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At least in political terms, Germany is now pulling its weight in Europe's new effort to build a common security and defence policy: it has participated (if modestly) in NATO's intervention in Kosovo, and it is beginning to restructure the Bundeswehr into a leaner but meaner force, shifting the emphasis towards fewer but more professional, more mobile and better equipped soldiers, towards a more developed command and control structure and towards power projection. While not denying the key role played by the Franco-British rapprochement in European defence matters (witness the Saint-Malo summit in Dec.1998) , it should be recognised that Berlin, too, had pushed for new initiatives in this field. As our correspondents note, this is indeed acknowledged by Germany's key partners and allies. Yet there also remains a hefty dose of scepticism, both inside and outside Germany, about Berlin´s willingness and ability to turn good intentions into military realities. We hear this from Steve Szabo from Washington, from John Roper and Kerry Longhurst from the UK, from Jean-Pierre Froehly concerning France, and also from Vladimir Handl and Olaf Osica from Central Eastern Europe. Reinhard Wolf echoes this view from inside Germany, while Wolfgang Brauner, while also noting the problem, marshals the case for optimism. Since the Kosovo crisis, progress on building a European security and defence identity has been remarkably swift, perhaps deceptively so: the achievements so far have been primarily political, the really difficult financical and practical hurdles are still to be taken. Germany has played an active role in shaping the political and military contours of ESDI. This may seem very surprising, as the purported objective of those policy initiatives is to endow Europe with its own, autonomous power projection capabilities. This smacks of a Europe committed to becoming a Great Power in a rather traditional sense. Where does this leave Germany, supposedly a "civilian power"? Are we witnessing, as Charles Kupchan has argued, a "quiet revolution in German politics", and Berlin´s "...return (!) to the mainstream" of European security and defence policies?(1) To this observer, the changes in Germany´s security posture are rather less dramatic(2). That Germany would seize an opportunity to push for deeper European integration in any new promising area is entirely consistent with its traditional post-war orientations; and that it should share the focus on foreign and security policy as the "new frontier" for the European project is also not very surprising: there aren´t many policy areas left, and CFSP figured on many people´s shortlists for "things to do" in European integration as early as the 1980s. One of those shortlists belonged to Jacques Delors at the time when he prepared to take the helm at the European Commission in 1985. Other items on this list, which eventually crowded out the CFSP idea, were the completion of the single European market and European monetary union. The surprise about Germany´s willingness to join this push for a European Security and Defence Policy is a bit difficult to understand: Germany´s (admittedly real) "culture of restraint" on military matters did not stop the FRG from fielding NATO´s largest conventional European armed forces during the Cold War. And this defence posture was by no means incompatible with being a "civilian power" - the concept always referred to how military power is organised (in Germany´s case, resolutely multilateral, with a high level of political and military integration and a complete renunciation of national military options) and to what ends (collective war avoidance through deterrence), not to its abolition. Thus, there is rather less drama than meets the eye in Germany´s new defence posture. Germany´s "culture of restraint" in security policy matters therefore continues to be relevant. The most obvious issue here is whether Germany will be willing to put its money where its mouth is on security policy reforms(3). This is the issue which our correspondents from both inside and outside Germany discuss at some length, with a generally sceptical undertone (though note the arguments for optimism put forward by Wolfgang Brauner). This scepticism is also shared by Philip Gordon in his contribution to the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs, in which he argues - rightly, in my view - that the Europeans are too much obsessed with institution-building, rather than with capability enhancement(4). The second dimension of the present debate on ESDP concerns the finality of European military power. This debate has hardly begun, for obvious political reasons: the political leaders of the European Union preferred to shelve this contentious debate because they knew that this would likely stop the whole project in its tracks(5). They thus contented themselves with defining the ESDP´s rationale by referring to the "Petersberg tasks". Yet this reference does not, as François Heisbourg has pointed out, clarify anything(6). Nor does the debate about whether Europe should enable itself to act autonomously, or whether it should stick to NATO as its principal repository of security, help to answer this question: at some point, Europe will have to come clear as to what (beyond collective defence) it wants to do with its military power. This question will have to be answered regardless as to the context for joint military action - be it NATO or the European Union. In this newsletter, Reinhard Wolf explicitly addresses this question - and counsels modesty and moderation for the EU´s military ambitions. What could be the purposes of European military power? In this rapidly changing international environment, the answers cannot but be tentative and highly uncertain. Yet recent experience provides a few pointers. It suggests that military power projection capabilities will be needed to create options for military intervention - to rescue Western nationals, to prevent or contain the escalation of military conflict in strategically sensitive areas, and to halt mass murder or mass starvation. It also suggests, however, that intervention will have only limited effects on the underlying causes of the contingency (after all, both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic are still in power!), often forcing the international community to set up international protectorates to rebuild the political and economic institutions needed for peace and self-sustainable development. While military interventions by the international community or NATO have on balance been modestly successful (though with an awful lot of bad experiences on the way, and some clear failures), "post-conflict rehabilitation" is still very much of an unfinished business. Nor has the international community, or NATO, been very effective in conflict prevention - and both prevention and post-conflict resolution mostly require non-military, rather than military means. Realistically speaking, the European Union will have its platter of security problems full with Balkan matters for the foreseeable future, even if it continues to get some help from non-European NATO members and others. The former Yugoslavia will probably absorb much of Europe´s old and new military capabilities for years, if not decades to come. But the key issues to a successful pacification and integration of the Balkans into the European zone of peace and stability will be non-military: a continued military presence will be a necessary, but far from a sufficient condition for Western success in that region. Europe would thus be well-advised not to create unrealistic expectations about its future military role, and to distance itself firmly from any notions of becoming a military Great Power, which will be neither feasible, nor necessary or desirable. Rather, Europe should continue to give priority to non-military over military security policies, hopefully within a framework of division of labour acceptable to the United States. As a civilian power, Germany would and could be comfortable with this. (1) Kupchan, Charles A., In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective, in: Survival, 42:2 (Summer 2000), pp.16-32 (2)This argument is developed in Maull, Hanns W., Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ´Civilian Power`?, in: Survival, 42:2 (Summer 2000), pp.56-80 (3) In fact, this metaphor may not be entirely apt. Germany´s interest in ESDP is political, rather than military, it is defined by the desire to promote European integration, rather than European power projection capabilities. The political decisions and arrangements needed to set up a European defence are relatively cheap. It is the military implementation which will be costly. (4) Gordon, Philip H.: Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work, in: FA 79:4 (Aug./Sept.2000), pp.12-17 (5) Jolyon Howorth, Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, in: Survival, 42:2 (Summer 2000), pp.33-55 (6) Heisbourg, François, Europe´s Strategic Ambitions: the Limits of Ambiguity, in: Survival, 42:2 (Summer 2000), pp.5-15
1. The German Perspective I: Rhetoric or Substance? Germany and the Future of Europe's Common Security and Defense Policy by Reinhard Wolf Germany along with France and, surprisingly, Britain has recently pushed for an increased European role in security and defense policy. This renewed effort has resulted in wide-ranging institutional reforms and ambitious force goals aiming to give the EU a genuine military capacity. However, on closer inspection it appears more than doubtful that these aims will be attained. Germany in particular seems unwilling to match visionary rhetoric with adequate funding for its armed forces. Like most other EU members, Berlin faces tight budgetary constraints which leave little leeway for additional military procurement. As long as structural deficits are not in line with the requirements of monetary union, and as long as the United States remains a loyal NATO ally, Germany should bridge the gap between rhetoric and substance by cutting back its force goals rather than compromising plans for achieving a balanced budget. No doubt, over the last two years, the European Union has made substantial progress in its efforts to create a Common Security and Defense Policy. Britain's new willingness to see the EU become a military actor in its own right has cleared the way for both substantial institutional reforms and ambitious European force goals. At the Helsinki summit, the European Council resolved to give the EU new institutions for military decision- making. By the year 2003 the Union is supposed to have its own Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee consisting of national chiefs of staff or their representatives, and a EU military staff. In the interim, informal institutions will be set up to smoothen the transition to the new structure. In contrast to past efforts for strengthening Europe's security role, at Helsinki EU leaders not only focused on institutional reforms but also gave serious attention to strengthening Europe's military capabilities. In the wake of the Kosovo intervention with its all too obvious display of Europe's dependence on U.S. power, the heads of states and governments called for the creation of a state of the art force for out-of-area operations. By the year 2003, EU members want to have the capability to field an intervention force of up to 60 000 soldiers within 60 days for a duration of up to one year or more. Such a capacity not only requires a total reaction force of 180 000 soldiers but also heavy investment in new equipment. Thus, the European Council decided to strengthen Europe's weak strategic air and sea lift capabilities and to provide for improved monitoring, early warning, sustainability and survivability. These force goals, however, will hardly be reached within the envisioned period. According to an estimate of Klaus Naumann, former chairman of NATO's military committee, the planned EU force may not be ready before the year 2010. Obviously, the greatest impediment is the staggering cost of the new military assets required. American experts calculate the expenditures merely for the required transport capabilities at some 50 billion Euro. Modernizing the forces themselves will cost at least as much, if not much more. For reasons outlined below, EU member states in general and Germany in particular seem very unlikely to foot such hefty bills. During the last decade, European defense budgets have actually stagnated or even shrunken, and this will hardly change in the years to come. Most European governments have little room for increased military expenditures. For one thing, several other EU projects severely limit their flexibility. Thus, eastern enlargement will cost tens of billions of Euros. On top of those financial transfers may have to come further billions to fund the new Balkan Stability Pact. But the commitments undertaken in the context of setting up EMU oblige member governments to balance budgets over the long run. Reducing public deficits is essential not only for increasing the markets' confidence in the stability of the Euro, but also for leaving national governments some leeway for deficit-spending in times of economic downturns. The latter option could be vital for sparing governments the ugly choice between mounting unemployment and jeopardizing monetary union. Unfortunately, even now, during a period of rather high growth and before the start of large-scale defense procurement, most member states face rising structural deficits. Thus, the European Central Bank and the Bundesbank have called for increased saving efforts. As a result, for the time being the EU faces an unpleasant choice between creating an autonomous intervention capacity and securing the future of monetary union. In contrast to former decades, Europe's largest economy will not be able to alleviate this financial dilemma. Germany can no longer compensate for other countries' reluctance to contribute. Instead, this time its economic and military condition contributes to make the prospects for European security and defence cooperation bleak. The Bundeswehr had to cope both with the task of merging two armies and with substantial budget cuts brought about by the staggering costs of unification. Diminished funding and the integration of East Germany's forces have resulted in a huge investment backlog. According to the German Defence Ministry, it has now reached 30 billion Deutsche Mark in infrastructure and military equipment. Underfunding and conservative attitudes on the part of both major parties have prevented timely adjustments of the force structure. Ten years after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Bundeswehr is still an army based on universal conscription and geared towards territorial defense rather than out-of-area missions. German officials, therefore, readily admit that the country's armed forces are no longer up to alliance requirements ("nicht mehr bündnisfähig"). It remains to be seen if the planned reform of the Bundeswehr will significantly enhance Germany's capacity for peacekeeping and power projection operations. To be sure, current plans envision more than a doubling of crisis reaction forces. A new national command will be set up to conduct combined German or multinational reaction forces. The army will be professionalized and the number of drafted soldiers will be sharply reduced. Yet it is far from clear that these additional reaction units will be able to use state of the art equipment. Restructuring and professionalisation will not come for free. At least in the short term, structural adjustments will not lead to savings that could be spent on investment - rather, they will push up overall costs. As the Schröder government has made it clear that reducing the budget deficit will remain a top priority, the next defense budgets will almost certainly be subject to the same criticism which former General Klaus Naumann leveled against the most recent one: They will probably be "absolutely insufficient to meet the requirements of Helsinki". Germany's government therefore is neither living up to its own European rhetoric nor to the requirements of NATO membership. But does it perhaps give priority to the wrong project? Should Berlin or any other EU member really accept larger public deficits as a price for more powerful intervention forces? As things stand now, the priority for fiscal retrenchment makes sense. Whatever grim scenarios defense enthusiasts may come up with, at the time of this writing there is no clear and present danger that would require an independent European reaction force. Monetary union, on the other hand, is already with us today. Should it unravel due to prolific military spending, the consequences for European integration would be hard to predict. Conceivably, a collapse of EMU would have grave repercussions for all fields of European integration, including the defense dimension. As long as European forces can still make a valuable contribution to US-led NATO operations, budgetary limits should therefore take precedence over ambitions of military interdependence, let alone the pursuit of European grandeur. 2. The German perspective II: Germany's Europeanised Role in the Development of ESDP by Wolfgang Brauner The main thesis that is to be presented here is that German foreign policy is fundamentally Europeanised and that this Europeanisation also explains the role Germany has played in the development of ESDP. This affects all dimensions of German foreign policy: the institutional framework, the decision-making process and the substance. The large majority of the political elite in Germany perceives this Europeanisation of security and defence policy as the "logical" consequence of European integration and an essential element in deepening Political Union. Thus, it is impossible to understand the role Germany has played in the development of ESDP outside of the broader context of European integration. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the development of the security and defence dimension of the EU and the WEU have formed an integral part of the CFSP. Its common principles, values, norms, rules and interests have facilitated learning processes among the EU member states. They have come to recognise that by acting collectively they can defend their common interests more effectively. In crisis management, CFSP is credible and thus effective only if it is backed by military force. That lesson was painfully learned in Bosnia and Kosovo. From the German perspective, ESDP is about providing the EU with the means to help stabilise the continent as a whole. The development of an autonomous capability for crisis prevention and management serves to provide the EU with the means necessary to be able to intervene military in violent conflicts. In fact, it has been one of the major lessons learnt from the experience in Bosnia and Kosovo that in crisis managment CFSP can be fully effective only if it is credible; and it is credible only if it is backed by military force and the capacity to use it autonomously. Indeed this capacity has to exist precisely to be able to avoid using it as long as possible. From the German point of view, the objective of ESDP thus is to enable the EU to present a European solution to European problems. It is not about power projection on a global scale in the sense of a "European Great Power", as a number of authors argue. At the end of this process, the EU might well be the only international organisation in the world that possesses the whole range of instruments that are necessary for effective crisis prevention and management. Since this is frequently neglected, it has to be emphasised that the non-military and civilian dimension forms an integral part of ESDP. It was at the insistence of Germany and the Scandinavian countries that this aspect of ESDP was developed alongside the military intervention. The measures to be taken include, among others, the development of a police force of 5000, an increase in the financial resources and the further institutionalisation of this dimension. For Germany, ESDP thus is not only about integration but also about acquiring the means necessary for credible and thus effective European crisis management, both in the military and the civilian dimension. The logic that is applied here is that of a pooling and sharing of resources and sovereignty. Germany has come to the conclusion that ESDP is not only more efficient in terms of inputs (instruments, resources) but also more effective in terms of outputs (impact on the resolution of a conflict) than uni- or bilateral measures. In contrast to the United States, no European country has the resources or the political will to conduct effective crisis management operations by itself. There is an almost unanimous consensus in Germany that NATO should remain the decisive security organisation in Europe. Thus, the purpose of ESDP is not to enter into competition with the Alliance or even to undermine it, but to strengthen it. In fact, for Germany as well as for all other major European actors, the problem with the Alliance is not that the US is too strong but that Europe is too weak. ESDP and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) thus both have the same goal: to strengthen NATO by strengthening the European pillar within it. While the details of the arrangement still have to be worked out, ESDP could ideally lead to a "win-win-situation" (NATO Secretary General Robertson). In this scenario, ESDP would strengthen NATO by reinforcing the European capacities and closing the technology-gap, thereby leading to a more equal burden-sharing within the Alliance. On the other hand, this reinforcement would no doubt also increase the relative weight of Europe within NATO. Thus, the underlying logic of ESDI, ESDP's predecessor, still remains in place. While Britain and France so far have been the leaders in the development of ESDP, Germany has been more than a merely passive follower. It has actively supported the development of ESDP during its presidency of the EU and the WEU in the first half of 1999. For example, the proposal that Javier Solana should also be nominated as the Secretary General of the WEU originated with Foreign Minister Fischer in early 1999. Only a small minority within the Green Party, parts of the PDS and what remains of the so-called "peace movement" criticise the ESDP as a ploy to "militarise" the EU by enabling it to intervene abroad and to develop the European arms industry. According to Foreign Minister Fischer, ESDP (as an integral part of CFSP) today represents, together with the enlargement process, the major project for the integration of the EU. This view has to be seen in the context of a reorientation of Germany's policies towards European integration: With the completion of the Common Market and EMU, the main focus of European integration has begun to shift from the internal to the external dimension of the EU and from "negative" to "positive" integration. As far as peace and security are concerned, the main objective of European integration remains the desire to avoid a return of a European history characterised by fragmentation and violent conflict. One might say that the EU currently is about to "externalise" the main lessons that member states have collectively internalised over the past decades. But will Germany be able to put its money where its convictions are? While the political development of ESDP has been impressively swift , the military and financial problems still remain to be resolved. Will the reform of the Bundeswehr be sufficient to equip Germany with the means necessary to make a significant contribution to ESDP? Present funding for the Bundeswehr appears insufficient to allow Germany to meet its obligations within NATO and ESDP. The agreement between Defence Minister Scharping and Finance Minister Eichel however seems likely to slightly increase the budget over the next two years. According to this agreement, the Bundeswehr will benefit one hundred per cent from lower operating costs and will receive 80 per cent of the revenues generated from the sale of land, buildings and equipment (in 2001 up to a total amount of DM 1 billion and in 2002 up to DM 1.2 billion). Finally, the DM 2 billion earmarked for crisis management operations are transferred to the defence budget, part of which can be used for investments. In sum, the basic idea of the Defence Ministry is to finance the necessary additional investment outlays by savings realised during the second half of the restructuring process (which is to be completed by 2006). Interestingly, this method corresponds to the one that was proposed by the so-called Weizsäcker-Commission. Germany has already indicated its willingness to contribute 15 000 - 20 000 troops to Europe's rapid reaction corps and to cover 15-20 per cent of the total cost. This commitment will be confirmed at a conference at the end of this year, where the member states will have to detail their contribution to ESDP. Given the importance that Germany attaches to this major project of integration, it seems highly unlikely that it will renege on the responsibilities which ESDP entails. Otherwise, Berlin would severely undermine its credibility and thereby weaken its ability to deepen integration in other areas, such as institutional reform and enlargement, to which it attaches high priorities. Germany's vigorous participation in, and contribution to, ESDP will be facilitated by the close complementarity of Germany's and the EU's defence and security "culture". Even after the realisation of ESDP, the EU is likely to remain a "civilian power". As things stand now, the German "culture of restraint" seems set to be transferred to the European level. Several factors support this expectation: the growing reluctance of modern democracies to risk the life of their citizens, the rising costs (including the political costs) of military intervention, the fact that the prevention and management of crises by non-military means may often be more effective and significantly less costly than military interventions, the ESDP's complex institutional set-up and diversity of views among participating countries are all likely to slow down the decision-making process and closely circumscribe the use of military means at Europe's disposal. 3. The French Perspective: France's Position towards ESDI and ESDP by Jean-Pierre Froehly A Franco-British engine Unsurprisingly, France has to be considered as one of the main promoters of ESDP since, in 1998, Great-Britain has lifted its veto on discussing defence matters in a European framework outside of NATO. Given the interruption of the Franco-German dialogue on defence matters following France's decision in 1996 to professionalize its armies, today's European decisions on ESDP are to a large extent the result of a "Franco-British engine" (the summit of Saint-Malo in December 1998 as far as the general shift towards autonomous European defence capacities, the summit of London in November 1999 as far as the creation of a European Crisis reaction Corps is concerned). Even if Germany successfully joined this "Franco-British dynamic" during its EU-Presidency (leading to the decisions of the Cologne Summit), one cannot ignore the structural asymmetry that exists between Germany on the one and France and Great-Britain on the other hand concerning the strategic orientations of the countries' armies. France's expectations concerning Germany One of the main concerns in France is the fear that Germany could structurally not be ready to fulfil the Helsinki summit's headline goals. As far as the "political capacities" are concerned, the French strategic community recognises the enormous progress of the German debate during the Kosovo conflict which leads, step by step, to a shared culture of power projection for humanitarian reasons. However, as far as Germany's ability to participate in Petersberg operations and the general orientations of its defence budget are concerned, France doubts the credibility of the Bundeswehr. In 1999, Germany has spent five billion dollars less than France and ten billion dollars less than Britain on defence. Furthermore, the defence budget is in qualitative terms not adapted to power projection. Concerning the current debate on the reform of the Bundeswehr, the French strategic community wonders whether such a reform could be compatible with cuts in defence spending. François Heisbourg thus warns that Germany could take on the role of a Trittbrettfahrer within the future ESDP. As far as procurement related to transport and observation is concerned, some progress has recently been made by the German decision to buy 75 of Airbus' A400M transport aircraft and to install an independent European satellite observation system together with France. France welcomes the German demand-side commitment towards the European defence industry (thus giving up projects to build the transport aircraft in cooperation with Russia and Ukraine), which has been restructured on the supply-side around a Franco-German core (EADS). France between NATO's ESDI and EU's ESDP The orientations of the ESDP perfectly met the longstanding French desire to create autonomous European defence capacities outside of NATO. For the first time since France has left the NATO military organisation (while remaining a member of the Alliance), the end of the Cold War has been seen by French decision makers as the moment to realise the project of an independent European defence. However, in the early 1990's, France was unable to avoid NATO's adaptation to the post Cold War situation (reform and "go-ahead" for enlargement) and to transform WEU into the main European security organisation, which was mainly due to the strong British reluctance and to the German unwillingness to weaken NATO. As a result of this situation and of the steady rapprochement between France and NATO's structures in the Yugoslav conflict, France's "new NATO policy" since 1995 has to be seen as an attempt to "Europeanise" NATO from inside by influencing the discussions on NATO's European pillar. This attempt failed for two reasons: First, from a French viewpoint, NATO's decisions to create ESDI within NATO gave the US a droit de regard on European operations, by way of the vote in the Atlantic Council (thus giving the US the right to veto ESDI) and by way of the lukewarm independence of the European deputy SACEUR (the US rejected the French proposal of a "Super-commando" including a European SACEUR). Therefore, ESDI was considered rather as an "Americanisation" of the European Pillar than as a real "Europeanisation" of NATO. Secondly, the modified French position, claiming a strategic NATO command for a European general (AFSOUTH in Naples), was rejected by the US in principle, while negotiations - including important French concessions - were interrupted by France's general elections and by the beginning of the "cohabitation" in May 1997. However, during the period 1997-1998, ESDI, organised around CJTF (with own double-headed command structures open to French participation), seemed to be able to reconcile in fine the "old NATO", to which France remained hostile and the "new NATO", intervening out-of-area, to which France came closer via the Yugoslavian conflict. France's preferences for the development of ESDP Despite a significant participation by France, the Kosovo conflict revealed the lack of autonomous European capacities and the strong role of NATO in European crisis management. The very nature of the Kosovo conflict pushed France to abandon its position towards NATO's New Strategic Concept, namely to insist on a mandate by the UN Security Council prior to any NATO operation. Furthermore, unlike the Madrid Summit in 1997, France did not insist on further NATO enlargement towards Romania and Slovenia. However, the American insistence on stronger European participation in European crisis management has been considered by the French strategic community as a chance to balance the transatlantic partnership outside of NATO. Therefore, France has stressed from the very beginning the "necessary duplication in the fields of observation, command and strategic transport" (Defence Minister Richard). Even if the Cologne summit went clearly in this direction, France's proposal of "convergence criteria" in order to ensure the necessary budgetary efforts could not find a majority among the EU member states (Defence Minister Alain Richard even proposed criteria on "operational capacities"). At the same time, France rapidly focused on the creation of autonomous European institutions for ESDP. Contrary to the American position, France also stressed the necessary duplication concerning the decision making process in ESDP. President Jacques Chirac's plan d'action, presented to EU partners in August 1999, followed a logic by which Europe should be able to act without consent by the US. This contradicted the position of some European partners, fearing that an autonomous ESDP could weaken the transatlantic partnership. While substantial elements of the plan were adopted by the Helsinki Summit (witness the setting-up of a Political and Security Committee and a permanent military committee), the French attempt to build ESDP without parallel discussions with NATO had to be abandoned in spring 2000, when the implementation of working groups between EU and NATO was decided. ESDP and France's Presidency of the EU During its EU Presidency, France will continue to realise the headline goals. As far as the European rapid reaction corps is concerned, the aim is to realise effective military evaluation, permitting each state to determine its own concrete participation. Therefore, a "Conference of engagement" will be held in November, followed by a General Affairs Council (including Foreign and Defence ministers). As far as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, consultations between will be pursued to assure the contribution by non-EU NATO members (mainly Norway and Turkey). As far as defence budgets are concerned, France might introduce "coherence indicators", that would not apply to budgetary efforts but to progress on concrete military capacities. Furthermore, France could work in favour of the establishment of a third command chain specifically designed for the EU. On the operational level, progress has to be made concerning the permanent European General Staff, which is supposed to be operational by the beginning or the middle of next year. Finally, the Rapid Reaction Corps should be fully operational by the end of 2003. 4. The British Perspective: Building European Defence Capability: The Impact of Reforms in German Security Policy by John Roper and Kerry Longhurst There has been widespread support among security specialists in Britain over the past decade for the direction of change in German security policy and an acceptance that Germany has already made substantial changes in redefining the tasks of her armed forces to enable them to play a substantial role, alongside allies, in crisis management in Europe. Despite this general approval, many in Britain, like others of Germany's allies and partners, regret the slow pace of Bundeswehr reforms, often because they fail to appreciate the tight parameters and limited resources within which German policy makers have to work. In Britain, as in other major Western countries, there is a welcome for Germany's commitment to playing a fuller role, not least because this would help address the shortfall in her own manpower provisions. However, despite general approval of Germany's plans, many in Britain are prone to expect the Germans to realise their reforms sooner rather than later. We will attempt to draw out what are seen in Britain as being Germany's broad vision and objectives in European security, and point to the principal differences between British and German positions. Recent German plans for Bundeswehr reform and ESDP initiatives will then be examined in the light of the British debate. While relatively little debate actually exists within the UK on German security policy specifically, what does exist tends to be within the broader framework of the discussion on European security. German / British Visions of European Security The German conception of European security architecture, as seen from Britain, is to provide the EU with a defence component serving the goals of a common European foreign policy, but limited to operating in a regional capacity in and around Europe, rather than globally as a partner of the US. Such European capabilities would be 'separable' but not separated from those of NATO. This is seen in Britain as indicating that Germany in deciding between her two strategic priorities, European integration and alliance with the US, is shifting from the middle-ground towards the promotion of a more robust European aptitude. Secondly, it would appear that Germany's long term objective of developing an effective CFSP for the European Union is now matched with a commitment to provide a credible military component for such a policy. The chief difference between the British and German positions here is that the UK would wish to see European military force prepared to operate over a wider geographical area and is resistant to any further institutional integration in the European Union. Thus while in their immediate objectives there is a parallelism between Britain and Germany there may be a contradiction in the longer term with Britain advocating a global role for Europe as contrasted with Germany's regional approach, and Germany pushing for clearer institutional structures contrasting with a British aversion to federalism. Recent German Proposals and Perspectives on ESDP The pattern of the recent proposals for Bundeswehr' reforms are in many ways in line with and complementary to those already implemented by Germany's principal allies and partners, including Britain. British commentators note that they address a number of key criteria expected of Germany by NATO, namely a heightened level of readily deployable manpower twinned with greater investment in relevant equipment. The reforms also go a long way in meeting the broader conceptual, operational and institutional objectives of European security by making the Bundeswehr more deployable and thus able to play a substantial role in regional crisis management. The enhancement of command and control structures will also make German military contributions easier to deploy. Moreover, the potential for greater funds to be devoted to equipping the Bundeswehr will help make the German armed forces more compatible with those of her European partners. Reception and Responses The strategic community within which the debate on European defence and the contribution Germany brings to this takes place is rather restricted in Britain. There is some specialist discussion in the serious press and among the Parliamentary parties, but while there have been criticisms from the Conservative party about the British Government's unprecedented move to European defence cooperation this has had very little public echo apart from passing reference in the Eurosceptic "heavy" newspapers - The Times and The Daily Telegraph. There has however been a widespread impression that in this area Britain and France have been the leaders and the Germany, in spite of the critical role she played in the preparation of the Cologne European Council of June 1999, has been a follower in the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. Despite the recent proposals for reforms in the German Atmed Forces one can find in the British debate the argument that in order to play a full part in the new challenges to European security the German government should go further in redesigning her armed forces and implement measures for change more quickly. Although Germany's partners concede that Minister Scharping's plans for the Bundeswehr are generally in the right direction, a certain skepticism is shared by analysts in the UK, US and France, that the current plans for reform do not go far enough and that they may not be fully implemented. There is thus an imbalance between these external expectations and demands upon Germany and the domestic constraints on what Germany can actually deliver. This means that a situation has transpired whereby Germany's partners are anxious to see her playing a larger role in European security than the German government is at present ready to contemplate. Conclusions Germany, as seen from Britain, has now accepted the need to make the changes to enable it to play a full role in European security, which is welcomed. The developments of the first half of 2000 have certainly been watched with a great deal of interest in Britain as in Germany's other partners, who will be equally interested in the effectiveness of their implementation, since a restructured Bundeswehr is viewed by the British government and the majority of analysts as a prerequisite for an effective European defence capability. 5. The American Perspective: American Views of Germany and a European Security and Defense Policy: Partners in Leadership or Competitors? by Stephen F. Szabo The United States has viewed Germany as its most important ally in Europe at least since the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military command in 1966/67. The Federal Republic was the political, economic and military keystone power for the US with the decline of Britain and the rivalry with France. President George Bush recognized this in his Partners in Leadership speech in Mainz in 1989, prior to the unification of Germany. German unification only enhanced the centrality of Germany to the US, both within NATO and the EU. The close German-American partnership was clear for all to see both during the Two Plus Four negotiations which led to German unification, and in the close German-American cooperation which led to the enlargement of NATO later in the 1990s. In both of these cases, the preferences of Bonn/Berlin and Washington prevailed over contrary visions and policies in London and Paris. American views of Germany's role in European security have been more ambigious and divided as Europe has begun to emerge as a serious actor first in finance and trade, and since Kosovo, in security policy. Public opinion, views in the strategic community and official policy have all reflected this divide. A strong majority of the public supports continued US engagement in Europe but would like to see a more balanced relationship in which Europe should share power more equally with the US. About eight in ten welcome strong EU leadership in world affairs and about half believe the US is too powerful and needs to be balanced by Europe. A large majority even support placing American troops under a European commander if the Europeans provide the bulk of forces in an operation. However about three of every four Americans polled believed that the US was doing more than its fair share in maintaing peace while Europe was doing too little.(1) When it comes to European unification, a majority supports European unification and only a minority fears that Europe will become a competitor of the US, but the American public is divided about Europe having a joint military force. As one study of American opinion summarized the findings, "the prospect of a European military force that could operate autonomously and that 'might do things that are not in the best interest of the US' is quite different from the prospect of sharing power in a partnership."(2) While feelings toward Germany as a nation remain positive, there is little tendency to single Germany out from Europe on these questions. The general tendency in the public toward indifference toward foreign policy issues which has accelerated since the end of the Cold War means that opinion intensity is low as these issues have low saliency. Leadership opinion, therefore, tends to be more influential than it is on domestic policy. The opinion shapers in the strategic community in general reflect these ambiguities in public opinion. There is general support for the idea of a larger European security identity and for the proposition that Europe should carry a greater burden in defense. Although skepticism about the commitment of Europe to defense remains high, the success of the Euro and the evident sentiment in Europe that it should do more in defense as a lesson of Kosovo has begun to reshape opinion in this influential segment toward taking Europe more seriously on defense. Concerns about a more independent European defense identity fall into a number of broad areas.(3) One is that NATO could lose its cohesion as the EU begins to duplicate what NATO does and might even become a rival to the alliance. Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott put this clearly in a speech in London in 1999. "We would not want to see an ESDI that comes first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO."(4) This is part of the traditional fear that a European caucus will "gang up" on the US and thwart US policies. Concerns also exist about the feasibility and commitment of European leaders to European defense. Will the nations of Europe give up sovereignty in this most vital of all areas of national policy and will they spend the money to create a credible defense capability? Many American analysts and officials fear that Europe likes to discuss architecture but is not serious about providing the resources to build the structure, and might begin a military operation which the Americans would have to finish. Another concern is for the role of non EU members of NATO such as Turkey and Norway. Finally there is a general view that security should be indivisible and there should be no division of labor in which Europe remains concerned with European regional issues and leaves the non European regional threats to the US. These concerns are reflected in the policy of the Clinton Administration known as the Three D's: Support for ESDP as long as there is no duplication of efforts or institutions, no decoupling of the European effort from NATO, and no discrimination against non EU members. Germany, the US and ESDP American policy toward ESDP remains oriented toward the bilateral rather than the EU level. The general view in Washington is that while the EU is the actor on trade and finance, defense policy remains at the intergovernmental level. The appointment of Javier Solana as EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy has not really changed this view. On defense three states matter the most, Britain, France and Germany. The general evolution of German policy toward the acceptance of a German military role outside of territorial defense has been both supported and promoted in Washington. The US government continues to see Germany as crucial in any effort to create a serious European pillar within NATO. It also relies on Germany to keep French ambitions to create a European defense force independent of the Atlantic Alliance in check and to be the guarantor that NATO remains the central institution of European security well into the new century. The decision of the EU at the Helsinki summit in December, 1999 to create a European intervention force of 60,000 men is an important step toward European credibility on defense. The German commitment of forces to that larger force and the role of German forces in Kosovo are welcome in the United States as is the general movement toward a professional military with mobile crisis reaction forces. Specialist opinion in the US has been skeptical about the continuance of a large conscript force with a continuing Central front focus. While force structure reform has been welcome, deep skepticism and concern over the reduction of defense spending in the Federal Republic is shared across the political spectrum. The Secretary of Defense, the Congress and numerous analysts in the American strategic community have all called for Germany to put more resources in defense. What may be a significant new element is an emerging consensus on both the right and the center that in return for a greater European commitment of resources and sharing of the defense burden, the US should be willing to relinquish major commands to European officers. The conservative Heritage Foundation has called for a new grand bargain in which "the United States would cede more authority to the Europeans in NATO in return for the Europeans providing more resources for their own defense."(5) Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations urges a similar bargain: "capabilities for influence."(6) While this represents mainstream thinking on Germany and ESDP, there still remains a current of concern and suspicion about the new Germany among many American leaders and the public. The abrasive relationship between the Schroeder Chancellory and the White House has caused some to worry about a new German "assertiveness." The way the first Chancellor from the postwar generation handled the appointment of a new Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and some of the more confrontational language which came out of the Chancellory during this period has caused some in the US to worry about the nature of the Berlin Republic and its leadership. The looming debate over national missile defense and other contenious issues leaves open the possibility for more breaks between Berlin and Washington. This is the other side of the coin of more German leadership but those who urge a greater European leadership role in defense should also be prepared to hear a louder voice both in Brussels and Berlin. America must also make adjustments in its leadership style if it is serious about Partners in Leadership. (1) For a summary of a number of public opinion polls on these issues see, Steven Kull, Seeking a New Balance: A Study of American and European Public Attitudes on Transatlantic Issues (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland: College Park, Maryland, June 1998) pp. 4-13. (2) Koll, Ibid., p. 21. (3) For a good description of American concerns see Charles Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective," Survival 42 (Summer 2000): 1-17; and Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and European Defence Chaillot Papers, No. 39 (Paris: Institute fro Security Studies, Western European Union, April 2000). (4) Strobe Talbott, "America's Stake in a Strong Europe," remarks at a conference on the future of NATO, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, October 7, 1999. (5) Kim R. Holmes, "The United States and Europein the 21 st Century:Partners or Competitors?" Heritage Lectures (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, March 20, 2000), p.7. (6) Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence,": 14. 6. The Polish Perspective: Germany and ESDP as seen from Poland by Olaf Osica For almost 40 years, German diplomacy has been exercising an unusual style of "acrobatics". It has been torn between the United States and NATO to guarantee its security, and France that always tended to instrumentalise Germany to realise its European ambitions. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, Germany is surrounded by friends and for the first time it has yet to decide on its security policy. This led to a number of questions. Would Germany be interested in following the old line of "sowohl als auch" in Transatlantic relations or will she gradually put more emphasis on Europe? Has Germany got the resources and the necessary political will to do both, continuing its commitment to NATO as well as actively supporting the creation of a European security policy? From the Polish point of view these questions deserve special attention. First of all, Germany is seen as the main Polish partner in security policy in Europe after the United States. Secondly, the future of transatlantic relations and thus the feeling of security among Polish citizens depends on the German commitment to NATO. Due to the geographic position of Poland and her relations with its Eastern neighbours, every single tension between Europe and America will affect policy in this region. Therefore, if there is a country that is really interested in a balanced NATO, it is certainly Poland. Under these circumstances the present development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy has been observed in Warsaw with great interest, if not as attentively as in Germany or France. The lack of a serious discussion on ESDP among scientists and experts (which is a general problem of all debates concerning the future shape of the EU) may be explained by weak institutional links between universities, shortage of money and the gap between generations in the field of political science. A confirmation of this negative trend is the poor state of publications on foreign and security policy. The only journal, International Affairs, is a quarterly and by definition cannot provide for a timely debate on trends in European politics. For policymakers instead, ESDP is not the main problem in the Polish foreign and security policy now. However strange it may sound, there is no rivalry in Poland between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence or between the government and the opposition on this subject. During parliamentary sessions it comes up only in relation to the process of integration with the EU. The reason is that at the present state of affairs there is simply nothing really important that the EU could offer Poland in this field or that Poland could contribute to the European capabilities. It is more about political dialog, which is a litmus paper for future cooperation between the EU and NATO. In this sense Poland, as the other non-EU NATO members - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Turkey and Iceland - is thoroughly observing the process of the creation of new military and political bodies. All of the so-called "6" non-EU NATO member states demand the right to be consulted in establishing ESDP. However it is Poland's position on the issue that is singled out for attention. Poland's perspectives seem to cause so much anxiety and concern that it prompted Minister Fischer and President Chirac to instruct Minister Geremek on how to be a "good European" (Gazeta Wyborcza, 27.04.00). Further, if one believes an article by the International Herald Tribune (05.06.00), Poland is torn between NATO and the European Union or more precisely between her American ally and her future partners in the EU, especially France. It is suggested that the choice is final and binding: either Poland supports the creation of ESDP or the climate of accession negotiations with the EU will get dramatically colder. At the same time, efforts undertaken by Polish diplomacy aimed at the partial inclusion of the "6" in the ESDP are seen as 'a neigh' of the "Trojan horse" (in the service of the Americans) impatiently trying to get through the gates of the EU and to paralyse its institutions. Polish officials argue that these accusations reflect prejudices rather than being based on facts. Poland indeed perceives itself as a partner of the United States in Central Europe, but this does not mean that every European initiative is being rejected by Poland or treated with disregard. They contend that it is a problem of the EU institutions that do not permit countries from the outside to participate in the framework of CFSP respectively ESDP. Similar statements can be heard from Polish Members of Parliament. Also the Polish media, especially newspapers, share this view, arguing that the idea of an "autonomous" European security and defence policy may succeed only within NATO and under the condition that all nineteen members are engaged in the process. Generally, if one looks at the attitude of the Polish public opinion and policy-makers towards ESDP, the following aspects seem to be worth mentioning:
But do these contradictory elements in Germany's policy towards ESDP really exist? Poland and Germany agree that it is necessary to include the six non-EU NATO members in the process of shaping ESDP procedures and mechanisms, and into future EU-led military operations. Otherwise the non-EU european NATO members will not be allowed - for constitutional reasons - to contribute their forces. Secondly, if the EU ever engaged in an operation that would use any of the Alliance's assets, Poland and other members of NATO could have recourse to their veto. Last but not least, the difference between EU and NATO operations may soon disappear. In case of an escalating conflict near the territory of the Alliance, NATO members would have to defend themselves according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Also, military experts and officials in Poland and Germany are afraid that the duplication of already existing structures could negatively affect NATO defence planing. Nevertheless, when it comes to meetings within the framework of the Weimar Triangle or between the EU and the six european member states of NATO that are not members of the EU, German representatives do not seem to share the concerns of their Polish counterparts. As one Polish diplomat said: "The Germans don't contradict our proposals, but they also do nothing to present their opinions. They are very passive." This might be a consequence of differences between the German Foreign Ministry and the Chancellery on one hand and the Ministry of Defence on the other. While the former tend to use ESDP as a tool for strengthening their cooperation with France in the European Union, the latter focuses on military aspects. From the Polish point of view this situation has to be treated with a great deal of anxiety. Without much exaggeration one can argue that it demonstrates the difficulties of the German-Polish "community of interests", which has been proclaimed ten years ago by the former Polish minister of foreign affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. In other words, every time when Germany has to make a choice between its eastern and western neighbours, it would choose France in order not to jeopardise European integration. The only question is whether this choice results from the simple fact that Poland is outside the EU or from the conviction that Poland is not interesting as a future partner in the EU. If the latter is the case, this will complicate Polish-German relations within the EU and force Polish diplomacy to look for other partners. Neither Poland nor Germany would benefit from this kind of development. 7. The Czech Perspective: Germany and ESDP by Vladimir Handl Germany has not been at the centre of the Czech debate regarding the ESDP, which itself has not attracted wide attention as yet. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find reference to German ESDP policy. Czech attitudes have to be judged, therefore, from the debate regarding Germany and from the still embryonic debate on the ESDP itself. This lack of focus on Germany in European defence matters is to be perceived as both good and bad news. Good, because any explicit focus on Germany in the Czech debate still tends to derive its arguments from the devastating experience of the first half of this century. This tendency towards "historisation" has only gradually abated under the influence of the political normalisation in bilateral relations with Germany, growing popular contacts and advancing historical research. The negative side is that where historical issues are not at the centre of the debate, the primary focus has been directed towards multilateral institutions and processes -European integration and security - with Germany only in second place. This attitude demonstrates a much more complex and mostly correct approach to both Germany and Europe. At the same time, the lack of focus solely on Germany and the tendency to deal often with technical aspects of integration and security issues means that the debate only partly influences the Czech perceptions with regard to Germany as such. A good example offers the way as to how the German EU Presidency, and its performance during the Kosovo war, were perceived in 1999. The debate and media coverage were highly differentiated including both critical voices as well as positive appreciation of German diplomacy. It has been acknowledged that the Kosovo crisis raised Germany to the level of 'the other Great Powers'. In any case, however, the coverage in fact disproved traditional apprehensions about the rebirth of an aggressive 'imperial Germany': Bonn/Berlin evidently did not steer either the EU or NATO - as should have been expected from a 'dominant' or 'hegemonic power'. Moreover, if popular criticism has blamed Germany for the disruption of Yugoslavia since the early 90s, the blame regarding the Kosovo conflict was perceived to lie with the USA, the United Kingdom and NATO. Germany played more of a secondary role and even the radical communist left largely chose not to raise the German issue. The Czech minority government of Social Democrats supported Joschka Fischer's search for a political solution of the crisis and perceived its own initiative (the controversial proposal brought in together with Greece) as its own contribution to the effort. The Czech media even speculated that the Czech Social Democratic party minority government followed a policy line set by the German government. With some generalisation, we can define several approaches to Germany, which arrive at different assumptions regarding Germany's 'Europapolitik'. The dividing lines are blurred and often run across the individual political parties:
Also the military efforts as defined in the Headline Goals concerning military capability have been perceived mostly as both understandable and realistic. Again, Germany's role is neither discussed nor emphasised in this context. In fact, the German situation is perceived as being rather precarious. It has been pointed out that its defence expenditure has contracted to some 1,3% of GDP. The low German military effort has been viewed as sharply contradicting the rhetoric of German politicians. This view of Germany's contribution may have important implications in the longer term. After all, insiders share the British attitude and stress that it is primarily capabilities rather than institutions which matter in the development of the European defence policy. Czech politicians have defined two preconditions for Czech support of and participation in the EDSP: firstly, it must not impede the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, the major focus in the Czech debate on ESDP is not so much German policy but rather the balance between European and American interests; secondly, the role and place of the non-EU member states of NATO in Europe. Czech policy has demanded full access to the decision-shaping process, notably to planning conferences of the EU which are to specify the military capabilities of the EU as well as preparing individual actions. In both issues, Berlin has been an important but not the exclusive address for consultations and support. The much discussed German 'advocate role' has been less explicit and Czech diplomacy has actively used other links for consultation and the presentation of its interests, notably its direct links with London. It is of relevance to relations with Germany that the question of the maintenance of Atlantic ties split the Czech political scene right in its centre. The outspoken Atlanticists (most actively Jiri Payne, ODS, Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament; similarly also Petr Necas, ODS, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Chamber and Michael Zantovsky, ODA, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate) shared most of the critical American views regarding ESDP. They warned against growing American isolationism. With the National Missile Defence debate stirring the deep waters of strategic security thinking, some radical Atlanticists criticised the EU for being afraid of the USA (in terms of a technological arms race) more than of Russia (in terms of security threats). Jiri Payne even formally proposed to build an American early warning station within the Czech Republic. The 'Euro-optimists', most explicitly the CSSD government and the KDU-CSL, endorsed ESDP and present it in fact as an enhancement of NATO. Among the centre left the underlying motivation may very well be the urge to post a certain distance between European and American security policymaking after Kosovo. The closeness of positions between the Czech centre-left and the red-green German government is clearly visible. Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kavan joined Germany and France in their criticism of the American NMD project on the grounds that it would breach the ABM Treaty. The KDU-CSL and the other small parties of the centre tend to seek rather closeness with the position of the German CDU. The centre-left oriented media have noted that Chancellor Schröder has not rejected out-right the concept of a joint system of non-strategic missile defence as brought in by Russia and has suggested that it should be considered within the Permanent Joint Council. Joschka Fischer's warning against a new round of arms race, which could re-start should the American missile defence programme be realised, found a resonance in the Czech press. A multifaceted, historically and theoretically informed Czech debate on Germany and Europe has only been developing slowly. The question is, whether the rather inconclusive Czech debates on Germany and on the EU/ESDP will arrive at a complex and coherent policy towards Germany and the EU. Without a multifaceted broad mainstream position towards both Germany and the EU, Czech policy is deemed to fluctuate following changes in the domestic political constellation and external impulses.
Writings on German Foreign Policy Culture II: Duffield, John S., World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification , Stanford: Stanford UP 1998 by Sebastian Harnisch This study by John S. Duffield constitutes an innovative and refreshing analysis of Germany's Post-Cold War Security Policy. He introduces the concept of "political culture" to the study of Germany's security policy in the 1990s. The concept clarifies the reasons for Germany's strong continuity in its security policy trajectory inspite of the dramatic changes in international and domestic conditions. Duffield argues that Germany's political elite and society at large hold a set of norms, values and beliefs that induces scepticism as to the efficacy and use of military force, an inherent preference for multilateral action as well as a desire to be regarded as a reliable partner. He surmises that external influences emanating from institutional constraints were bolstered by this distinct foreign and security policy culture (5).(1) In the four empirical chapters of the book, the author posits that this discernible political culture guided Germany's policy towards European security institutions, its efforts to transform the Bundeswehr, and its responses to out-of-area missions and major international crises throughout the 1990s. Duffield's argument is straightforward and appears to try to circumvent some of the key flaws of culturalist explanations of foreign policy behaviour: the avoidance of tautological argumentation, a clear and operationalized methodology to track political culture, an empirically rich causal pathway as to how social factors delineate the scope of the security policy realm, as to how political culture affects the interpretation of the environment and thus shapes the definition of national preferences, i.e. national interests (26f.). In sum, the empirical conclusions drawn from this analysis are sound. There has been no "renationalization" of Germany's security policy - as some observers have argued with reference to the development of a national command and planning unit - nor has there been a "remilitarisation" of Germany's security policy. Duffield rightly states that Germany's increased engagement in multilateral out-of-area mission should be interpreted as an effort to quell local conflicts and not as indicators of a new German assertiveness (230). While Duffield deserves much credit for his pioneering study he falls short of a convincing theoretical deduction of continuity and change in Germany's security policy. To begin with, problems with accounting for continuity and change pervade much of the scholarship on Germany's foreign and security policy, Duffield is certainly not alone in this. But his conflation of an institutionalist argument with a culturalist approach is especially prone to criticism on logical consistency: if political culture is indeed a "social filter" for anything emanating from the environment Germany exists in, then this filter certainly should apply to "structural influences", i.e. effects from international security institutions. Without the German inclination "to believe in institutions", these institutions might have a totally different meaning. Duffield certainly acknowledges this point on several occasions (e.g. 223-225; 247), but he does not draw any theoretical conclusions from it. The theoretical puzzle here is that European security institutions changed considerably in the 1990s, due to, among other factors, Germany's effort to keep them in sync with new security challenges, whilst Germany's overall security policy culture remained stable. By avoiding choosing between the two possible causal pathways (actor shapes => institution or institution shapes => actor) Duffield fails to outline a clear picture of the complex "social interaction" between the change in Europe's security structure and Germany's security policy culture. [To give just one example, Germany's push for NATO enlargement definitely shaped that institution more (at least in the early period 1993-94) than that institution shaped Germany's behaviour or political culture.] Secondly, in the context of explanatory power, one cannot help but find a "relaxed attitude" towards causal inference. Most scholars would agree that no single factor is sufficient to explain all aspects of Germany's security policy" (245), but Duffield's set of criteria for analysing political culture is so broad that a widely diverging spectrum of political actions can be "explained" by referring to culture. Lacking a clear hierarchy of norms and values constituting Germany's security culture, policy-makers are free to pick and choose one or the other ideational prescription, i.e. anti-militarism or multilateralism (240). There is nothing wrong with this description of trade-offs between core values and diverging prioritizations among German policy-makers and the public at large, but the reader is left alone to figure out how and when the hierarchy of values constituting Germany's policy culture change. In this respect Duffield's scenarios (widespread instability in CME and FSU; breakdown of international economic cooperation, revival of Russian military threat) are plausible scenarios for any European country to drastically change its security policy. A "German scenario" for change in policy culture would first have to tackle threats to core values of multilateralism. If European security institutions, i.e. Germany's European and transatlantic partners, fail to address central security concerns through integration, Germany might "renationalize" its security policy out of frustration. Again, it is important to conceptualise a two-way causal pathway between political culture and institutions. In sum, while Duffield fails to develop a consistent model of national political culture interacting with international institutions, he succeeds in challenging traditional approaches by presenting a sound empirical analysis of Germany's security policy in the 1990s. (1) A comprised version of Duffields argument can be found in: John S. Duffield, Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism, in: International Organization 53 (1999) 4, S. 765-803.
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