German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, No. 1, March 2000
Contents
Editorial by Hanns W. Maull
I. Germany's Participation in the Military Intervention in Kosovo as Viewed from Different National Perspectives
1. The German Perspective by Wolfgang Brauner
2. The French Perspective by Hans Stark
3. The British Perspective by John Roper
4. The American Perspective by Thomas Banchoff
II. Op-ed
Germany's National IMF Policy: Lessons to be Learned
by Sebastian Harnisch
III. Book Reviews
1. Thomas U. Berger 1998: Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan, Baltimore and London
by Hanns W. Maull
2. Writings on German Foreign Policy Culture I:
Markovits, Andrei; Reich, Simon 1997: The German Predicament. Memory and Power in the New Europe, Ithaca, NY
by Sebastian Harnisch
IV. Online Ressources
V. Recent Publications
About the Authors
by Hanns W. Maull
German foreign policy is undergoing complex and subtle processes of change. Perhaps against the thrust of what we might expect if we followed recent theory-inspired analyses of Germany´s post-unification foreign policy trajectory¸ these changes appear not primarily driven by domestic changes, nor by changes in the international distribution of power or the role of institutions.
To be sure, domestic changes since unification, the arrival of the "successor generation" at the apex of political power and the change of government in Bonn/Berlin, have all had some impact on Germany´s foreign policy. This has expressed itself in differences in style, a more robust and overt articulation of German interests and some adjustment in strategies and tactics. Yet, by and large, the domestic impetus behind foreign policy since 1990 and into this new decade has been towards "continuity". We would argue that Germany's deeply internalised, embedded post-war role concept of itself as a "civilian power", and the norms and guidelines which have flowed from it, have been important in this context, as have been the influence of the bureaucratic foreign policy machinery and its key players (who have been important "agents" for this role concept) and the simple fact that the old, highly successful foreign policy approach of the Federal Republic developed since the 1950s, with its emphasis on European integration, on the transatlantic security community and on pan-European accommodation and security co-operation, has proven its sturdiness and continued superiority over any conceivable alternatives in the world of "Germany unified and the world transformed", to paraphrase the title of a well-known study on unification.
Nor have shifts in the international distribution of power or the weight of institutions contributed decisively to the evolution of German foreign policy since 1990. Again, this is not to deny the relevance of those variables, but to underline their explanatory limitations. Thus, the implosion of Soviet power continues, and continues to reverberate throughout Europe and the international system. Yet it is far from clear that this implosion has enhanced the ability of others - the United States, Europe, Germany - to shape developments decisively. And if we wish to identify other important changes in the international distribution of power, we would first have to state that those are extremely difficult to identify, weigh and assess in their importance analytically (what really constitutes power today? How can it be measured? How can it be compared, along different dimensions of power and between countries, non-state actors and corporations?), and would then be forced to recognised that important shifts - perhaps even THE most important - have not been between states, but from states to business and other non-state actors.
Our own analysis therefore points to other sources of changes in the evolution of German foreign policy as crucial. They concern the evolution of international society as a whole, in particular the changing relationship between technological, commercial and societal forces on the one hand and the responses of politics (at the national and the supra-national level), on the other. This changing relationship is encapsulated (though not particularly well described, let alone explained) by the two catchwords of "globalisation" and "governance". Our central proposition therefore is that German foreign policy has evolved, and will continue to evolve, in response to the challenges of "globalisation", and that its evolution can best be analysed in terms of "governance" - the national, regional and multilateral policy arrangements which Berlin has chosen or at least favoured.
This newsletter will try to document and analyse the evolution of German foreign policy. We continue to believe in the relevance of the state as key actor in international relations, and in this context in the importance of Germany´s role concept of itself in the world, and of the expectations of others in German foreign policy. In this context, we have been fortunate (and extremely grateful) to have been able to enlist the support of several well-known foreign analysts in helping us to assess external reactions to German foreign policy issues and expectations on Berlin. We will continue to call on them, and on others, to help us understand those reactions and expectations, and we hope that this will soon turn into a lively debate.
As should have been made clear already, our assumption of the continued centrality of the state does not blind us to the weight of domestic and external technological, economic and societal influences working on this foreign policy. The second important function of this newsletter therefore will be to provide general, fairly broad-ranging documentation, resources and also additional analysis, on the evolving German foreign policies. We hope that you, our readers, will find this newsletter helpful, and that you will be enticed to "join the fray" - by your response, by your contributions, and, of course, also by your constructive criticism.
| I. Germany's Participation in the Military Intervention in Kosovo as Viewed from Different National Perspectives |
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1. The German Perspective
by Wolfgang Brauner
The role Germany played during the resolution of the Kosovo crisis corresponded to the expectations of its "elites" (by a large majority) and of the German population in general (by a small majority) as well as to those of other members of the "international community". Internally, the majority of the German population and politicians supported the government's policy. Externally, Germany's main partners expected it to contribute to the definition and implementation of an effective policy within the relevant international institutions. Thus, Germany acted according to its identity as a "civilian" and European power. This identity shaped its perception of the conflict and its preferences for its resolution. It can be said that Germany acted according to the so-called "logic of appropriateness" within a highly institutionalised multilateral context (NATO, UNSC, EU, OSCE, G-7/8, Contact Group). This concept implies that Germany's behaviour in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict was shaped by the norms and rules of international organisations and by the expectations formulated by other members of these institutions.
Germany's role concept implied that Germany (as well as other relevant actors) do the utmost to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but it also included a willingness to participate in the use of force once all other measures had been exhausted. Thus, Germany played an important part in making Rambouillet possible. And it was to a large extent Germany that brought Russia back into the negotiations, that accelerated the peaceful settlement of the conflict and that initiated the long-term stabilisation of the entire region of Southeast Europe. The fact that Germany held two Presidencies in 1999, that of the EU and that of the G-8, helped in this regard.
The German initiative for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, also called "Fischer-Plan", illustrates Germany's policies towards the resolution of the war in Kosovo very well. On April 14 1999, Foreign Minister Fischer proposed this plan, which was based on six interconnected steps. Its main points included the formulation of a Security Council Resolution based on the demands agreed upon by the G-8 and a Chapter VII-Resolution including a date for the withdrawal of Serbian troops and a verification mechanism. This United Nations Security Council Resolution would provide an international peace-keeping force with a "robust" mandate and the KLA would commit itself to end the hostilities. Other aspects of the plan concerned the return of the refugees, the work of the humanitarian organisations, the reconstruction of the Kosovo and the creation of a UN administration.
This initiative combines, in what has been called a "double strategy", diplomatic and military aspects in order to accelerate the negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict. By focusing on the UN Security Council, it also tried to bring Russia back into the negotiating process aimed at resolving the crisis.
The subsequent developments proved that this initiative did indeed provide fresh impetus and a perhaps decisive push to the termination of hostilities. During its Washington Summit (23-24 April 1999), the Alliance took up the German initiative and stressed its five essential demands.
The Kosovo conflict also loomed large in Germany's Presidency of the EU. The meetings on the Petersberg and in Cologne, as well as Ahtisaari's mission in Moscow, marked important episodes in the resolution of the conflict. The conflict was also a major subject at the European Council meetings in Berlin and Cologne. Germany not only initiated and coordinated measures taken by the EU during the Kosovo conflict (sanctions, Stability Pact, humanitarian assistance), but also contributed successfully to the definition of a common policy and represented that policy effectively in international negotiations.
Most importantly, Germany succeeded in contributing substantially to the definition and maintenance of a common policy of the EU, including unanimous support of NATO's Operation Allied Force and extensive sanctions. The EU considered NATO's intervention to be "necessary and justified". The extent of this unity contrasts starkly with the divisions between the member states that largely paralysed the EU during the first three wars in former Yugoslavia.
During its Presidency of the EU, Germany also initiated the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe as a Common Action of the EU which later was to be transformed into a Common Strategy. The Stability Pact aims at the stabilisation and transformation of the entire region by offering the perspective of eventually joining the EU. This perspective is considered to be a major incentive for the countries of the region to reform and cooperate. In this sense, Germany and the other member states of the EU explicitly use the attractiveness of the EU to help stabilise and transform these countries. The strategy is based on the assumption that the region's problems cannot be solved with one big stroke but require instead a long-term engagement by the international community and especially by the EU.
With the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the EU explicitly recognizes this region to be an integral part of Europe and takes responsibility for its stabilisation, reconstruction and transformation. The Stability Pact is based on the premise that only the politics of integration can create a peaceful and stable order in all of Europe. The Stability Pact also recognizes the fact that a task of this magnitude can adequately be addressed only by the EU as a whole, and not by any single member state. Both concepts are central to Germany's view of the EU and of its own role in it.
To sum up, Germany's behaviour in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict once more shows how tightly it is integrated into multilateral institutions. This high degree of integration found expression in both the procedural and the substantive aspects of Germany's behaviour. As far as procedure was concerned, Germany once more expressed a clear preference for multilateral coordination of various institutions, capitalising on their respective strengths. In substance, Germany's foreign policy remained "civilian", trying to exploit every conceivable option for a negotiated settlement before resorting to the use of force.
The fact that Germany took part in a military intervention against Serbia without a mandate by the United Nations Security Council could be interpreted as contradicting this evaluation that Germany acted according to the role concept of a civilian power. Several arguments nevertheless tend to support this assessment. First, Germany's participation in combat does not represent such a radically new development as some appear to think. Though not directly involved in the actual bombing, Germany already participated in NATO's intervention against Serbia in 1995. Moreover, since the early 1990s one can observe a rather continuous development towards Germany's participation in military operations. Secondly, for the German government Operation Allied Force represented an extremely rare exception and in no case set a precedent.
Third, there is a considerable number of experts of international law who argue that NATO's intervention can be legitimised in spite of the fact that the Security Council did not provide a mandate for it. In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly in fall of 1999, Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer implicitly referred to this controversy when he pleaded for a debate that should lead to a reform of the Security Council and a new balance between the sovereignty of nation states and humanitarian law in favour of the latter.
2. The French Perspective
by Hans Stark
(Please note that this is a bilingual newsletter)
Obwohl die Natoaktion 'Allied Force' im Kosovo nun fast ein Jahr zurückliegt, drängen sich immer noch interessante Aspekte auf, die auch für die nahe Zukunft - sollte es zu einem vierten Balkankrieg kommen - von Belang sein werden. Was die jüngste Kosovokrise und das deutsch-französische Verhältnis betrifft, ist vor allem die Tatsache bemerkenswert, dass es im Gegensatz zur Affäre im Dezember 1991 (Anerkennung von Slowenien und Kroatien durch die Bundesrepublik gegen den Willen der französischen Regierung) acht Jahre später keine deutsch-französischen Meinungsunterschiede im Hinblick auf die Ursachen der Krise gab. In der Tat waren sich Frankreich und Deutschland nicht nur in der Grundannahme einig, dass die Hauptverantwortung für die Auseinandersetzung auf dem Amselfeld bei den Serben und nicht bei den Kosovaren lag. Zudem stimmten Berlin und Paris auch darin überein, den Kosovo-Albanern die Unabhängigkeit nicht zu gewähren, da dies aus der Sicht beider Länder zu einer weiteren Verschlechterung der Lage auf dem Balkan und zu unvorhersehbaren Konsequenzen in der ganzen Region hätte führen können. Diese Übereinstimmung reflektierte sich im übrigen auch in der Medienberichterstattung und in den Hintergrundanalysen der jeweiligen Politikexperten beider Länder, die sich kaum voneinander unterschieden.
Diesem globalen Grundkonsens war es sicherlich auch zu verdanken, dass der Kampfeinsatz der Bundeswehr auf dem Kosovo von der französischen Regierung, der bürgerlich-konservativen Opposition, den Medien und einer breiten Bevölkerungsmehrheit positiv aufgenommen worden ist. Für Frankreich war die Beteiligung deutscher Soldaten an der Operation 'Allied Force' nicht Ausdruck neuen Macht- und Behauptungswillens der " Berliner Republik ", sondern ganz im Gegenteil der Beweis für aussenpolitische Kontinuität. Dass dieser Schritt unter einer rot-grünen Regierung gemacht wurde, hat nicht nur eventuelle Zweifel an der Bündnistreue Deutschlands ausgeräumt, sondern darüber hinaus Sympathien für die Troïka Schröder, Fischer, Scharping geweckt.
So ist es den Franzosen keineswegs entgangen, wie schwer es der deutschen Regierung gefallen ist, am Militäreinsatz der Bundeswehr festzuhalten. Ebenso wurde auch dem außenpolitischen Spagat der Bundesregierung Respekt gezollt. So ist es Berlin gelungen die Interessen Washingtons, Paris und Moskaus zu berücksichtigen, d. h. neben den transatlantischen Bündnisverpflichtungen auch die europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität zu pflegen (Stichwort deutsch-französisches Treffen in Toulouse und Kölner EU-Gipfel), bzw. über die deutsche G-8 Initiative Russland wieder ins Boot zu holen.
Letztendlich können noch drei weitere Punkte angeführt werden, die die positive Reaktion Frankreichs erklären. Zum ersten haben die innerparteilichen Querelen der SPD und vor allem der Grünen bewiesen, dass den Deutschen die Entscheidung an 'Allied Force' teilzunehmen alles andere als leicht gefallen ist. Ähnliche Zweifel hatten auch viele Menschen in Frankreich - trotz der generellen Zustimmung zu der Militäroperation. Zweitens ist der deutsche Militäreinsatz über ein bestimmtes Niveau nicht hinausgegangen. Nur sechs Tornados haben an den Luftoperationen teilgenommen, und keiner von ihnen war am Beschuss ziviler Ziele beteiligt gewesen. Vor allem aber haben die deutsche Initiative zugunsten eines Stabilitätspaktes und die Übernahme der Verantwortung eines der fünf Militärsektoren im Kosovo durch deutsche Truppen gezeigt, dass der Einsatz der Bundesregierung für das Amselfeld sich nicht auf den Krieg beschränkt hat, sondern Deutschland vielmehr bereit ist, sich auch in Zukunft politisch und finanziell in der Region zu engagieren.
Die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an der Operation 'Allied force' steht somit nicht im Widerspruch zum Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik als " Zivilmacht ", öffnet aber den Weg für eine Europäische Union, die sich - wie Frankreich das seit langem fordert - Machtpolitik nicht länger verschliesst. Gerade unter diesem Aspekt wäre es daher aberwitzig gewesen, wenn Frankreich unberechtigte Kritik an dem Militäreinsatz der Bundeswehr geäußert hätte.
3. The British Perspective
by John Roper
There was surprise and admiration in Britain that the relatively new Social Democrat/Green
German administration were able to play so constructive a part in Operation Allied Force in the
first half of 1999. The picture of the German Foreign Minster defending the use of NATO
military force against Milosevic while being assaulted by paint at the conference of the
Green Party is likely to stay as an icon of the New Germany.
The new German government certainly established its credentials in Washington as a reliable ally
and in Europe as an effective President of the European Union who attempted to use the diplomatic
mechanisms of the Union in parallel with the military efforts of NATO. Behind that there were
some concern that German inhibitions about the use of military force had only been partially
lifted. There was a willingness to provide a limited number of aircraft to take part in the air
operation, primarily in a counter electronic warfare role, and a readiness to take part in KFOR
once the conflict was over, but the German refusal to the use of ground forces in the offensive
operations against Milosevic, while by no means unique, was a serious obstacle to such measures
being carried out by more extrovert allies.
If the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin negotiations in Belgrade in the first days of June 1999 had not
succeeded in persuading Milosevic to accept the Western terms, the issue of ground force action
would have returned to the agenda and the German reluctance, and probable refusal, to participate
would have created more of a strain on relations between London and Bonn.
Germany had used its Presidency of the EU and of the G7/8, linked with its membership of the
Contact Group, to achieve Russian involvement in the negotiations with Belgrade, certainly an
essential precondition for their success. From London it was not clear how far this involvement
of the Russians was a result of American or German efforts, and perhaps the latter did not get
the credit they deserved.
The bombing campaign coincided with the final months of General Klaus Naumann's period as
Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. While not getting as much publicity as some others, his
professionalism was remarked in what was inevitably a very difficult time for effective political
-military operations. It has now become clear that decision making in NATO sometimes operated
on the basis of restricted groups of countries, and while Germany seems to have played a full part
in some of these, there seems to have been some decisions on targeting in which the three
countries providing the most weapons operated on their own. This was not discussed publicly at
the time, but demonstrates some of the dilemmas of European and Alliance decision making in time
sensitive crisis situations.
Once KFOR was deployed after the Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo the German contribution
was seen as one of the more effective and General Reinhardt's appointment as its second
Commander towards the end of 1999 was treated in Britain as being perfectly normal
even by the eurosceptic end of the British press. While he did not get as much press attention
in Britain as his British predecessor, what he did get was favourable. The decision by NATO
in early 2000 to use the headquarters structure of the Eurocorps as the basis for the third command
period of KFOR was again accepted without any adverse comment in London.
Although there were differences between Bonn and London over the use of ground forces in the
Kosovo conflict and probably some private German irritation at the lack of consultation over
targeting strategy the Kosovo operation was publicly praised in both London and Bonn as an
example of Alliance and European solidarity. Where there may be some criticism of Germany
was in their European Presidency initiative of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the
appointment of its Special Co-ordinator.
There was general agreement of the need for a holistic approach to the problems of South Eastern
Europe and a need to bring together the activities of the various parts of the "international
community" which had too often demonstrated deplorable signs of "institutional chauvinism".
Some commentators in Britain have suggested that part of the motivation for the Stability Pact
for the Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer was to demonstrate to his own party as well as the SPD
that Germany could take the initiative in peace-building. This was seen as helping to make the
SPD/Green government's support for the bombing more palatable. While such a political strategy
is well understood in any democracy, the concern is whether the commitment to provide
substance to the rhetoric of the Stability Pact, and in particular the necessary financial resources,
exists in Germany or elsewhere in Europe. It is almost inevitable that when governments fail to
support an international initiative the person appointed to lead it rightly or wrongly becomes the
target of criticism. If the Stability Pact does not show greater signs of success in the next few
months criticism of its Special Co-ordinator and to some extent on Germany for having launched
it will inevitably grow.
Alongside the conflict in Kosovo the other important development of European foreign and security
policy in 1999 was the new focus on European defence cooperation. In London this is seen as
having originated from Tony Blair's conversion from the restrictive position he had adopted at
the 1997 Amsterdam IGC following the experience of the British Presidency of the European Union
in the first half of 1998, and the Franco-British initiative at St Malo in December 1998.
However the important contribution made by Germany in its dual presidencies of Western European
Union and European Union and the preparation of the Communiqués of the WEU ministerial meeting
in Bremen in May 1999 and the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 were critical for the success
of the initiative. Germany is also felt to have contributed through its good relations with Paris
and Washington to ensuring that European proposals agreed at Cologne were so congruent with
the views that had been agreed in the NATO jubilee summit in Washington, although here there was
almost certainly very close cooperation between London and Bonn.
Germany is however criticised in London in terms of the substantial implementation of more
effective European defence cooperation. It is felt that the Bundeswehr which clearly represents
one of the major concentrations of military capability in Europe is still oriented too much to
territorial defence and has not faced up the restructuring necessary to face post Cold War
challenges. There is in Britain a lack of comprehension of the historical, political and social
arguments in favour of the maintenance of conscription and possibly an overoptimistic assumption
that the Commission on the Future of the Bundeswehr chaired by President von Weizsäcker will be
able to move Germany towards a professional army. Misgivings about the current relevance of the
Bundeswehr are linked in the eyes of some to the apparent vulnerability of the German defence
budget to the raids of the Finance Ministry.
Overall the Red/Green government is considered in London to have proved a reliable partner in the
Kosovo conflict and in the development of the new institutions of European security but there are
concern as to whether in terms of European defence capabilities there is yet a clear
understanding in Berlin of the new requirements.
4. The American Perspective
by Thomas Banchoff
Did Germany's participation in the Kosovo war mark a break with its postwar aversion to military instruments of foreign policy? Or did it represent an extension of its postwar emphasis on solidarity with the western powers? Not surprisingly, American observers have emphasized the latter perspective. Like its predecessors, the Clinton administration framed the issue of German participation in terms of the imperative of alliance unity. And the media, by and large, construed the Bundeswehr's involvement in the Kosovo campaign as a repudiation of militarism and expansionism * that of Milosevic * and not as a throwback to a terrible German past.
There was some concern in the US about the new German government's direction. The media portrayed Gerhard Schroeder's election as the coming of a new generation; much was made of his activist past, which included a trip to Cuba. And some commentators equated the Greens of the late 1990s with the peace movement of the early 1990s. But policy analysts and academic observers, aware of Schroeder's emphasis on foreign policy continuity during the campaign, and of Joshka Fischer's pragmatism, correctly predicted a continued Atlantic orientation. German participation in the bombing campaign and subsequent operation on the ground was viewed more with satisfaction than with surprise. Within less than a decade, so the prevailing view, Germans had adjusted their security policy instruments to a new post-cold war constellation.
Interestingly, certain trans-Atlantic tensions, reminiscent of the late 1980s, persisted. Schroeder's April 1999 idea of a ceasefire to allow for a Serbian withdrawal, never formally proposed, rankled some Washington officials. So too did his public opposition to the use of ground troops in June, when the US administration was trying to win the allies for such an eventuality. Exactly a decade earlier, Genscher's eager embrace of Gorbachev and opposition to SNF modernization had provoked similar irritations. As it had during the earlier period, US policymakers' awareness of the constraints of German domestic politics helped to keep irritations from breaking out into open division. So too, of course, did Milosevic's unexpected capitulation.
Germany's National IMF Policy: Lessons to be Learned
by Sebastian Harnisch
It is perfectly all right to bash the Americans for some of the things they do in world politics these days. It is simply wrong to abrogate the American committment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Equally, it is disturbing that the US is under way to build a national missile defense system, thereby undermining the bedrock of cold war nuclear order: assured mutual destruction. Yet, it is equally important to pick a fight with the US for the right reasons.
In the transatlantic debate about the new IMF-Director, most German commentators have argued, wrongly, that the US has undercut the German candidate, Caio Koch-Weser, because it wants to reform the IMF along American designs and dominate the Europeans. Disturbingly enough, quite a few commentators and politicians pleaded for a "show of force" and an end to the "era of transatlantic domination". The underlying analysis is not only wrong, its implications are dangerous too. Therefore, it demands correction.
Firstly, there has been no evidence that the Clinton administration did not support a European as head of the IMF. To the contrary, President Clinton publicly stated that he did not support the Acting Director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, who would appear to be the best suited American to implement an American "grand design" for the IMF.
Secondly, there simply has not been a European design for the IMF, which a German candidate, be it Mr. Koch-Weser or anybody else, could or should try to impose on the Americans. If there has been an American grand design for the IMF, there was no European and /or German design to challenge it. Let's be honest: if you want to pick a fight with an arrogant world power, you had better prepare properly for it.
Thirdly, the German Chancellory (and Finance Ministry) has badly mishandled the preparation of the Koch-Weser and Köhler nomination. It has neither brought forward a "European concept" for IMF-Reform associated with a German candidate, thereby building argumentative momentum for a German candidate. Nor has the Chancellor or his Foreign Policy Advisor, Mr. Steiner, made sure, that, inspite of the lack of convincing arguments for a German candidate, the European partners would nevertheless "wholeheartedly" support the German candidate. To the contrary, if the public record available today is correct European partners were caught off guard by heavy German diplomatic pressure. There are already signs that European partners will make the Chancellor pay dearly for their support of his candidate.
Fourthly, Germany has done harm to the European cause and the IMF by prematurely creating transatlantic fault lines where there should be room for discussion in the ongoing IMF reform debate. The German Chancellory and Finance ministry simply did not see or did not want to see that the Clinton administration's need to present a very strong agent of change at the IMF after several years of an ever-intensifying battle with its critics in Congress. Thus, recent German newspaper reports suggesting that the US Embassy in Berlin had already signaled consent to Koch-Weser only to be corrected by the White House at the very last moment, is not a very convincing explanation for the quarrel with Washington ("Berlin verbreitet Zuversicht über die Chancen Köhlers auf den IWF-Vorsitz", in: FAZ, 11.03. 2000). If this ad-hoc American change of mind indeed took place, the German narrative of a deliberate campaign by the US Treasury Department against a German/European candidate looks even less compelling. Hence, the "them versus us" narrative by some German policy makers is hardly convincing at best and a deliberate cover-up of diplomatic hamhandedness at worst.
Fifthly, in this episode the German Chancellory (and sadly most commentators) has wrapped, as it increasingly does, its narrow interpretation of Germany's national interest in European clothing. By being a "normal European nation state" in this respect but talking otherwise, the chancellory has started to deconstruct Germany's role as a persuasive leader of European integration. If Germany is to build European identity by means of bashing outsiders and pursuing its own narrow interests in the future, it will certainly fail.
Sixthly, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has been conspicuously absent from this "transatlantic fight" as the liberal German weekly "Die Zeit" put it. Yet, he has made no effort to disguise his antipathy against "foreign policy bureaucrats in the chancellory". Following Mr. Köhler's nomination as the "transatlantic candidate for the IMF", the time has now come for the Foreign Ministry to prevent further damage to Germany's interests.
In the coming weeks and months Germany needs to present a persuasive argument for a European IMF reform agenda. While doing so, it should stop speaking of Europe when it means Germany.
Thomas U. Berger 1998: Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan, Baltimore and London
by Hanns W. Maull
Why have Germany and Japan since 1945 resolutely rejected any opportunity to revert to traditional, military Great Power policies, cultivating instead a peculiar military abstentionism? This is the puzzle Thomas Berger tries to answer in this important study. Berger´s explanation is what he calls the "cultures of antimilitarism", which developed in the two countries in response to the historical catastrophies of Nazism/militarism, war and defeat.
To prove his point, Berger systematically surveys the evolution of defence and security policies in the two countries, focusing on their policies towards alliances, on civil-military relations, on defence posture and military organisation, and on what he calls the "politico-military culture" of public opinion, elites, and political parties in the two countries. While his survey does not offer any important new insights to scholars familiar with the security policies of the two countries, Berger shows persuasively that "…the two countries have displayed a pronounced aversion to the use of force and military power in any form and have gone out of their way to reassure their neighbours of their peaceful intentions" (p.193).
Where Berger succeeds less well is in explaining this behaviour. To be sure, any explanation of defence and security policies will have to include prevailing ideas, norms and values of a country as one among several critical causal factor. Berger recognises this in his introduction, and in the concluding chapter. The actual analysis, however, too often falls into the trap of trying to explain everything in the evolution of German and Japanese security policies in those terms. Equally problematically, the political cultures of Germany and Japan throughout are reduced to only one norm, that of "antimilitarism". But this is certainly misleading for Germany, where other norms - such as solidarity with its Western allies or opposition to genocide - from the beginning were equally important as, if not more important than, the rejection of military means to settle political conflicts. Not surprisingly, Berger therefore fails to anticipate the participation of the Bundeswehr in the NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict - an important shift in Germany´s defence posture which had been in the making since the mid- 1990s.
From the point of view of International Relations theory, Berger therefore fails to develop a fully persuasive alternative framework for foreign policy analysis based on the concept of historical political culture. He does succeed, however, in challenging prevailing theoretical explanations for German and Japanese security policy behaviour, and in demonstrating the importance of integrating ideas, norms and values into our conceptual framework for understanding security policies.
Writings on German Foreign Policy Culture I:
Markovits, Andrei; Reich, Simon 1997: The German Predicament. Memory and Power in the New Europe, Ithaca, NY
by Sebastian Harnisch
Andrei Markovits' and Simon Reich's book on Germany Foreign Policy after 1989 is very readable and their conclusions are thought provoking. The main strength of the book is its unambigious message about what really drives Germany's foreign policy. In contrast to other recent works by realists and institutionalist on German foreign policy, the authors address the question how collective memories shape Germany's foreign behaviour. They hold that the "collective memory of Auschwitz" has led to the internalisation of an "ideology of reticence" (p. XII) which calls for trouble as Germany is destined to take a leadership role in the New Europe (p. XIII).Obviously, not everyone will agree as the research community is still struggling to explain Germany's continued "policy of restraint" (Politik der Zurückhaltung) since gaining full sovereignty in 1990.
Empirically, the study covers a wide range of issues. First, it develops its main argument on the role Germany's collective memory plays in its foreign policy by drawing upon Germany's foreign policy discourse since 1989. Secondly, it presents the expectations by neighbouring countries and the US on what role Germany should play in the new Europe. Thirdly, Markovits and Reich conclude their study by analysing recent German foreign policy behaviour in three policy areas: the out-of-area mission of the Bundeswehr, foreign trade and economic policy and cultural policy. It is hard to do justice to the wealth of the material provided, but to begin with, there are very few studies on German foreign cultural policy.
Theoretically, the author take up a constructivist perspective by arguing that immaterial factors, i.e. perceptions of the past, influence Germany's foreign behaviour most. This is the weakest part of the book. In particular, the authors attempt to come to grips with the complexities of historical memory and ideational forces in foreign policy leaves many questions open. First, the authors' inclination to narrow Germany's historical memory to the Holocaust is misleading. As Thomas Banchoff, Peter Katzenstein and others have pointed out, the historical experience of regaining self-respect and sovereignty through European integration is crucial for understanding Germany's post Cold War foreign policy. Secondly, the authors do not really present a coherent concept to explain how historical memories are constituted, how they might change and how they drive foreign policy behaviour. In fact, what Markovits and Reich employ is rather a role theoretical approach, with Chapters I and II describing the ego-part of the role, and chapters three through nine constituting the alter part.
These deficiencies may be negligible, but the authors' argument that the Berlin Republic has to create a "normal historical memory" commensurate with its material power, i.e. economic might, is not. Simply put, you cannot have it both ways: either, all foreign matter is socially constructed, so there is no "need" to bring immaterial factors, i.e. historical memories, into line with material factors, i.e. economic might because one constitutes the other, or, all matters foreign are essential. Then, perceptions and historical memory really do not make that much of a difference, since material factors will determine which interpretations are right or wrong. This is hardly an academic point, when you think of how Germany's perception of itself as well as of its material environment, are shaped by the expectations of others.
In short, if other European partners continue to support European integration mainly as an instrument to circumscribe German power, Germany itself might reconstruct its notion of "Europe" from a desirable end to a veritable means of German foreign policy as Markovits and Reich foresee (205).
Written before Chancellor Schroeder's election campaign for a "refund on German EU contributions" and his recent hamhanded push for a German candidate to head the IMF, "the German predicament" is also politically an important book. It is the first of several recent studies on Germany's post-cold war foreign policy discourse and its impact on Germany's evolving role in Europe.
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| Thomas Banchoff |
Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC |
| Wolfgang Brauner |
Project manager at the University of Trier, Ph.D. candidate at Darmstadt University of Technology |
| Sebastian Harnisch |
Associate Professor at the Chair for International Relations, Trier
University |
| Hanns W. Maull |
Chair for International Relations at Trier University |
| John Roper |
Professorial Fellow at the Institute for German Studies, University of
Birmingham |
| Hans Stark |
Secretary General of the Comité d'étude des relations franco-allemandes
(CERFA), Paris |