by Hanns W. Maull
June 2nd, 2005

It probably started quite some time ago, with the meteoric political rise (and then the assassination) of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. Then came the failure of the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin to beat the candidate of the extreme right, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in the first round of the French Presidential elections in the spring of 2002. More recently, we have had, inter alia, the political shock waves of the murder of Theo von Gogh in Holland, the results in regional and European elections in France and Germany, and now the political earthquake in the state of Northrhine-Westphalia in Germany and the resounding "non"/"nee" in the referenda on the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands.

The Demise of Politics, or: Triumph of Form Over Substance

But what exactly is the pattern here? To me, it it's the growing gap between what people expect from politics (and they clearly, and rightly, do not make much difference here between European or national politics), and what they get in several of the core states of Europe, namely France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium (Italians probably never expected much from their government, anyway). This leaves Luxemburg as the one and only "outlier" among the founding members of the European project, as the only of these countries in which people seem reasonably satisfied with their politics. Given the profound disenchantment of the electorates in five of the EU-6, it would be surprising indeed if the malaise had not affected the European polity itself.

Politics is about how people want to live together, now and in the future. It is about a common sense of purpose, a vision of the good live, and about how to get there collectively. In other words, politics is about the appropriate course for a collective, and about how those to whom the political power has been entrusted can steer the good ship's course and undertake the journey safely and intelligently, with a minimum of delays and a maximum of side benefits. Conversely, politics is not, in the first place, about the organisation of the crew, the rules and procedures of stewardship, or the regulations about interaction between the passengers and the crew - although those things are important, too. But it is the substance of politics on which the performance of the crew will be judged - and while the referenda where on the Constitutional Treaty, and therefore on the rules and institutions and hence on the form of politics in Europe, it is, somewhat ironically, on the substance of politics in those five countries and the European Union as a whole which has been given the thumbs down by voters in France and the Netherlands.

It follows that concern about the "democratic deficit" of the European Union as a source of the present malaise is mostly rubbish. Abuse of power as a result of excessive concentration of authority simply is not the problem with Brussels, and if the electorates were given more say in the process, this would probably mess up the capacity of "Europe" to deliver what peoples expect from it yet further. Much of the talk about the democratic deficit ignores the - admittedly opaque and complex - realities of decision-making in the EU. If there is anyone to blame, it is member governments, rather than the supranational European institutions: the European Parliament has become significantly more effective in its political performance, and the European Commission has been put in its place by member governments, anyway - with much too much micro-management and excessive attention to preventing a powerful Commission. Seen from this perspective, the "democratic" deficit in the EU is mostly about the political defects of member governments and their efforts to force European politics in the service of their own, often very petty, preoccupations.

What will happen now? Presumably, we will witness desperate efforts by those concerned to rescue "European politics as usual", and to re-stage the triumph of form over substance in European politics. Yet this will no longer fly: the Constitutional Treaty, this Constitutional Treaty, is now beyond rescue. On balance, this probably is a pity - the framework for European politics provided by the Treaty of Nice overall seems less appropriate for managing the European Union than that of the Treaty. But this really is besides the point: even a much better framework than that developed by the Convention (with much "help", nota bene, by the governments!), let alone that of Nice, would in itself not supply the answers to present problems. What is needed is a shift towards substantive political progress in "old" Europe - and the chances are that electorates will keep reminding their governments of this until they start getting it.

What does such a shift to substance imply? And why is it overdue? Europe´s aging electorates are concerned (nay, scared stiff) about the speed of change in their lives (codename: the challenges of globalisation), about the risks this entails, and about the onus of adjustments they expect they will have to make in their own lives. Politics will have to address those concerns meaningfully - that is, by making a credible and sustainable difference. This will have to begin by being honest with voters - electorates are too intelligent to buy easy promises and empty recipes -, and continue with working, single-mindedly and determinedly, on sustainable change and domestic reforms. Politics will also need to point out to the electorates the schizophrenia of their own behaviour: we are all happy to enjoy the benefits from globalisation and European integration, but are reluctant to accept the less comfortable consequences.

The first implication of the melt-down of European politics is that politics in "old Europe" (that is, the five founding members plus the European institutions) will for the next few years be turning around internal affairs. More specifically, the EU will be preoccupied with digesting enlargement and the challenges of globalisation, and European politicians would therefore do well to acknowledge and accept this as a blessing in disguise.

Second, specific solutions and approaches will have to be put in the context of a new European "vision". Europe needs to provide a focus for identification and moral commitment, yet the old vision of "peace and prosperity" no longer works. A new one is needed urgently. When Jacques Delors prepared to assume the Presidency of the Commission in 1985, he consulted at length about possible priorities. He then came up with a shortlist of three huge projects, in that order: the realisation of the single European market, a common European currency, and a common European foreign and security policy. His projects managed to galvanise European politics, and by the time he stepped down ten years later, in 1995, Europe had secured the first two projects, and was working on the third. Now, it is high time for a new vision for Europe.

Third, whatever specific vision emerges, it will probably require courageous steps by governments towards supranationalism in the implementation process. This may sound disingenuous after the results of France and the Netherlands - but if my analysis is correct, the problems leading to the "non"/"nee" were not with the promotion of "more Europe", but with the lack of credibility of the promoters. And it is hard to think of any substantive advance towards meeting what peoples expect and want from politics in Europe which would not involve, as part of the answer, "more Europe" in the form of more supranational authority. Equally, however, it is clear that a shift towards substance will involve very different ways of doing things politically - more setting directions and parameters, less micro-management; more reliance on the interplay of regulation and market mechanisms, fewer subsidies, more devolution of responsibilities, less harmonization, in short: more politics, less governance.

To move into this direction will require political entrepreneurs and leadership - resources which nowadays seem at least as scarce as fiscal surpluses. In this context, a heavy burden will almost inevitably come to fall on Germany. For alone among the three big founders in trouble, Germany may soon find itself with some political margin of manoeuvre. While France will probably be all but paralysed politically by President Chirac´s refusal to step down and the campaign for the presidency (which in fact has started already), and Italian politics also offers little hope that Italy finally might overcome its severe deficiencies, Germany has an opportunity to create the kind of shift which is needed through the elections likely to take place in September and the prospect of a prolonged period of stable identical majorities in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat - if the CDU/CSU and the FDP win. This could be Germany´s, and Europe´s, chance - if the CDU/CSU knows how to seize it. Perhaps with some help from a political revitalisation in the Netherlands, and with assistance by astute little Luxemburg and its shrewd conservative leader, Jean-Claude Juncker, a new government in Germany could try to form a double coalition for change, for putting substance back into European politics: one domestic coalition tackling the woes of Germany, one within the European Union to promote and secure changes at the European level. This would also take Germany back to where it once was: at the centre of the European project.

Hanns W. Maull holds the Chair for Foreign Policy and International Relations at the University of Trier