<sup>5</sup> For an in-depth analysis cf. Missiroli, Antonio (2004): Lo ‘Strategic Concept’ europeo nel contesto della Presidenza italiana dell’UE, “Osservatorio Strategico”, CeMISS, May 2004, p.45-56.

## **A Secure Poland in a Better Union? The ESS as Seen from Warsaw's Perspective**

*By Olaf Osica*

So far, Javier Solana's job change to High Representative for Foreign Policy of the EU has not earned him much credit in Poland. As Secretary General of NATO, he was responsible for and committed to the organization's enlargement policy which was naturally very important to Warsaw. As High Representative of the European Union he has since become engaged in projects which enjoyed, at best, lukewarm support in Warsaw – most notably the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) – and, at worst, were seen as largely irrelevant to the concerns of Central and Eastern Europe.

This unrewarding situation changed at least somewhat when Solana presented the Security Strategy for the European Union (ESS). The resulting document – entitled “A secure Europe in the better world” – was welcomed as a valuable contribution to the debate on European security, and a good departure point to heal the transatlantic rifts created by different approaches to the war in Iraq. It was praised for emphasizing the role of political instruments and the economic ‘carrot’, without neglecting the importance of the military stick. Though the ESS is more a general outline rather than a detailed plan of action and catalogue of tools, Polish diplomats consider this as an advantage as it leaves ample room for further work on it.

Despite this positive reception among Polish diplomats, the debate among the wider public was rather limited. The publication of the ESS' first draft in June 2003 and the subsequent discussion in Brussels overlapped with the climax of the “Nice or death” debate on the EU Constitution which dominated Polish media and public attention, pushing everything else – with the exception of the war in Iraq – into the background. It might have helped, of course, if one of the three seminars organized to discuss the draft version of the Strategy – in Paris, Rome and Stockholm – had taken place in Warsaw or Vilnius. Even so, the EU would still have had a difficult position in Poland when it comes to security and defense policy: NATO, rather than the EU, is and probably will remain the most important security organization for Poland for the foreseeable future.

Yet, the importance of the ESS will grow as Poland gradually alters – as seems likely – its approach to ESDP and CFSP from that of a critical observer to a prudent participant.

***Poland's Role in CFSP/CESDP: Added Value or a Trouble Maker?***

It sounds like conventional wisdom to say that Poland shares with its main allies similar perceptions of security threats and risks. The new Polish Strategy on National Security, published on September 8, 2003, states that:

“(...) the line of distinction between the external and internal security aspects becomes blurred. The importance of the international factor is growing and so is the role of international collaboration, including, in particular, one within the allied arrangements. The impact of non-military factors, including, above all, economic, social and ecological, is growing. (...) the changes in our security environment essentially consist of a shift of emphasis away from the classical risks (armed invasion) that decrease in importance and towards the unconventional risks that originate also with hardly identifiable non-state entities.”<sup>6</sup>

Like other European allies, Poland does not refrain from military engagements: It is present on the Balkans, in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention UN peace-keeping missions (Golan Heights and Lebanon). Despite having one of the lowest GDP *per capita* among EU members and an army which still carries the burden of 40 years of membership in the Warsaw Pact, it currently deploys about 4.000 troops abroad and it will continue to do so in the upcoming years. Poland also appears as one of those EU members which has developed a strategic perspective and whose interests go beyond the direct neighborhood reaching the Middle East and Central Asia.

But Poland also tends to follow a different approach from that of many of its European partners when it comes to priorities and political strategies. First, Warsaw emphasizes the importance of continued political and military U.S. engagement in Europe. Few Polish politicians would subscribe to the sentence that “Euro-Atlantic relations are a matter of choice and not of necessity” – a conviction that led Polish troops to Iraq. Also Poland’s attitude towards the Israeli-Arab conflict is substantially different from that in many western European countries. Since 1990, Warsaw has traditionally been more sympathetic to Israel than the majority of EU-members. Though Poles would like to see Russia as a reliable and

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<sup>6</sup> Source: Foreign Ministry of Poland website, [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

predictable partner, they advocate a rather hard-line policy of conditionality which would clearly stress the values and norms of democratization and the constitutional state. It seems worth noting that contrary to what some foreign observers may think, Polish foreign policy does present a sober and down-to-earth approach to the future of Ukraine and Belarus. Yet, while knowing that little can be done in the absence of reliable governmental partners in both countries, Poland is quite unhappy with the present status-quo there and tendencies to political reintegration with Russia.

### ***ESS: A Strategy Only for the 'Old' Members?***

Whether Poland will actively contribute to the further development and the implementation of the ESS depends on the way Poland blends its interests into the EU context and how they will be absorbed by EU institutions and members. For that reason the strategy rightly stresses the need for developing “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.” Indeed, the lack of such a culture is one of the stumbling blocks to the creation of genuinely common foreign and security policy. However, before one thinks of a ‘robust intervention’, it would be wise to consider how to introduce the new members’ security concerns and ideas for CFSP and CESDP so that enlargement strengthens the EU’s voice and power, rather than dilutes it. The pernicious impact of Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe left no doubts that EU member states act and think strategically different when it comes to the most important contemporary security concerns.

### ***New Threats, New Security Environment and Strategic Objectives***

One of the pitfalls for today’s strategic thinking is a tendency to either include all possible threats and risks or to yield to a certain ‘fashion’; both approaches may lead to false premises and solutions. A too wide definition of threats may unnecessarily blur the picture and hence make it impossible to translate into political and military directives. The ‘fashion approach’ in turn, tends to stress ‘modern threats’ as if their emergence was tantamount to the disappearance of old ones. The first draft of the ESS, presented in Thessaloniki in June 2003, was rather disappointing in this regard. Even though the final version of the ESS seems to escape both traps, it was still written more through the prism of old member’s security apprehensions and according to their ideas of countermeasures.

Undeniably, the ESS was rightly supplemented with the threat of ‘regional conflicts’ which still is far from being obsolete. The absence of ‘regional conflicts’ in the draft version and the focus on terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could be seen as a ‘fashion approach’. Despite the fact that September 11 exposed the destroying power of terrorists attacks and shifted attention to WMD challenges, one should keep here proportion and hierarchy. First, the threat of terrorism does not affect all EU members in the same way. Arguably, ‘old’ EU members may be more prone to attacks. Secondly, and more importantly, it is regional conflicts, organized crime and state failure that give birth and fuel terrorism. Hence, the fight against those threats offer a substantially better ‘strategic glue’ than fight against terrorism which may easily cement existing differences in security perception. It does not mean that ESS does not take into account the wider causes of terrorism. But there seems to be a good point in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s remark that “terrorism is a technique of killing people, but not a target or the enemy. It is as though we called the World War II a war with ‘Blitzkrieg’.”<sup>7</sup> This warning should be kept in mind before European politicians – often so critical about the U.S. – go down this road which very much resembles a political cul-de-sac.

The three strategic objectives put forward in the ESS – addressing the threats, building security in our neighborhood and creation of international order based on effective multilateralism – are quite obvious. Yet, from the Polish point of view the latter two bear direct political consequences which the ESS apparently omits.

### ***Russia: The Great Absentee***

From the Polish perspective, the most important omission of the ESS relates to Russia. Russia has always been the litmus test for Polish public opinion and politicians of European foreign policy. The ESS’ exclusive reference to Russia in terms of a partner and not also as a source of potential security problems is not a good sign for the future. Though it is perfectly understandable that any references in such an official document must be written in a more diplomatic language than it is usually the case, it is myopic not to express real concerns at all. After all, the sentence “bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode states from within” could easily be used to describe the “achievements” of Vladimir Putin. The way in which the Russian army wages

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<sup>7</sup> Quote after the interview for ‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, October 7, 2003.

the war in Chechnya has already given birth to Caucasian terrorism and it further fuels it. It will be hard to convey to the Polish public that “the resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe, but Russia’s policy on the Caucasus is beyond the main scope of the ESS. By the same token, if the Great Lakes region or Kashmir impact on European interests, so does Kaliningrad with its poverty and devastated ecology, not to mention the leak of Russian weapons to organized crime groups.

### ***Neighborhood Policy or Enlargement Policy?***

Enlargement policy is surely the most powerful tool the EU has for shaping its neighborhood. The strategy does not mention this link as it might have opened the Pandora’s Box with respect to accession candidates which are contested within the EU such as Turkey. Yet, it does not change the fact that the pressure on the EU to continue enlargement will increase as the various partnerships evolve and bring positive results. One can easily assume that without membership prospects, most partner-states would not be interested to bear political and financial burdens of adjusting their legal and economic systems to deal with the EU. Against this background, the balancing act of how to induce eastern neighbors such as Ukraine to further reforms without using the ‘carrot’ of membership occupies the centre of Polish debate on eastern policy. Yet, behind the official discourse there is a growing consciousness among experts and politicians in Poland that the attempt of strengthening pro-western attitudes in Ukraine by means of EU admission is doomed to fail. First, it appears doubtful that such a prospect may substantially impact Ukrainian politics, and secondly – if that was the case – then Poland would win nothing while putting at risk relations with some EU members. Therefore, the support for Ukraine’s membership in WTO, also possibly NATO, combined with an active and clever neighborhood policy is seen to yield better results. In other words, a focus on the road to EU membership rather than the membership itself promises to be more successful. In result, Poland did not push for references to Ukraine in the ESS and it was a wise step. After all, Kiev’s policy has been lately a constant source of embarrassment to the EU as it did not fulfill the hopes of a clearer western orientation. Instead Warsaw did what it could. It objected to a passage in which Ukraine was mentioned together with Moldova and Belarus in one breath: From Poland’s perspective, bracketing Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus, the complicated political situation in Transdnistria and a country that contributes to peace-keeping operations on the Balkans and in Iraq (with 1.500 troops) together in the same category was a huge misjudgment.

## *NATO vs EU*

The relation between NATO and EU was another issue where the “Polish touch” was palpable during the work on the Strategy. Poland wants both institutions to co-operate rather than compete and it insists that NATO shall keep the upper hand in European security as the alliance disposes of the better military capabilities. Therefore Warsaw pushed, unsuccessfully, for a separate paragraph in the Strategy which stressed the importance of NATO and the transatlantic link in a more coherent way than the ESS does. Yet, Poland – and this is a sea-change in the attitude – clearly recognizes that in the course of time, the EU will become the equal partner of NATO.<sup>8</sup> Important is, however, that it will be a natural process driven by a common-sense since any political haste or institutional competition may result in undermining NATO as well as the CESDP.

## *Effective Disillusionment?*

Another key concept in the ESS is an international order built on “effective multilateralism”. This issue evokes mixed feelings in Poland. Here, it is seen as rather doubtful whether this goal can be achieved without a prior reform of the United Nations and international law, an issue that the ESS does not mention. Due to its own ‘lessons learnt’ in the past and its geopolitical location, Polish policy makers find it unrealistic to assume that a multilateral security system can be effective without relying on the same values and common interests. From this stems a certain skepticism towards the United Nations Security Council. Naturally, Poland is not very keen to make its national security dependent on Russia’s veto. Therefore, Poland would like to keep the EU’s ability to perform military operations unrestrained by UN resolutions.

## *Conclusion*

Let us be clear: As for a document negotiated within a group of 25 countries, which is only a departure point for further actions, the strategy appears as a climax of what was realistic to achieve. However, it is the overall context of European foreign policy making – a process in which members pursue their own national interest first, while their shared European concerns

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<sup>8</sup> This is reflected in the more constructive Polish stance towards CESDP as it was demonstrated during the meeting in Naples in November 2003, when Poland subscribed to the idea of a ‘structured co-operation’.

often take the back seat, in which the smaller states often find themselves neglected – that ultimately may affect the ESS’ legitimacy most negatively. Just as the British say: “The proof of the pudding is in the eating”, Poles prefer instead “to do the laundry and see what will come out”. If European Foreign Security and Defense Policy is to win Polish hearts and minds it must not shy away from tough political actions towards all those places, where “effective multilateralism” is still treated by the ruling elites as a post-modern dream of the rich and the naïve. The aim is high but so are the stakes.

**The European Security Strategy from the Austrian Perspective.  
A Valuable Contribution to the Further Europeanization of Austria's Security Policy**

*By Erich Reiter and Johann Frank*

***Aspects of the Current Austrian Security Policy***

The development of the European Security Strategy (ESS) should be assessed in the context that the EU seeks to become a global actor in foreign and security affairs. This globalization is a significant challenge, especially for neutral states and those EU member states which obtain a more reactive/ passive defense culture. Although Austria was hardly involved in drafting of the ESS, the document certainly had a crucial impact on the Austrian security policy. This is in line with the observation that small states normally can only influence the pace of international processes rather than their substantive outcomes. In particular the ESS presents a fundamental base for the Austrian security policy vis-à-vis the non EU member states and also was an important document for the definition of the new concept for the armed forces.

As a consequence of the international security policy paradigm-shift, the Austrian Security and Defense Doctrine, agreed in December 2002, determines the European Union as the central framework of Austrian security policy. In this doctrine, traditional Austrian policy of neutrality was conceptionally replaced by the policy of European solidarity, also including an adequate military contribution to the whole spectrum of those tasks which were formulated in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Although NATO membership remains an option within the context of the Austrian Doctrine, it is very unlikely to be realized in the medium term, especially due to the post Iraq War developments.

Austria's attitude towards ESDP is based on the comprehensive correlation of almost all fields of policy making in the EU. It is the central premise of Austrian policy makers that the country can only maintain her position in the core group of European states if remains involved in all aspects of deepening integration. This includes the involvement in the major projects of ESDP, especially with regard to the defense-political aims within the EU constitution. The primary aim of Austrian security policy is to promote Austria's role as an active and solidarity showing player within ESDP in order to preserve national and European security interests, as well as maintaining Austria's position in the group of European financial

core contributors and policy shapers. The Austrian Security and Defense Doctrine assumes that the national Austrian and European security interests become more and more interwoven. Looking at the European and global interdependencies, an autonomous realization of national foreign and security political aims does not seem possible. This aspect is supported due to the fact that there is no Austrian security without European security.

Due to its economic and cultural strength, Austria belongs to the group of countries which can positively participate in the further development of the EU. Since ESDP is gaining more importance within European policy making, Austria needs to intensify its efforts in the field of security policy in order to maintain its influence. This demands a reorganization of Austrian security policy to equip it with ambitious and proactive military components that meets European standards – a need that has been explicitly acknowledged by the new Austrian Security Doctrine. However, it seems that these ambitions are still in conflict with more traditional aspects of Austrian Defense Policy which has long been oriented towards conventional threats and does not provide sufficient resources for the Austrian participation in multilateral operations. A report of the Reform Commission of the Armed Forces which was presented in June 2004 clarified this conflict to some degree. This report made clear that the tasks of the armed forces in Austria and the participation in international crisis management operations have equal priority. However, in terms of military structures and capabilities international operations enjoy a higher priority.

Despite this residual political ambivalence situation in current defense policies, Austria supports all political developments which contribute to strengthening the EU's security policy. Austria thus has welcomed the new ESS and encourages its further development. For this reason, Austria confined its own input to the Strategy to a few selected changes during the first drafting phase, for example on putting more emphasis on the important role of Russia, as well as on the importance of disarmament for European security.

*The European Security Strategy – Initiation of a New Phase of ESDP-Development?*

Along with the work on the European constitution and on the (still unfinished) draft of an “European Defense White Book” (EDB), the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 marks a new phase in ESDP development. This phase can be seen as an attempt to develop modern, so-called “transformed” rapid reaction elements and strategic assets, and to increase the politically binding character and the demand for military operations. The EDB is to provide more details of European Security Strategy with regard to concrete operation scenarios and EU military requirements derived from this.

The ESS must be seen in close connection with the U.S. national security strategy and thus with US foreign policy. In certain respects, the European’s Strategy can be considered as a reaction to the U.S. doctrine. It reads like the European attempt to join the American debate about appropriate reactions to the new threats in a globalized world, even if the ESS is not precise on the question of “preventive deployment of military forces”. From the Austrian perspective the ESS’s term of “preventive engagement” does not include military operations without a sufficient UN mandate. The Strategy document was very well received by both the member states and the U.S., and was considered a constructive measure in the face of a lacking common policy prior to the Iraq War. As opposed to the first draft, the ESS version that was eventually passed in December 2003 is no longer based on the will to shape global politics independently but is written to support an effective multilateral order in the spirit of the UN Charta.

The particular challenge for a European Strategy is that it has to take into account the diversity of the strategic and defense traditions of its member states. It has to develop a generally accepted framework and at the same time offer sufficiently detailed guidelines for European security policies to provide concrete instructions for action. Being such a general document (which necessarily has a compromise character), the ESS has to be complemented by sub-strategies on specific issue areas (e.g. on proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD], the fight against terrorism, dealing with “rogue states”).

Thus far, one of the weakest points in EU foreign relations has been the incongruence between the goals and the means available to reach them. Concerning the goals, the document clearly concentrates on five top security risks, i.e. strategic terrorism, proliferation of WMD,

“failed” states, regional conflicts and organized crime. At the same time, the ESS develops a comprehensive set of both civilian and military means to meet these challenges. While in the past the EU has repeatedly pointed out the significance of soft power, i.e. the ability to influence others through positive incentives rather than through coercion, it has gradually become more and more accepted that a comprehensive and effective security policy rests on the application of soft *and* hard power, deployed in ways which complement and mutually reinforce each other. In the past, the EU was frequently (and rightly so) accused of reacting to crises only passively and too late. The new security risks, however, increasingly demand proactive and preventive actions. As the EU member states will most probably not find to an all-out agreement in this sensitive question, a specification of the ESS is in a real-political and pragmatic sense not expected. The ESS takes into account the need for Europe to develop a new military doctrine as well. This is codified in the concept of “modified self-defense” and the idea that “with the new threats the first line of defense is often abroad”.

The ESS also intends to guarantee that the EU can really use its comparative advantage, as opposed to other international organizations, i.e. “security from one source”. This will require increases in military spending, the reduction of duplications, and the improvement of capabilities for civil crisis management. That these demands do not currently match reality is best reflected by the fact that out of the total EU’s budget of about 100 billion Euro, a mere 63 Mio. Euro have been allocated to the CFSP in 2004.

Having the current financial restrictions on the defense budget in mind, the realization of the EU’s ability to act, as mentioned in the ESS, seems only possible through a clear concentration on the international capacity to react to crises. The necessary strategic abilities such as strategic transportation, command and control capabilities as well WMD-protection can hardly be nationally provided from an Austrian perspective. Hence, a common European effort as well as an open discussion on the use of the common EU budget for security interests is needed.

Despite its positive achievements (the fact that it exists is already an achievement), the ESS has some principal weaknesses. Firstly, the document leaves the complex question of how to share tasks with NATO and the United States open. Secondly, the Strategy also lacks a clear statement on the time horizons for making available to the Europeans the necessary means, and, thirdly, it fails to postulate a coherent policy linkage between internal and external

security. Thus, the question which role military means could play in coping with identified security risks and especially with “strategic terrorism” remains to be debated, let alone settled.

### *The “Way Ahead” as Seen from the Austrian Perspective*

An important step to make the European strategic dimension more concrete would be the concept of a “European Military Doctrine” (EMD). Austria would support the development of such a document. A precise coordination of military objectives on the European level represents a crucial precondition for continuing the process of “Europeanizing the Austrian Armed Forces”.

Although the realization of such an EMD would without doubt be difficult – both the acceptance of 25 defense ministries and a reliable CFSP are needed –, this step would certainly be of great advantage, especially for the small EU member states. The EMD would facilitate the reorientation of national defense planning towards European objectives and duties. Furthermore, it could also help to reform the framework for deepening the integration of the armed forces and create an additional element of legitimacy for collective military operations: the higher accordance among member states, the stronger the domestic political acceptance. This also holds true for the European context.

Another dimension could be the development of a European information strategy, bringing the need for and the aims of a European security policy closer to the European people. EU membership will inevitably require a higher level of security and political engagement (from all member countries, not only Austria) – a fact which has neither been fully recognized by the political establishment nor by the (Austrian) people. The ambition of becoming a real global actor also requires the support of large parts of the European population.

The adoption of the European Security Strategy as such has to be seen as an important first step. Yet, the ESS should undergo a permanent review process in order to adapt to rapidly changing international challenges. Therefore, from the Austrian point of view, such a review process – including the above mentioned aspects – should further devote special attention to the following elements:

- the importance of Turkey for European security. After all, Turkey is directly involved in 13 out of 16 conflict situations that could have an impact on the EU;
- the role of the EU in the “Greater Middle East”;
- concrete aims and steps for deepening the integration of European armies;
- the development of a European strategy of homeland defense.

Certainly, such a review process has to constantly question whether the self-defined aims can be realistically achieved. In order to evade the recurring critique of pursuing only a declaratory policy and for the sake of credibility of European action, clear priorities have to be set. This also means reducing, if necessary, excessively ambitious goals, and concentrating on really achievable projects.

In the context of the current intensification of the security-political relations of Austria with the neighboring states, further development of the ESS and the adaptation of the national security strategies remain the preferential projects. In line with this objective and as a first step, the ESS already compares, evaluates and bundles up the national threat perceptions. Austria will continue to contribute to the Europeanization of defense policy and to the transformation of the EU’s role on the international stage from a passive into a more active one.

## **European Security Strategy from the Finnish Perspective: The Fading Away of Non-Alignment?**

*By Kristi Raik*

The EU has been often blamed for a reactive foreign policy. The same can be said about the coming into existence of the European Security Strategy, adopted by EU leaders in December 2003: The Strategy was largely a response to the increasingly unilateralist international policy of the United States. 9/11 and the consequent war on terror fought by the Americans could not be left unanswered by the Europeans. Although formulating a common European position seemed quite impossible in early 2003 when the Iraq crisis threatened to create insurmountable divisions in Europe, it now looks like the EU has managed to survive the crisis and even strengthen its status as an international actor through it. As the divisions within Europe have been healed, differences in comparison with the U.S. have also become somewhat bleaker. Europeans have by and large adopted the U.S. vision of security threats, while stressing the differences between ways to address the threats.

Even more markedly, the division of Europeans into “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists” has considerably faded during the past year. The former, although highlighting the indispensable role of the U.S. in guaranteeing European security, share the European view of the primacy of multilateralism and international law as cornerstones of the international system. The differences of opinion that exist among Europeans on some crucial questions such as the use of force do not necessarily run along the line between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists. One can find no notable difference between the two groups over the importance of combining civilian and military means of security promotion, or over the necessity to tackle the social and economic causes of threats such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The case of Finland is a peculiar example of the ambiguity of dividing lines within the EU over security issues. As we see in the below overview of the Finnish position, a European country may even try to be simultaneously Europeanist, Atlanticist and non-aligned. Attempts to reconcile the first two – defending the multilateralist international system and a stronger role of Europe in it, and maintaining partnership with the U.S. – are more or less common to all European states. What is more specifically characteristic of Finland (and the other non-aligned EU member states) is the tension between non-alignment on the one hand, and the tight integration with international and especially European structures of security on the other

hand. The tricky task of combining these not easily compatible elements constitutes the core of current Finnish security political discussion.

### *Non-Alignment at the Heart of the Finnish Debate*

First and foremost, the Finnish discussion has been recently centered round the policy of non-alignment. While the combination of neutrality and a credible national defense served the country well over the Cold War period, the changing security environment of the post-Cold War world has required a considerable adjustment of the former. The concept of neutrality was replaced with military non-alignment in the 1990s<sup>9</sup>, and the latter has been narrowed further in recent debates. So far, however, the country continues to hold on to this cornerstone of its security policy. According to the current leaders – most notably President Tarja Halonen, Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja – Finland remains non-allied as long as it stays outside NATO. Membership in NATO is considered a “true option” for the country, but it is defined as a solution for which there is neither need nor public support in the moment.

Meanwhile, the importance of the EU as a security community and actor is growing, and Finland emphasizes its commitment to this development. The official position does not see active participation in EU Security and Defense Policy as contradictory to non-alignment. Thus, the government seeks to maintain a distinction between Finland’s contribution in the EU on the one hand, and the question of non-alignment on the other. In order for this division to be possible, the concept of non-alignment has been narrowed to concern territorial defense only: It is in this area that Finland stays non-allied, whereas in other forms of security and defense policy cooperation the country is actively engaged (military crisis management).

The combination of this distinction with an active role in the European Security and Defense Policy has not been unproblematic. It was one of the most important demands of Finland in the negotiations over the new Constitutional Treaty for the EU that the treaty should not include unconditional military security guarantees. In the final phase of negotiations in early December last year, Finland rejected the formulation of mutual security guarantees as

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<sup>9</sup> See Hanna Ojanen together with Gunilla Herolf and Rutger Lindahl (2000): *Non-Alignment and European Security Policy: Ambiguity at Work*. Helsinki and Bonn: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, vol. 6, pp. 103-106.

suggested by the Italian presidency, and took the initiative in proposing a “softer” wording. The Finnish proposal was supported by the other non-allied member states<sup>10</sup>, and led to redrafting the respective article of the treaty. Mutual defense with a reservation that it “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States”, as stated in the final version of the draft adopted in June 2004 (Art. I-40.2), is acceptable for Finland and the other non-allied countries.

The obstructive position on European security guarantees that was pursued by the Finnish government in the end of last year was criticized in the domestic discussion for harming Finland’s overall leverage in the Union. Finland’s activeness in this matter was seen as a sign of a new, more reserved approach to integration pursued by the government led by Matti Vanhanen (Centre Party), as opposed to the strongly pro-integrationist policy of the former PM Paavo Lipponen (Social Democratic Party). The current government has tried to disprove the criticisms by underlining the commitment of Finland to strengthening the EU’s status as an international actor. Among other things, this has involved support for the solidarity clause against terrorism that was adopted by EU heads of states in the summit held in March<sup>11</sup> and is included in the draft Constitutional Treaty, and a promise to contribute to the new rapidly deployable battle groups, to be completed by 2007.

Several Finnish commentators, including prominent members of the Social Democratic Party that belongs to the government coalition, have called for reassessing the very grounds of Finnish security policy in the light of the evolving EU as an actor<sup>12</sup>. It is questionable whether active membership in all aspects of the European security and defense policy leaves space for a credible non-alignment. Using the words of Kimmo Kiljunen, who was a representative of the Finnish Parliament in the Convention, the new EU treaty will “dissolve” the non-alignment of the member states<sup>13</sup>. One can also see mutual defense as a natural companion of and a necessary support for the close European integration in other fields. By opposing the security guarantees, Finland may thus undermine the overall strengthening of the EU’s international role.

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<sup>10</sup> Letter from the foreign ministers of Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden to Franco Frattini, the President of the Council of the European Union, CIG 62/03, Brussels, December 4, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism, the European Council, Brussels, March 25, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Paavo Lipponen, ”Ydineurooppa on Suomelle realiteetti”, *Turun Sanomat*, January 19, 2004; Kimmo Kiljunen, *EU:n perustuslaki – suomalaisena konventissa*. Eurooppa-tietoa 181/2004, Ulkoasiainministeriö/Eurooppa-tiedotus; Liisa Jaakonsaari, interview to *Kaleva*, March 28, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Kiljunen, *op.cit.*, p.138.

### ***Concern about European Unity and Transatlantic Partnership***

The other key position of Finland concerning the security and defense articles in the new EU treaty was to defend the EU's unity. Finland therefore opposed provisions that would have made possible the emergence of a closed "core group" in the form of structured cooperation. The extension of crisis management tasks and the strengthening of the EU's military capabilities were supported by Finland on the condition that any new forms of cooperation would remain open to all member states. Finland continues to stress the importance of the inclusion of all member states in the framework of Common Security and Defense Policy. Behind this position there is a concern that the country will be marginalized, excluded from the "core" of European Security and Defense Policy, and thus be unable to influence European developments. This concern has been strongly present in the overall Finnish discussion on the future of Europe and the new treaty, and has shaped the formulation of national positions.

The Finnish government is expected to present a detailed analysis of the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy as a whole in a White Paper to be launched in the autumn of this year. Public debate on the preparation of the paper has been preoccupied with speculations over possible NATO membership, but at least so far, there are no indications of a change in the government's position on this matter. Meanwhile, it is the rapid evolution of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy that, although given less weight in public discussion, primarily frames the reformulation of national security policy. The importance of the EU for national security policy was highlighted particularly strongly in a recent speech by PM Vanhanen (again a response to the criticism concerning Finland's leverage in the EU) that defined the EU as *the* most important channel for Finland in promoting international security<sup>14</sup>.

Although the EU is the primary channel of international cooperation for Finland, the country has expressed no support for an Europeanist vision that sees the strengthening of the EU's international role as aimed at independence from the U.S.. The Finnish position on the relation between the EU and the U.S. has been cautious and somewhat ambiguous. The country has avoided taking sides and tried to remain neutral even with respect to the divisions that emerged in Europe during the Iraq crisis. However, the Finnish position can be

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<sup>14</sup> Matti Vanhanen (2004): Speech at the 60-year anniversary of Kyösti Virrankoski. Ylihärmä, April 4, 2004.

categorized as Atlanticist inasmuch as it stresses the importance of the transatlantic partnership and is not ready to develop the EU's Security and Defense Policy in a way that would undermine the U.S. commitment to European security or duplicate or compete with the position of NATO. A more precise position on the EU-U.S. and EU-NATO relationship is one of the matters that should be addressed in the coming White Paper on the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy.

### ***Support for the European Security Strategy***

The emphasis on non-alignment tends to create a misleading perception of continuity, while new threats and new forms of cooperation imply significant shifts in the national security doctrine. Irrespective of the question of non-alignment, the European Security Strategy has an important place in the (re)formulation of the national doctrine. The overall direction and key points of the ESS have raised no major objections on the side of the Finnish government. According to Foreign Minister Tuomioja, the Strategy "is not a revolutionary document", but "it crystallizes in a very useful way the European approach to the security threats Europe is facing"<sup>15</sup>.

In line with the ESS, the programme of the current government (adopted on June 24, 2003) stresses "a more effective UN and other structures of broad-based international cooperation" as the primary framework of national policy. It is stressed in the programme that active participation in peace-keeping and crisis management continues to be an important part of Finland's contribution to international security. As for the EU's external action, the government programme takes a strongly value-based approach, underlining the basis of common values and principles of the member states and the need for the Union to act "in an economically and socially equitable manner".

The emphasis of the ESS on effective multilateralism and the role of the UN is strongly supported by Finland. The need to combine military and civilian capabilities and to focus on crisis prevention are also well in line with Finnish thinking. The main points of criticism raised in the Finnish discussion have been related to these aspects of the Strategy: the critics

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<sup>15</sup> Erkki Tuomioja (2004): Speech held at the Finlandia Hall. Helsinki, February 25, 2004.

agree with the priorities of the Strategy, but call for a stronger or more specified position in certain respects.

One of the targets of criticism is the legitimacy of the use of force, identified by Tuomioja as one of the most important elements of effective multilateralism, and as an issue where the ESS should take a clearer stance. Finland stresses the primary role of the UN in mandating interventions, but acknowledges also the need to reassess this question in the light of the new threats addressed in the Strategy. This question is linked to Finland's participation in more demanding crisis management operations carried out by the EU. The government sees it as a matter of Finland's responsibility as an EU member state to take part in militarily more demanding operations. It has also expressed readiness to change the law on peace-keeping that allows Finland to take part only in operations which have a UN mandate, in order to make possible participation in EU operations in situations where the UN is incapable of making decisions. This should not, however, undermine the primary role of the UN in international crisis management.

In addition to the concern about the authority of the UN and the international legal system, another major critical point discussed in Finland concerns crisis prevention and the importance of addressing the roots of conflicts and threats. This issue is emphasized in the report published by the Parliamentary Review Group on Finland's Security Environment in March. According to the report, the Strategy is inconsistent in pointing to the social and socioeconomic root causes of threats such as territorial conflicts, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, but not addressing these causes sufficiently in the practical conclusions concerning EU policies. The value of civilian means as a specific strength of the EU is also emphasized in the report. The Review Group expects the EU to pay more attention to the connections between the causes of conflicts, preventive action and civilian crisis management.<sup>16</sup>

### ***Adopting a Global Approach to Security***

Last but certainly not least, Finland has a special interest in the strengthening of the EU's policy towards neighboring countries in the east. Russia obviously continues to have a distinct

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<sup>16</sup> Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän raportti, Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 9/2004.

place in the Finnish Security and Defense Policy, but it needs to be underlined that the relative importance of the eastern neighbor in comparison to the Cold War period has dramatically diminished. Finland stresses the importance of values and norms as a basis for the EU-Russia partnership, and expects the Union to develop a clearer strategy accompanied with practical guidelines towards Russia.

On the whole, perhaps one of the most notable shifts in the Finnish security discourse in recent years is an increasing understanding of national security in global terms. The relative weight of traditional territorial defense and of the regional context has decreased respectively, or rather, the national and regional aspects of security have become intertwined with the new global concerns – quoting Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen: “... the means for achieving [national] security are all but isolation. [...] it is a fact that terrorism and global crises concern us. We cannot escape them even if we try. We have to choose whether we want to be part of the problem or of its solution. We are involved in any case.”<sup>17</sup> Finland has thus taken on board one of the key messages of the ESS: The security of Europeans needs to be safeguarded by a common global policy.

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<sup>17</sup> Vanhanen, *op.cit.*

## **II. Interview with Dr. Heusgen on the Genesis of the ESS**

Hanns Maull and Marco Overhaus interviewed Dr. Christoph Heusgen on the genesis of the European Security Strategy. As Head of the Secretariat's Political Section in the Council of the European Union Heusgen was directly involved in the process.

*Q: The European Security Strategy [ESS] was written against the background of Europe's division over the war in Iraq. Could you please briefly sketch the genesis of the Strategy and the process of its drafting?*

Heusgen: The intra-European dispute in the course of the Iraq crisis was the trigger for the drafting of the European Security Strategy. All those involved were convinced that such an open dispute should not be allowed to repeat itself. The Strategy was intended to function as political guidance for the (European) management of possible similar crises in the future. Germany, France and Great Britain launched the idea which was subsequently endorsed by the Greek Presidency (and most notably by Foreign Minister Papandreou). At the beginning of May 2003, Javier Solana and his staff – which consists of representatives from all EU member countries – was given the mandate to table a first draft. Member countries were asked to provide the input, but were not allowed to participate directly in the drafting of the text. Solana published the first version of the Strategy in June 2003 on the occasion of the European Council in Thessaloniki, after which he was asked by the Heads of State and Government to work on the final version. In the following process, member countries were involved, most notably through a series of three seminars which focused on the most important issue areas of the Strategy – threat perception analysis, strategic goals and consequences for the EU – which took place in Rome, Paris and Stockholm respectively. On the basis of the seminars' results Javier Solana published a revised version which was finally adopted – with only minor changes to it – by the Brussels' European Council in December 2003.

*Q: Do you think that the Strategy Paper will contribute to the European Union and its member states speaking with a single voice and acting accordingly should a similar crisis surface again? If so, how?*

Heusgen: There is no guarantee that the Union will act differently than in 2002/ 2003 should another similar crisis happen. Yet, the European Security Strategy increases the chances that such an internal row will not repeat itself. The Strategy makes a common analysis of security threats and challenges much easier and it delineates ways of dealing with them. On the Balkans, the European Union has already demonstrated that it has the ability to learn from past experience. While it was split when the Yugoslav crisis broke out at the beginning of the 1990s, it has today found a clear and common policy for that volatile region.

*Q: The terms „preventive engagement“ and „effective multilateralism“ denote two core issues of the Strategy, which still leave ample room for interpretation. Do you see a consensus emerging among member states on the concrete meaning of these two terms?*

Heusgen: There is a high degree of consensus among member countries concerning the meaning of both terms in the Strategy Paper. “Preventive engagement” denotes an early intervention by the EU when a crisis appears on the horizon, as happened in the case of Macedonia in the spring of 2001. “Engagement” includes all means at the disposal of the Union and its member states: political, diplomatic, and economic means, development assistance, but also instruments of civil and military crisis management. “Effective multilateralism” has to be seen as the opposite of non-legitimate unilateralism. The supplement “effective” is important here. With it, the Union commits itself not only to contributing to the creation of effective international norms and rules but also to ensuring their implementation and compliance with them – again with the whole spectrum of those means available to it.

*Q: How do you judge the drafting process of the ESS in general? Do you see it as a model for future decision-making and planning within the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy?*

Heusgen: When foreign ministers tasked Javier Solana to write the Strategy Paper, they gave him an advance in trust (Vertrauensvorschuss). He has clearly justified this trust in his work, since all member countries were very content with the results. Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that the “Method Security Strategy” will be used in the future more frequently. This means that the High Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy – and later the EU Foreign Minister – has a mandate which he or she implements in close

coordination with member countries without the pitfalls of “drafting by committee” where national governments haggle over every single comma in the text.

*Q: Which role did Germany play in the initiation and drafting process of the Strategy and in what ways, if any, could it leave its footprints on the outcome?*

Heusgen: Foreign Minister Fischer was among the initiators of the European Security Strategy, and Germany was also engaged during the first drafting phase. The fact that the document stresses conflict prevention as an essential goal of European policy and emphasizes the importance of non-military instruments for crisis management reflects German core concerns.

*Q: Recently, some commentators have complained that Germany needs a national security strategy first before it can effectively participate in the formulation of an European security strategy. Do you agree with this argumentation?*

Heusgen: A „German national security strategy“ would suggest that Germany can provide autonomously for its security. An analysis of the most important threats which Germany is currently facing – terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts (e.g. in the Middle East) – makes it clear that these threats can only be tackled in the European context. Thus, it would be of little use if Germany were to develop its own strategy. Instead, Berlin should consistently commit itself to the implementation of the European Security Strategy.

(English Translation by Marco Overhaus)

### **III. Book Review**

Dyson, Kenneth/ Goetz, Klaus H. (Eds.) (2003): *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint*. Oxford.

*Reviewed by Sebastian Harnisch*

This volume brings together a comprehensive and original set of analysis on the effects of EU membership on Germany's polity, politics and policy-making. The "Europeanization of Germany" drew considerable scholarly attention in the 1990s, but so far there had been no consistent and systematic effort like this one. In short, the volume not only constitutes the state of the art on the Europeanization of Germany but also provides ample food for thought both empirically and theoretically. It combines three analytical sections (Europeanization of Germany's polity, Germany's politics and public policies) and two theoretical ones: a conceptual one with essays by Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz outlining the argument of the book and a critical reflection of Jeffrey Anderson on the concept of Europeanization and a comparative one in which the editors summarize the core findings and evaluate them vis-à-vis other recent research.

In their introduction Dyson and Goetz argue that recent scholarship on Europeanization has driven the concept too far with the inclusion of such concepts as "integration", "political unification" and "convergence" and by mixing different levels of analysis. They hold that a more limited concept that gives analytical primacy to the impact of European integration on German domestic politics (download of European norms onto the Germany level) will produce better results. Rather than focusing on the question of "fit/misfit" between the German and European regulatory schemes, the interrelationship between material interests and their ideational effects, they hope that this parsimonious understanding of Europeanization will help the volume's authors to identify patterns of co-existence/co-evolution, constraints and contestation between the German and the EU level.

The findings of the empirical chapters suggest that change on the domestic polity level (identities and interest groups) as a response to European integration has been modest. In the polity section the analysis by Oskar Niedermayer on Germany's party system reveals no noticeable changes. Rainer Eising, in his chapter on interest groups, agrees and argues that European integration generally reaffirms domestic power structures rather than upsetting them.

A slightly different perspective is taken by Klaus Goetz (Executive), Charlie Jeffrey (The Länder), Thomas Saalfeld (Bundestag) and Gunnar Schuppert (Public Law) in the section on German politics and Europeanization. They find that an Europeanization effect is clearly discernible but they posit that it varies over time and policy areas, e.g. Goetz identifies a “Europe of administrations” (i.e. officials meeting regularly in EU committees) rather than a “Europe of the executives”.

This pattern of differentiated if modest Europeanization also characterizes Germany’s public policies. As Simon Bulmer et al. maintain in their analysis of electricity and telecommunication policy, substantial normative change in telecommunication policy occurred while overall regime liberalization was incremental. In the electricity market, Berlin was able to shape the European reform effort thus limiting adaptation pressures. In contrast Jörg Monar finds in the chapter on Justice and Home Affairs that Germany is less europeanized than one may expect given its previous leading role in pushing European integration (p. 322). Alister Miskimmon and Willie Paterson maintain that Berlin continuously pushed for a common European defense as one of the key issues concerning the finality of European integration in the 1990s, but that the firm public and elite support for CFSP and the fact that it is associated with the foreign ministry have been balanced by the influence of the “traditional transatlanticism in the defense ministry” and by the lack of other EU member states functioning as an external agent for deeper integration in this policy field.

In their conclusion Dyson and Goetz complement the empirically rich and analytically deep chapters by pointing out the key findings: Germany’s declining ability to shape the regional milieu (Bulmer/Jeffery/Paterson 2000) because of apparent weakness of the German model and the loss of Germany’s gatekeeper role in the enlarged European Union, the ensuing domestic debate on the constraining effects of EU membership and the subsequent increase in contesting Germany’s traditional pro-European policy. The editors identify the Länder, the Federal Constitutional Court and domestic interest groups as the major source of contestation and they rightly claim that there is a growing gap between pro-European policies and German politics that resists further Europeanization, e.g. the party system and the Bundestag (p. 366). These empirical and analytical findings are complemented by a comparative contextualization that reveals that the “German case” is far closer to that of other North Western European states in both “uploading and downloading” that has been acknowledged before. Theoretically, Dyson and Goetz stress that their one-way approach to Europeanization (focusing on

downloading European norms, institutions and policies to the domestic level) has yielded strong evidence, but they rightly cede that Europeanization is an interactive process that must involve both up- and downloading processes. They also find that Europeanization does not require a misfit of EU and domestic level institutions as a precondition.

In sum, this volume constitutes a timely and thorough set of systematic studies by well-known experts on Germany's EU policy. The strength of the compilation lies in its systematic approach and its concise operationalization. Thus it is a must read for any advanced student and scholar on Germany's EU policy.

## IV. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Documents

This section contains the relevant documents which our authors refer to in their respective contributions. We do not claim to give a full compilation of all relevant sources on the issue at hand.

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